TRACE: Data-Free Text Reconstruction Attacks against Approximate Unlearning in LLMs

Large Language Models (LLMs) inevitably internalize substantial amounts of sensitive or private information during pre-training, while LLM unlearning aims to selectively erase specific knowledge to prevent privacy leakage with minimal loss of model utility. However, existing methods struggle to balance forget quality with utility, and typically incur substantial computational costs due to parameter fine-tuning. To address this, we propose Nullify, a training-free, non-destructive activation steering method for LLM unlearning. Nullify employs steering vectors during inference to redirect privacy-related activations away from their memorized answers, while satisfying a null-space constraint that leaves retained-query activations essentially unaffected to maintain utility. Evaluations on TOFU and MUSE show that Nullify matches or surpasses established baselines in forget quality while achieving near-lossless preservation of model utility. By avoiding weight updates entirely, Nullify serves as an efficient, plug-and-play inference-time intervention framework.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world systems, they must support post-hoc removal of specific content to meet privacy and governance requirements. This motivates selective unlearning, which suppresses information about a particular entity or topic while preserving the LLM's general utility. However, most existing LLM unlearning methods require access to the original training corpus and rely on output-level refusal tuning or broad gradient updates, creating a tension among unlearning strength, non-target preservation, and data availability. We propose Geometric Unlearning (GU), an approach that operates directly on the model's prompt-conditioned hidden states without access to the original training corpus. Specifically, GU distills a compact, low-rank safe-behavior subspace from a small set of safe reference prompts and uses lightweight anchor-in-context synthetic prompts to trigger localized, projection-based alignment of hidden representations to this safe subspace. A teacher-distillation regularizer on synthetic non-target anchors further reduces collateral drift. Across privacy-oriented unlearning benchmarks (ToFU and UnlearnPII), GU achieves strong target suppression with minimal impact on non-target performance, demonstrating that effective unlearning can be achieved with minimal synthetic data.

Unlearning large language models (LLMs) is important due to copyright and privacy concerns. A key challenge is unintended forgetting, where removing data inadvertently impairs model utility. While prior work has focused on architectural innovations, the influence of data-level factors remains underexplored. We introduce GUARD, a framework for Guided Unlearning And Retention via Data Attribution. GUARD uses a lightweight proxy data attribution metric tailored to LLM unlearning, which efficiently quantifies the "alignment" between the Forget and Retain (or synthetic supplement) Sets. This metric leads to a new unlearning objective that assigns adaptive, nonuniform weights to samples, decaying exponentially with their proxy attribution scores, and thereby provably mitigates unintended retention loss. On the TOFU benchmark with a 10% forget set, applying GUARD to Gradient Ascent (GA) improves Retain Set ROUGE-L from 0.18 to 22.40 (a 124x increase) and Retain Probability from 0.06% to 17.50%, a substantial recovery from the GA collapse. Furthermore, GUARD combined with NPO (Negative Preference Optimization) outperforms Representation Misdirection for Unlearning (RMU) with 33.80% and 53.10% reductions in the Retain Set Sacrifice Rates computed from ROUGE-L and Probability ($ρ_r$ and $ρ_p$), and a 16.01% improvement in knowledge retention on the MUSE NEWS Retain Set. These findings persist when attribution scores are computed using synthetic or highly subsampled (20%) Retain Sets, where NPO+GUARD still reduces $ρ_r$ and $ρ_p$ by up to 43.89% and 48.13% over NPO. Similar improvements are observed on MUSE, with a tolerable absolute privacy leakage degradation of 13.7 compared to the best-performing existing method in the privacy category.