cs.CRNov 4, 2026

A Hybrid Approach for Automated Security Pattern Recovery

Authors: Anh Minh Nguyen, Tuan Dat Tran, Alzubair Hassan, Liliana Pasquale

Organizations: University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

Abstract

Security-by-design emphasises integrating security into software design and development. Security pattern catalogues operationalise this principle by prescribing reusable architectural solutions to recurring security problems. However, recovering their implementations from source code remains challenging because security patterns are abstract, span multiple components, and admit many valid implementations. We present SecPatRec, a hybrid approach for automated security pattern recovery from source code repositories. We treat a security pattern as a reference architecture and frame its recovery as a deductive task: determining which prescribed roles are present, grounding them in code entities, and recovering their interaction sequences. SecPatRec pairs a ReAct-style LLM agent equipped with semantic and lexical code search for role detection and grounding with static code property graph analysis for interaction recovery. We curate a human-validated ground-truth dataset of 100 pattern instances covering five security patterns across 93 open-source Java and Python repositories, and introduce a three-level evaluation framework measuring recovery correctness against this ground truth. We evaluate SecPatRec using four LLMs, including proprietary and open-source models. Averaged over all models and pattern instances, SecPatRec achieves role-detection accuracy of 0.84, role-grounding similarity of 0.84, and an interaction-recovery score of 0.66. Compared to a one-shot end-to-end LLM baseline, SecPatRec achieves higher aggregate recovery scores and lower estimated LLM API costs per run, while processing repositories that exceed the baseline's configured input limit. The recovered role mappings and statically derived interaction sequences provide structural and behavioural evidence that can support inspection of security-pattern implementations.

Figures & tables

Appendix figures & tables35 assets

Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.

Appendix

Explore similar work

Oct 24, 2026

Can Agentic Code Review Catch Vulnerabilities Before They Are Merged?

LLM agents have been increasingly adopted for security-focused code review, but existing benchmarks mostly derive the reviewed changes from their later fixes instead of the real-world bug-introducing commits. In this paper, we present SecPRBench, the first comprehensive benchmark for evaluating agentic security review on validated real-world code changes. More specifically, we have built an automated agentic pipeline to autonomously harvest, build, and validate massive real-world bug-introducing commits for popular software systems. To ensure precise evaluation, we also adopt LLM-as-a-judge to credit the findings matching ground-truth vulnerabilities. To date, we have collected 265 tasks from nine critical systems, including Firefox, V8, and OpenSSL with millions of lines of code. Across eight frontier models, recall ranges from 32.5% to 78.1%, with Grok 4.6 and GPT-6 sol ranking at the top. Our study also shows that most misses are not simply oversights: in 68% of them, the agent reports on a file that holds the flaw but argues for a different mechanism. Security-focused harnesses also behave differently: OpenAI's Codex Security lowers recall by 8.3 points, mostly by abstaining, while Anthropic's Defending Code harness raises it by 7.7 points, at a higher cost.
May 26, 2026

SEC-bench Pro: Can Language Models Solve Long-Horizon Software Security Tasks?

Large language models (LLMs) now support automated software security tasks, including vulnerability discovery and proof-of-concept (PoC) generation. Existing benchmarks do not faithfully evaluate LLMs in real-world bug hunting scenarios because they rely on fuzzing harnesses, target-specific descriptions, or vulnerability-reproduction tasks. We present SEC-bench Pro, a benchmark for measuring agent bug hunting on critical, high-complexity software systems. This work discloses reports with concrete PoC inputs and links fixes into reproducible tasks through a three-phase pipeline for vulnerability collection, environment reconstruction, and oracle-based validation. We instantiate SEC-bench Pro with 183 validated vulnerabilities across V8 and SpiderMonkey, including a V8 subset with more than $1.5 million in cumulative Google Vulnerability Reward Program awards. These instances span memory-safety, sandbox, JIT, and race-condition bugs under browser-grade and runtime-grade execution conditions. Our evaluation shows that coding agents with frontier models remain below 40% success on both evaluated engines. The open-weight Kimi-K2.6 baseline reaches 11.7% on V8, while the strongest frontier configuration reaches 32.0% on V8 and 38.8% on SpiderMonkey. ClaudeCode and Codex solve complementary instance sets, and their two-agent union reaches 37.9% on V8 and 48.8% on SpiderMonkey. SEC-bench Pro provides robust environments for assessing LLM-based security agents and exposes limitations in long-horizon bug hunting tasks.
Oct 10, 2026

SEEK: Agentic Knowledge Graph Retrieval for Secure Code Generation

Large Language Models (LLMs) can generate functionally correct code while introducing exploitable security weaknesses, particularly when developers specify functionality without explicit security requirements. Recent state-of-the-art approaches mitigate this problem using external security knowledge, but largely rely on flat similarity-based retrieval over independent artifacts, making it difficult to infer the relevant vulnerability space and retrieve targeted knowledge when direct matches are unavailable. We propose SEEK, an agentic Graph RAG framework for secure code generation that constructs a security knowledge graph using the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) taxonomy as its structural backbone and injects it with curated real-world CVE vulnerability-fix instances. At inference time, a Planner Agent predicts potential CWE weaknesses associated with the developer query, which guide Graph Scoping to restrict retrieval to relevant regions of the CWE taxonomy before deterministic multi-faceted candidate ranking. A Selection Agent subsequently validates the predicted weaknesses and retrieved candidates prior to code generation. Across five open-source LLMs, we evaluate SEEK in an out-of-distribution setting on CodeGuard+ and CyberSecEval, spanning C, C++, and Python. SEEK achieves the highest SecurePass@1 of 77.45% on CodeGuard+ and the highest aggregate ICD pass rate of 79.45% on CyberSecEval, surpassing prior approaches. Moreover, SEEK achieves 85.2% SecurePass@1 across 13 unseen CWE types with no directly linked vulnerability-fix instances, demonstrating strong generalizability, while maintaining acceptable inference latency costs.