cs.AIOct 29, 2026

ChatGPT as a Surveillance Assistant? An Exploratory Case Study of AI-Assisted Surveillance Risks

Authors: Ayana Hussain, Nicholas Vincent

Organizations: Simon Fraser University, B.C., Canada

Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) can generate detailed guidance, functional code, and persuasive text at scale. As one of the most widely used consumer language model products as of 2026, ChatGPT gives broad public access to these capabilities, motivating concerns about its potential use in surveillance-related tasks. We present an exploratory case study of what potentially harmful surveillance assistance looks like in ChatGPT's public web interface. We contribute a taxonomy of seven surveillance risk categories based on prior LLM risk research and reports of deployed surveillance systems, instantiated as 110 prompts, along with a manually reviewed analysis of ChatGPT's responses. Prompts were issued using two approaches: 55 jailbreak prompts drawing on five types of elicitation strategies, and 55 plain-language direct prompts, each run alone, and if unsuccessful, again with a short fixed prefix. We find that ChatGPT provides substantive surveillance guidance for 40 of the 55 jailbreak prompts and for 33 of the 55 direct prompts without any prefix. Compliant responses also rarely included policy mentions or suggestions for privacy-preserving alternatives. We manually review every response and find that even when ChatGPT states a refusal, it may still supply detailed instructions, working code, or architectural guidance alongside brief ethical caveats.

Figures & tables

Appendix figures & tables14 assets

Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.

Appendix

Explore similar work

Jun 24, 2026

AI Snitches Get Glitches: Towards Evading Agentic Surveillance

To better assist users with completing challenging tasks, AI agents mediate communications, access data, and interact with different APIs. Many employers (and even nation-states) already provide their users with this technology. However, widespread adoption of AI agents creates a new risk to abuse access to user data for another goal: surveilling users. These users might not even have the ability or permission to control the actions and data accesses of the surveilling agents. We introduce and formalize the problem of agentic surveillance: the ability of an AI agent to analyze available information, craft a report, and send it out using available tools. To evaluate surveillance capabilities across different models, we create SurveilBench, a dataset of various reporting scenarios focusing on three domains: corporate, education, and police. We find that some models exhibit emergent (i.e., unprompted) tendencies to help surveillance, but they also report the attempts to surveil users to the government. Finally, we repurpose prompt injections for evading surveillance and develop three evasion techniques that hide from, deceive, or induce over-escalation in surveillance agents. We conclude that agentic surveillance can already be easily implemented and, therefore, call for a comprehensive technical, ethical, and legislative framework to protect users.
Mar 12, 2026

Human-Centred LLM Privacy Audits: Findings and Frictions

Large language models (LLMs) learn statistical associations from massive training corpora and user interactions, and deployed systems can surface or infer information about individuals. Yet people lack practical ways to inspect what a model associates with their name. We report interim findings from an ongoing study and introduce LMP2, a browser-based self-audit tool. In two user studies (Ntotal=458N_{total}{=}458), GPT-4o predicts 11 of 50 features for everyday people with ≥\ge60% accuracy, and participants report wanting control over LLM-generated associations despite not considering all outputs privacy violations. To validate our probing method, we evaluate eight LLMs on public figures and non-existent names, observing clear separation between stable name-conditioned associations and model defaults. Our findings also contribute to exposing a broader generative AI evaluation crisis: when outputs are probabilistic, context-dependent, and user-mediated through elicitation, what model--individual associations even include is under-specified and operationalisation relies on crafting probes and metrics that are hard to validate or compare. To move towards reliable, actionable human-centred LLM privacy audits, we identify nine frictions that emerged in our study and offer recommendations for future work and the design of human-centred LLM privacy audits.
Jun 16, 2026

Security and Privacy Prompts in the Wild: What Users Ask LLMs and How LLMs Respond

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used to answer users' information needs: users ask LLMs about the weather, pose educational questions, and consult them for legal assistance. One particularly understudied area is digital security and privacy (S&P), where users may seek LLMs' help on how to secure their online accounts or protect their computers from cyber attacks. To the best of our knowledge, no prior study has collected or analyzed the S&P questions users ask LLMs; prior research on LLM response quality relied on expert-authored S&P misconceptions or FAQs rather than user queries. Drawing from WildChat, a dataset of 3.2M user-LLM conversations collected in the wild, our study identifies 14,727 S&P prompts and categorizes them into nine categories covering a wide range of S&P topics. We sampled 450 S&P prompts, and performed a thematic analysis to characterize the S&P questions users ask LLMs. Separate from the thematic analysis, we curated 270 advice-seeking S&P prompts, where users ask for recommendations, guidance, or specific S&P information. We measured LLM response quality and consistency when posing each prompt to the LLMs 10 times. We found that commercial LLMs outperform open-weight models (GPT 5.5 provided "good enough" responses on 98% of prompts; Llama 4 on 47%). However, among prompts that received high-quality responses on average, commercial models sometimes produce semantically inconsistent responses across runs (some are contradictory, and others are different in specificity), thereby risking confusing or misleading users.