Personalized neural audio watermarking systems embed user-specific payloads into audio to trace the user associated with a leaked or misused copy. Existing evaluations mainly assume access to a single personalized copy, but real-world distribution may expose multiple copies of the same recording. We find that simple sample-wise averaging breaks traceability: averaging only two copies produces tracing-failure rates of 87.7-99.7% across the five systems while largely preserving audio quality. Decoder outputs show distinct responses to coalition payload composition across systems, with high majority agreement in TimbreWM but substantially lower agreement in WMCodec. In a more sophisticated payload-aware setting, mixture weighting can further steer the decoder toward a selected nonmember, achieving a target success rate of 92.3% in TimbreWM. Preliminary confidence screening rejects many collusion-induced assignments while retaining most valid single-copy outputs. Code and results are available at https://github.com/Silwan5z/neural-audio-watermark-collusion-attack. This work highlights multi-copy traceability as an additional evaluation dimension for personalized neural audio watermarking alongside conventional single-copy robustness.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: A single copy maps to its user; averaging personalized copies from a coalition can produce a payload assigned to a user outside the coalition.
K=2
K=3
K=5
K=8
System
TF (%)
PESQ
STOI
TF (%)
PESQ
STOI
TF (%)
PESQ
STOI
TF (%)
PESQ
STOI
AudioSeal
99.0
4.60
0.999
97.3
4.59
0.999
98.3
4.59
0.999
100.0
4.58
0.999
WavMark
96.7
4.57
0.999
97.7
4.56
0.999
98.0
4.54
0.998
99.3
4.52
0.998
TimbreWM (10-bit)
87.7
4.56
0.998
84.7
4.56
0.997
88.0
4.55
0.997
92.0
4.53
0.996
VoiceMark
93.7
4.20
0.983
99.0
4.17
0.978
99.3
4.11
0.974
98.7
4.05
0.971
WMCodec
99.7
4.37
0.989
97.7
4.30
0.986
99.7
4.26
0.984
99.7
4.24
0.983
Table 1: Tracing-failure (TF) rate and audio quality under uniform averaging (300 trials per cell; for all 3 metrics, higher is better).
Figure 2: Fraction decoded as 1 versus bit support at K=8 . The dashed line is the ideal bit-choice reference; error bars show 95% intervals across speakers.
System
Bit agreement ↑ (%)
Trial agreement ↑ (%)
AudioSeal
84.9
20.7
WavMark
95.0
54.3
TimbreWM
100.0
100.0
VoiceMark
61.9
0.7
WMCodec
62.5
1.0
Table 2: Per-bit and full-trial majority agreement at K=8 .
Figure 3: Representative one-bit mixture paths. Curves show decoder support for B’s value at the differing bit; color strips show the complete decoded payload (A, B, or Other).
Target success rate ↑ (%)
Average quality
System
K=5
K=8
PESQ ↑
STOI ↑
AudioSeal
41.9
43.6
4.58
0.999
WavMark
51.4
54.4
4.52
0.998
TimbreWM
78.4
92.3
4.52
0.996
VoiceMark
1.1
0.6
4.04
0.972
WMCodec
1.0
1.3
4.20
0.983
Table 3: Target success rate and audio quality.
Figure 4: Minimum confidence for Single, Average, and successful Targeted outputs at K=8 . For Targeted, n denotes the number of trials contributing one successful target hit.
Modern neural audio watermarking systems typically embed a message repeatedly across time and then collapse the resulting temporal evidence into a single payload using averaging, voting, or another fixed aggregation rule. We argue that this temporal collapse limits both robustness and the recovery of multiple payloads, and that the limitation can be addressed without retraining the underlying watermarker. We freeze a pretrained watermarker's encoder and detector and train only a low-latency Conformer-based decoder. The decoder consumes the detector's temporal soft outputs, which a system-specific adapter pools into a sequence of window-level representations, and predicts the embedded message. On three frozen watermarkers (AURA, AudioSeal, and WavMark), the learned decoder improves recovery of attacked messages and yields higher detection AUROC point estimates on all three. Under controlled full- and partial-coverage multiplexing, it improves joint-exact recovery of two alternating payload words by 9.7-48.0, 6.9-17.3, and 8.2-14.2 percentage points, respectively, under one to three chained attacks on feasible clips.
Xuanye Wang, Linxi Li, Yechen Wang +3
OfSpectrum, Inc., Los Angeles, CA, USA · University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom
Neural watermarking systems are typically trained as tightly coupled embedder-detector pairs and implicitly assume static deployment. In real-world deployments, embedders and detectors are frequently updated and selectively decoupled for security and versioning purposes, which can break detection in previously embedded content and, more critically, increase false-positive rates on embedders that a given detector is intentionally not intended to recognize. In this paper the concept of backward compatibility in zero-bit audio watermarking is formalized. A training framework is proposed that pairs a new detector with a sequence of frozen legacy embedders (its legacy chain), using a performance-weighted sampling strategy so that the detector retains accuracy across all earlier versions. This coupling, while necessary for backward compatibility, is shown to induce an embedder-collapse effect that catastrophically degrades the true negative rate (TNR) against out-of-chain embedders. To counteract this, a Angular Diversity Loss (ADL) is introduced that explicitly forces each new embedder to occupy a distinct region of the output space. The combined approach restores near-perfect TNR with no measurable cost to detection accuracy or perceptual audio quality.
Neural audio watermarks are increasingly used to attribute and detect AI-generated speech, so their practical value rests on how cheaply an adversary can remove them. Robustness is usually measured by running a fixed battery of distortions blindly against every scheme. We instead make removal diagnostic: from a few clean/watermarked pairs we compute cheap structural probes that reveal where a watermark sits in the signal (its embedding domain), then apply a single domain-matched attack rather than a blind sweep. We further summarize each scheme with one threshold-free fragility score, the area under its accuracy-versus-quality trade-off, which an accuracy-only benchmark cannot provide. Across ten watermarking schemes the probes separate fragile from robust marks: for magnitude and carrier-domain watermarks a single matched attack erases the payload (WavMark, SilentCipher, audiowmark) or removes the detection flag (AudioSeal) at high objective quality (PESQ >= 3.6), whereas latent-domain marks (VoiceMark, WMCodec, AlignMark, AWARE) resist every training-free attack we apply. The same pair-only probe signatures also identify which watermarking scheme is present (84% over ten schemes).
Likhith Kumara
Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai, India