cs.CRNov 1, 2026

Black-Box Adversarial Example Attacks on Machine Learning based Election Systems

Authors: Subek Acharya, Syed Ayon, Khaleque Md Aashiq Kamal, Alina Barnett, Surya Eada, Kaleel Mahmood

Organizations: University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, USA · Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon, USA

Abstract

Machine learning models have shown exceptional accuracy for ballot classification in election systems. Recent research has demonstrated that these ballot classification models are vulnerable to adversarial example attacks. This is a critical security issue because a successful attack could alter the outcome of an election and undermine the democratic process. However, all adversarial example attacks in the voting domain have assumed a white-box threat model, where the classifier parameters are known. In this work, we advance the field of machine learning in election systems by analyzing a realistic black-box adversary. We implement and evaluate eleven state-of-the-art black-box attacks: query based attacks ADBA, Square, SurFree, RayS, and SA-MOO. We also test adaptive transfer based black-box attacks with APGD-l∞l_\infty, APGD-l2l_2, APGD-l1l_1, PGD l0l_0, PGD l0l_0+l∞l_\infty, and PGD l0l_0+σσ. Our attacks span multiple different norms (l∞l_\infty, l2l_2, l1l_1, and l0l_0) and three different black-box adversarial threat models (decision based, score based and transfer based). In addition to digital analyses, we physically print and scan 20,00020,000 adversarial examples to evaluate the real-world performance of different black-box attacks. Our finding demonstrate an even larger physical-digital robustness gap exists for black-box adversarial examples than for white-box adversarial examples. Lastly, we conduct the first ever adversarial example transferability study in the voting domain and test adversarial training and barrier zones as two possible black-box defense strategies.

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