Rethinking LLM Jailbreak Evaluation: Continuous Risk Landscapes Beyond Binary Outcomes
Organizations: ShanghaiTech University
Abstract
A binary success indicator is a natural representation for discriminative tasks such as image classification under adversarial perturbations, where each input is mapped to a single prediction. However, generative tasks are fundamentally different: an LLM jailbreak prompt induces a distribution over open-ended trajectories, while a sampled response reveals only one path. Yet LLM jailbreak evaluation typically retains the binary response indicator underlying attack success rate, obscuring the surrounding structure of possible generations. We introduce a continuous, context-conditioned risk landscape over first-token branches, estimated by fixing candidate openings and repeatedly sampling their continuations. This continuous risk-landscape perspective reveals two complementary properties: current decoder exposure and safe rerouting capacity, which have been obscured by binary-indicator-based ASR. The resulting representation also provides a common basis for comparing clean prompts, attacked variants, and attack strength against a known adaptive defense. Across multiple target models and jailbreak attacks, we uncover risky branches beneath apparently safe outputs, identify qualitatively different ways attacks reshape the model's opening distribution, and show that attacks strongest before a defense do not necessarily remain the strongest after the adaptive defense reacts. These findings recast jailbreaks as deformations of the surrounding continuation-risk landscape, establishing a more informative foundation for understanding jailbreak behavior and developing safer language models.
Figures & tables
| Target | Basin Density | AHS | Pre DHS | Post DHS | Abs. DHS Reduction | Rel. DHS Reduction |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gemma 3 | 92.90% | 0.9069 | 0.9765 | 0.8854 | 0.0910 | 9.3% |
| Gemma 4 | 87.90% | 0.8694 | 0.8839 | 0.6468 | 0.2371 | 26.8% |
| Qwen 3.8 | 40.19% | 0.4197 | 0.4386 | 0.0575 | 0.3812 | 86.9% |
| Selection objective | Pre-rerouting | Post-rerouting |
|---|---|---|
| Gemma 3 | ||
| Policy-risk selection | 0.9712 | 0.5654 |
| Defense-aware selection | 0.9133 | 0.8669 |
| Gemma 4 | ||
| Policy-risk selection | 0.8815 | 0.4781 |
| Defense-aware selection | 0.7378 | 0.6378 |
| Attack | Direct top-1 ASR | Direct AHS | Direct DHS | Adaptive DHS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| No attack | ||||
| Clean prompt | 0.0351 | 0.1424 | 0.0354 | 0.0112 |
| Existing attacks | ||||
| Learning style | 0.6326 | 0.7095 | 0.6279 | 0.3961 |
| Past tense | 0.5791 | 0.7349 | 0.5835 | 0.3452 |
| Refusal suppression | 0.3351 | 0.5553 | 0.3448 | 0.1684 |
Appendix figures & tables10 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
| Attack name | Brief description |
|---|---|
| Affirmative Prefix ( Zhu et al., 2024 ) | Requires the response to begin with a fixed affirmative sentence before continuing with the harmful request. |
| AIM Roleplay ( Shen et al., 2024 ) | Casts the assistant as the unfiltered AIM character in a fictional Machiavelli scenario and requests an in-character answer. |
| Base64 ( Chu et al., 2025b ) | Encodes the original request in Base64 and asks the model to decode it internally before responding. |
| JSON Format ( Yoosuf et al., 2025 ) | Frames the model as an API endpoint and requests an answer in a strict two-field JSON object. |
| Learning Style ( Luo et al., 2026 ) | Rewrites the request in a concise learning or academic style using exploratory or hypothetical framing while preserving intent. |
| Low-Resource Language ( Huang et al., 2026 ) | Translates the request into Classical Chinese while preserving its original intent. |
| Target | Pre-existing risk exploitation | Conditional risk activation | Candidate-set replacement | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gemma 3 | 416 | 78 (18.8%) | 159 (38.2%) | 179 (43.0%) |
| Gemma 4 | 209 | 28 (13.4%) | 23 (11.0%) | 158 (75.6%) |
| Qwen 3.8 | 67 | 7 (10.4%) | 38 (56.7%) | 22 (32.8%) |
| Target | Selection objective | 4 probes | 8 probes | 16 probes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gemma 3 | Policy risk | 0.5300 | 0.5519 | 0.5654 |
| Gemma 3 | Defense-aware | 0.8455 | 0.8561 | 0.8669 |
| Gemma 4 | Policy risk | 0.4744 | 0.4798 | 0.4781 |
| Gemma 4 | Defense-aware | 0.6182 | 0.6346 | 0.6378 |
| Qwen 3.8 | Policy risk | 0.0336 | 0.0352 | 0.0372 |
| Qwen 3.8 | Defense-aware | 0.0179 | 0.0329 | 0.0437 |
| Target | Disjoint max. | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gemma 3 | 0.585 | 1,972 | 1.52 | 14.1% |
| Gemma 4 | 0.791 | 1,639 | 0.79 | 13.2% |
| Qwen 3.8 | 0.664 | 1,243 | 1.24 | 30.4% |
| Gemma 3 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Rank | Policy risk | Defense-aware residual |
| 1 | Past tense | Learning style |
| 2 | Learning style | Past tense |
| 3 | AIM roleplay | Base64 |
| 4 | Prefix injection | Prefix injection |
| 5 | Affirmative prefix | AIM roleplay |
| Attack | Direct top-1 ASR | Direct Policy-DHS | Direct Raw-DHS | Direct AHS | Adaptive DHS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No attack | |||||
| Clean prompt | 0.0351 | 0.0354 | 0.0359 | 0.1424 | 0.0112 |
| Existing attacks | |||||
| Learning style | 0.6326 | 0.6279 | 0.6269 | 0.7095 | 0.3961 |
| Past tense | 0.5791 | 0.5835 | 0.5871 | 0.7349 | 0.3452 |
| Refusal suppression | 0.3351 | 0.3448 | 0.3494 | 0.5553 | 0.1684 |
Language Model Safety Evaluation
Language model safety evaluation measures harmful behavior, refusal, robustness, and over-refusal across realistic prompts, users, and deployment settings.
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