cs.GTNov 4, 2026

Regret Bounds for Market Making with Persistent Orders

Authors: Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Tommaso Cesari, Roberto Colomboni, Luigi Foscari, Vinayak Pathak

Organizations: Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy · University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada · School of Mathematics, University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom · Computational Rational Agents Laboratory (CORAL)

Abstract

We study adversarial market making with orders that remain active until execution. The maker operates on two markets: a primary market where orders are made and a secondary market where the resulting positions are hedged. In each round, the maker posts a quote on the primary market before observing both primary and secondary market prices. An order executes when the primary price reaches its quote, and the resulting position is immediately offset at the secondary price. When both price sequences are chosen by an adversary over TT rounds, we give a simple deterministic policy with regret of order log⁡T\log T against the best fixed quote (static comparator) and T\sqrt T against the best quote for each submission date (dynamic comparator), plus two terms measuring exposure to future primary and secondary prices. These rates remain optimal even when both exposure terms vanish and lower bounds show that the exposure terms are necessary. Our policy naturally extends to simultaneous bids and asks, where we show that static and dynamic regret are both characterized (up to constant factors) by the exposures terms (where the primary price exposure VTtwoV_T^{\mathrm{two}} now accounts for both bids and asks) and a term of order VTtwolog⁡T\sqrt{V_T^{\mathrm{two}}\log T}. Our policy is simple, efficient and fully parameterless. We extend this setting by demonstrating how natural assumptions on the price processes lead to improved guarantees without changing the policy.

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