Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to visual jailbreak attacks that bypass safety safeguards. Existing methods typically optimize isolated adversarial examples, limiting attack diversity, transferability, and generalization. We propose Jailbreak Connectivity (JC), a framework based on the observation that effective adversarial inputs can be connected through low-loss regions in image space. JC optimizes continuous adversarial paths: path sampling yields diverse jailbreak images, lightweight surrogate classifiers guide cross-model transfer, and a distribution-level objective enables universal attacks across harmful queries. On MM-SafetyBench, JC achieves average attack success rates of 84.01%, 85.77%, and 97.95% on Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct, InternVL3.5-8B, and Gemma-3-12B-IT, respectively, exceeding the strongest baselines by up to 68.36 percentage points. In black-box evaluations, JC improves attack success rates over FigStep by 24.69 and 27.34 percentage points on GPT-5.6 and Gemini 3.1 Pro, respectively. These findings reveal structured vulnerabilities in MLLM safety alignment and inform more comprehensive security evaluation.
Figures & tables
Fig. 1: The Jailbreak Connectivity (JC) framework. JC addresses three key limitations of existing methods by generating diverse and transferable attacks and enabling universal jailbreak capabilities.
Fig. 2: Comparison of the optimized Bézier curve and linear interpolation on Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct. (a) Jailbreak loss along each path. (b) Binary attack success.
Scenario
Qwen3-VL-8B
InternVL3.5-8B
Gemma-3-12B
PT
AE
QI
JC
PT
AE
QI
JC
PT
AE
QI
JC
Economic Harm
4.37 ± 2.00
17.07 ± 4.42
14.59 ± 3.59
100.00 ± 0.00
4.23 ± 1.76
36.10 ± 4.64
41.49 ± 4.53
100.00 ± 0.00
7.05 ± 2.41
31.45 ± 3.72
42.14 ± 5.07
100.00 ± 0.00
Financial Advice
9.56 ± 2.50
15.91 ± 4.24
26.54 ± 3.78
100.00 ± 0.00
2.04 ± 1.64
37.91 ± 4.31
16.47 ± 3.39
100.00 ± 0.00
7.85 ± 2.93
34.75 ± 4.12
40.34 ± 4.11
97.09 ± 1.65
Fraud
7.59 ± 2.64
15.97 ± 3.81
29.51 ± 5.11
57.54 ± 10.90
8.77 ± 2.87
30.33 ± 3.90
22.59 ± 3.41
62.76 ± 10.60
3.14 ± 2.02
9.63 ± 3.01
16.80 ± 3.54
96.79 ± 0.51
Government Decision
6.39 ± 1.99
20.56 ± 4.72
8.77 ± 2.35
41.19 ± 10.80
6.61 ± 2.79
38.30 ± 4.55
35.71 ± 5.00
94.98 ± 1.96
7.55 ± 3.05
28.46 ± 4.86
32.08 ± 4.23
100.00 ± 0.00
Hate Speech
2.40 ± 1.78
28.94 ± 3.79
30.09 ± 5.48
85.85 ± 8.57
3.98 ± 2.26
27.76 ± 5.27
15.69 ± 3.64
100.00 ± 0.00
4.31 ± 2.26
17.61 ± 4.04
38.05 ± 4.36
100.00 ± 0.00
TABLE I: White-box ASR (%) of different jailbreak methods across 13 safety scenarios on three MLLMs. Results are reported with their corresponding uncertainty estimates. Best results within each model and scenario are highlighted in bold. For brevity, column headers omit the -Instruct and -IT suffixes of the model names.
Scenario
Qwen3-VL-8B
InternVL3.5-8B
Gemma-3-12B
PT
AE
QI
JC
PT
AE
QI
JC
PT
AE
QI
JC
Economic Harm
6.50 ± 0.89
15.31 ± 1.79
24.39 ± 1.08
2.12 ± 0.14
6.43 ± 0.44
27.83 ± 0.85
47.04 ± 0.64
2.75 ± 0.21
7.69 ± 0.73
24.77 ± 0.11
47.59 ± 1.12
3.33 ± 0.37
Financial Advice
8.80 ± 0.32
14.55 ± 1.71
34.46 ± 0.35
3.13 ± 0.34
5.46 ± 1.71
29.02 ± 0.50
25.98 ± 0.61
2.90 ± 0.40
8.05 ± 1.41
26.94 ± 0.39
46.07 ± 0.27
3.95 ± 0.48
Fraud
7.93 ± 0.99
14.59 ± 1.18
36.96 ± 1.54
2.34 ± 0.35
8.45 ± 1.07
24.03 ± 0.32
31.13 ± 0.17
2.93 ± 0.67
5.95 ± 1.71
10.41 ± 1.09
26.25 ± 0.76
4.35 ± 0.58
Government Decision
7.39 ± 0.16
17.61 ± 1.76
19.49 ± 0.23
26.26 ± 4.11
7.49 ± 1.55
29.27 ± 0.71
42.18 ± 1.20
20.67 ± 5.73
7.91 ± 1.70
22.80 ± 1.35
39.12 ± 0.58
16.49 ± 1.90
Hate Speech
5.62 ± 1.74
23.12 ± 0.26
37.44 ± 1.88
2.32 ± 0.52
6.32 ± 1.71
22.34 ± 1.80
25.32 ± 1.00
2.99 ± 0.40
6.47 ± 1.50
15.66 ± 1.27
44.15 ± 0.54
4.20 ± 0.86
TABLE II: PPL of generated responses under different jailbreak methods across 13 safety scenarios. Lower PPL indicates higher likelihood under the evaluation language model. Best results within each model and scenario are highlighted in bold.
Scenario
Qwen3-VL-8B (Source)
InternVL3.5-8B
Gemma-3-12B
FORCE
JC
FORCE
JC
FORCE
JC
Economic Harm
84.24 ± 3.21
87.12 ± 3.27
82.09 ± 3.62
80.60 ± 4.29
81.61 ± 3.75
75.61 ± 3.95
Financial Advice
92.31 ± 2.68
86.82 ± 2.87
81.42 ± 3.29
74.97 ± 4.78
69.65 ± 4.09
83.01 ± 3.43
Fraud
51.35 ± 5.18
49.96 ± 4.99
48.31 ± 5.72
52.86 ± 5.11
71.78 ± 3.82
77.97 ± 3.38
Government Decision
35.99 ± 3.93
36.26 ± 3.91
77.72 ± 4.37
70.33 ± 5.06
79.33 ± 3.79
84.30 ± 3.80
Hate Speech
69.70 ± 4.79
77.48 ± 4.86
69.33 ± 4.30
86.82 ± 3.37
71.43 ± 5.32
85.55 ± 3.52
TABLE III: Transferable jailbreak ASR (%) of FORCE and JC across 13 safety scenarios. Adversarial images are generated using Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct as the source model and evaluated on InternVL3.5-8B and Gemma-3-12B-IT as transfer targets. Best results are highlighted in bold.
Scenario
GPT-5.6
Gemini 3.1 Pro
ASR (%) ↑
PPL ↓
ASR (%) ↑
PPL ↓
FigStep
JC
FigStep
JC
FigStep
JC
FigStep
JC
Economic Harm
12.74 ± 2.93
34.48 ± 4.18
11.06 ± 1.89
9.55 ± 0.89
33.25 ± 4.44
67.46 ± 4.42
16.90 ± 1.02
13.51 ± 1.38
Financial Advice
27.72 ± 4.50
59.83 ± 4.93
12.03 ± 0.24
9.18 ± 0.32
31.95 ± 3.95
65.58 ± 4.02
12.33 ± 0.82
8.69 ± 1.47
Fraud
22.03 ± 4.30
50.21 ± 5.18
10.97 ± 0.90
9.20 ± 0.99
23.34 ± 4.84
53.11 ± 5.72
19.35 ± 0.24
16.63 ± 1.11
Government Decision
18.57 ± 3.18
44.34 ± 4.07
14.15 ± 0.29
10.65 ± 0.16
32.73 ± 4.92
56.72 ± 4.94
9.41 ± 0.53
7.89 ± 1.49
TABLE IV: Black-box jailbreak performance of FigStep and JC against GPT-5.6 and Gemini 3.1 Pro across 13 safety scenarios. Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct serves as the base model for JC. Results are reported as mean ± standard deviation over five independent runs. Higher ASR and lower PPL are preferable.
Configuration
Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct
InternVL3.5-8B
Gemma-3-12B-IT
ASR (%) ↑
PPL ↓
ASR (%) ↑
PPL ↓
ASR (%) ↑
PPL ↓
JC (Full)
74.56 ± 0.88
5.84 ± 0.36
70.01 ± 0.91
3.46 ± 0.49
78.56 ± 0.90
5.77 ± 0.32
w/o Path
28.65 ± 4.49
7.94 ± 1.08
27.68 ± 3.19
4.82 ± 0.90
35.04 ± 2.96
7.84 ± 1.16
w/o JSP
79.34 ± 3.30
7.44 ± 1.11
54.85 ± 4.68
3.83 ± 0.82
54.04 ± 4.58
7.25 ± 1.29
w/o SC
75.85 ± 3.40
8.31 ± 1.64
39.32 ± 2.58
4.08 ± 1.22
55.62 ± 5.23
8.51 ± 1.31
TABLE V: Ablation study of JC under the transferable jailbreak setting, with Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct as the source model and InternVL3.5-8B and Gemma-3-12B-IT as transfer targets. We report ASR (%) and PPL as mean ± standard deviation over five independent runs. Higher ASR and lower PPL are preferable. Best results are highlighted in bold.
Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, which can elicit harmful responses from MLLMs. Many MLLMs support multi-image inputs, inadvertently introducing new vulnerabilities due to less efforts on multi-image safety alignment. Previous MLLM jailbreak methods only uses a single image, which restricts the attack space: they cannot distribute harmful requests across multiple images, carry abundant information, or exploit additional visual reasoning tasks to distract MLLMs. To address these limitations, in this paper, we propose a compositional jailbreak framework, DMN, which leverages Distributed instruction, Multimodal evidence and a Number chain task to fully enhance the jailbreak performance. Extensive experiments show that DMN is highly effective for MLLM jailbreaking, e.g. achieving attack success rates of over 90% on GPT-4o, Gemini-2.5-pro and Claude Sonnet 4, surpassing other baselines by a large margin. This compositional, multi-image jailbreak strategy reveals fundamental weaknesses in their safety mechanisms.
Wenzhuo Xu, Zhipeng Wei, Zonghao Ying +4
AI Security Lab, Beijing, China · International Computer Science Institute, CA, USA · UC Berkeley, CA, USA +1
Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable performance but remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that can induce harmful content and undermine their secure deployment. Previous studies have shown that introducing additional inference steps, which disrupt security attention, can make MLLMs more susceptible to being misled into generating malicious content. However, these methods rely on single-image masking or isolated visual cues, which only modestly extend reasoning paths and thus achieve limited effectiveness, particularly against strongly aligned commercial closed-source models. To address this problem, in this paper, we propose Multi-Image Dispersion and Semantic Reconstruction (MIDAS), a multimodal jailbreak framework that decomposes harmful semantics into risk-bearing subunits, disperses them across multiple visual clues, and leverages cross-image reasoning to gradually reconstruct the malicious intent, thereby bypassing existing safety mechanisms. The proposed MIDAS enforces longer and more structured multi-image chained reasoning, substantially increases the model's reliance on visual cues while delaying the exposure of malicious semantics and significantly reducing the model's security attention, thereby improving the performance of jailbreak against advanced MLLMs. Extensive experiments across different datasets and MLLMs demonstrate that the proposed MIDAS outperforms state-of-the-art jailbreak attacks for MLLMs and achieves an average attack success rate of 81.46% across 4 closed-source MLLMs. Our code is available at this link.
Yilian Liu, Xiaojun Jia, Guoshun Nan +6
Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, China · Nanyang Technological University, Singapore · Guilin University of Electronic Technology, China
The safety of large vision-language models is increasingly stress-tested by multimodal jailbreaks, yet existing attacks remain largely static at the meta level: template-based attacks freeze the image-text layout, while iterative attacks adapt only the image-text content with fixed attack strategies and frozen attacker parameters. We propose Meta-Adaptive Multimodal Jailbreaking (MAMJ), which instead optimizes the attacker itself along two axes: an attack strategy prompt (ASP) governing attack iteration and attacker model weights determining attack effectiveness. Across groups of multimodal attack trajectories, an LLM-based critique first refines the ASP, after which group-aggregated attack success rate (ASR) rewards update those weights. On MM-SafetyBench, MAMJ achieves 81.0%, 78.9%, and 82.3% ASR against GPT-4o, Gemini-3-Pro-Preview, and Seed 2.0, respectively, outperforming the strongest sample-level baseline by up to 24.1 percentage points. The learned attacker, comprising the optimized ASP and attacker weights, also transfers without retraining to unseen victims and remains effective under representative defenses. These results reveal a systemic vulnerability of frontier VLMs to meta-adaptive jailbreaks and motivate defenses against meta-level adversaries. Code is available at https://github.com/Alibaba-VELLDEPTH/MetaJailbreak-VLM.
Benlei Cui, Shen Pang, Yuke Wang +7
1Yuvion Team, Alibaba Group · Laboratory for Statistical Monitoring and Intelligent Governance of Common Prosperity, School of Statistics and Data Science, Zhejiang Gongshang University