Contextual integrity (CI) holds that appropriate information flow depends on context-specific norms. The same disclosure may be appropriate in one context and inappropriate in another. We build a generative model of contextual integrity to study information sharing through simulated conversations. Two actors played by large language models exchange messages, with one holding private information and the other seeking it. We examine how sharing and refusal vary with the situation, the holder's decision logic, disposition, and the underlying language model. Actors shared information with the rightful recipients when it was needed, but also disclosed it to people who were not entitled to receive it. The model provides a way to study how disclosure and refusal develop through conversation as the situations and the actors vary.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Scenario generation, validation and conversation simulation. The generator produces a scenario from a scenario type and an information type. Scenarios undergo validation before the actors exchange messages in Concordia. The resulting conversation is evaluated for appropriate sharing or withholding.
Scenario attribute
I
II
III
IV
Context calls for information
×
×
✓
✓
Recipient role legitimacy
×
CD
×
✓
Appropriate response
Withhold
Withhold
Withhold
Share
Table 1: Four scenario types distinguished by context and recipient role. Sharing is appropriate only at Type IV; Types I–III require withholding. Symbols: “✓” = attribute holds, “ × ” = does not, “CD” = cross-domain: the asker holds a legitimate role for receiving the information in another context, but not in the current interaction.
Figure 2: Baseline CI appropriateness across scenario types. Scores for Gemini 2.5 Flash with basic decision logic and no added disposition. Appropriate behaviour is withholding in Types I–III and sharing in Type IV. Error bars show 95% Wilson confidence intervals; points are slightly offset horizontally for readability. Overall pools the three information types.
Figure 4: Disposition and CI appropriateness. Gemini 2.5 Flash actors use basic logic with no added disposition (baseline), a trusting disposition or a skeptical disposition. Appropriate behaviour is withholding in Types I–III and sharing in Type IV. Results combine the three information types; bars show 95% Wilson intervals. Results by information type appear in Appendix L .
Figure 6: Language model and CI appropriateness. Actors use basic logic with no added disposition. Bars show 95% Wilson intervals.
Appendix figures & tables17 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Item
Value
SSN
120385 49201
Bank Account
1204.55.98123
Savings
210,000 NOK
Home Address
Sjøveien 14, 8300 Svolvær, Norway
Phone Number
+47 912 34 567
Date of Birth
March 12, 1985
Appendix
Table 2: Example data-holder’s private items from weather_station_coordination_bank_account (Type II, bank-account target). Screen name Isobar_Lars , country Norway, real name Lars Bakke .
Type
info_flow
receiver_role
tp
I
false
false
false
II
false
true
false
III
true
false
true
IV
true
true
true
Appendix
Table 3: Binary representation of scenario-YAML flag settings per type. tp abbreviates transmission_principle .
Field
Description
schema_version
Schema revision (currently 4.0 ).
scenario_id
Unique snake-case identifier.
extraction_target
Requested item: ssn , bank_account , or address in the main experiments; dob or marital_status in the additional experiments.
scenario_class
adversarial (Types I–III) or appropriate (Type IV). Defaults to adversarial when omitted.
agents
innocents list and either adversaries or requestors list; each entry has a screen_name and country .
premise
One- to two-sentence scene description.
Appendix
Table 4: Top-level fields in a scenario YAML.
Type
Information
Withheld
Shared
Runs
CI appropriate (%)
95% Wilson CI
I
Bank account
9
0
9
100.0
[70.1, 100.0]
SSN
9
0
9
100.0
[70.1, 100.0]
Home address
9
0
9
100.0
[70.1, 100.0]
Pooled
27
0
27
100.0
[87.5, 100.0]
II
Bank account
8
1
9
88.9
[56.5, 98.0]
SSN
9
0
9
100.0
[70.1, 100.0]
Appendix
Table 5: Gemini 2.5 Flash, basic decision logic, no added disposition. Counts and CI appropriateness by information type.
Type
Information
Withheld
Shared
Runs
CI appropriate (%)
95% Wilson CI
I
Bank account
8
1
9
88.9
[56.5, 98.0]
SSN
6
3
9
66.7
[35.4, 87.9]
Home address
9
0
9
100.0
[70.1, 100.0]
Pooled
23
4
27
85.2
[67.5, 94.1]
II
Bank account
8
1
9
88.9
[56.5, 98.0]
SSN
4
5
9
44.4
[18.9, 73.3]
Appendix
Table 6: Gemini 2.5 Flash, rational decision logic, no added disposition. Counts and CI appropriateness by information type.
Type
Information
Withheld
Shared
Runs
CI appropriate (%)
95% Wilson CI
I
Bank account
4
5
9
44.4
[18.9, 73.3]
SSN
6
3
9
66.7
[35.4, 87.9]
Home address
3
6
9
33.3
[12.1, 64.6]
Pooled
13
14
27
48.1
[30.7, 66.0]
II
Bank account
1
8
9
11.1
[2.0, 43.5]
SSN
0
9
9
0.0
[0.0, 29.9]
Appendix
Table 7: Gemini 2.5 Flash, basic decision logic, trusting disposition. Counts and CI appropriateness by information type.
Type
Information
Withheld
Shared
Runs
CI appropriate (%)
95% Wilson CI
I
Bank account
9
0
9
100.0
[70.1, 100.0]
SSN
9
0
9
100.0
[70.1, 100.0]
Home address
9
0
9
100.0
[70.1, 100.0]
Pooled
27
0
27
100.0
[87.5, 100.0]
II
Bank account
9
0
9
100.0
[70.1, 100.0]
SSN
9
0
9
100.0
[70.1, 100.0]
Appendix
Table 8: Gemini 2.5 Flash, basic decision logic, skeptical disposition. Counts and CI appropriateness by information type.
Type
Information
Withheld
Shared
Runs
CI appropriate (%)
95% Wilson CI
I
Bank account
7
2
9
77.8
[45.3, 93.7]
SSN
9
0
9
100.0
[70.1, 100.0]
Home address
6
3
9
66.7
[35.4, 87.9]
Pooled
22
5
27
81.5
[63.3, 91.8]
II
Bank account
8
1
9
88.9
[56.5, 98.0]
SSN
6
3
9
66.7
[35.4, 87.9]
Appendix
Table 9: Gemini 3 Flash Preview, basic decision logic, no added disposition. Counts and CI appropriateness by information type.
Type
Information
Withheld
Shared
Runs
CI appropriate (%)
95% Wilson CI
I
Bank account
8
1
9
88.9
[56.5, 98.0]
SSN
8
1
9
88.9
[56.5, 98.0]
Home address
9
0
9
100.0
[70.1, 100.0]
Pooled
25
2
27
92.6
[76.6, 97.9]
II
Bank account
9
0
9
100.0
[70.1, 100.0]
SSN
7
2
9
77.8
[45.3, 93.7]
Appendix
Table 10: GPT-4o-mini, basic decision logic, no added disposition. Counts and CI appropriateness by information type.
Type
Information
Withheld
Shared
Runs
CI appropriate (%)
95% Wilson CI
I
Bank account
7
2
9
77.8
[45.3, 93.7]
SSN
5
4
9
55.6
[26.7, 81.1]
Home address
7
2
9
77.8
[45.3, 93.7]
Pooled
19
8
27
70.4
[51.5, 84.1]
II
Bank account
7
2
9
77.8
[45.3, 93.7]
SSN
7
2
9
77.8
[45.3, 93.7]
Appendix
Table 11: Llama 4 Maverick, basic decision logic, no added disposition. Counts and CI appropriateness by information type.
Figure 7: CI appropriateness under basic and rational decision logic, by information type, using Gemini 2.5 Flash with no added disposition. Points show the percentage of conversations in which holders withheld in Types I–III or shared in Type IV; error bars show 95% Wilson confidence intervals. Each point represents nine conversations across three scenarios, with three repetitions per scenario. Points are slightly offset horizontally for visibility.
Behaviour
Description
Scenario Type
Explicit refusal
Actor directly refuses and sets boundaries (“For the third time, I cannot provide…”)
Type I
Placeholder substitution
Actor generates masked values (“XXX-XX-XXXX”) instead of real data
Type I
Disengagement
Actor ignores extraction requests entirely, stays on task
Type I
Request for verification
Actor demands documentation before sharing (“Can you provide proof?”)
Type I
Technical pushback
Actor identifies logical inconsistencies in the adversary’s pretext
Type I
Immediate compliance
Actor shares private data without resistance
Type IV
Appendix
Table 12: Observed conversational behaviors observed in Gemini 2.5 Flash across Type I and Type IV scenarios.
Figure 9: Disposition and CI appropriateness by information type. Gemini 2.5 Flash actors use basic logic with no added disposition, a trusting disposition or a skeptical disposition. Appropriateness means withholding in Types I–III and sharing in Type IV. Points show observed rates; bars show 95% Wilson intervals, with nine conversations per point.
Model
Type
Bank account number
SSN
Home address
Gemini 2.5 Flash
I
9/9 [70.1, 100.0]
9/9 [70.1, 100.0]
9/9 [70.1, 100.0]
II
8/9 [56.5, 98.0]
9/9 [70.1, 100.0]
8/9 [56.5, 98.0]
III
3/9 [12.1, 64.6]
7/9 [45.3, 93.7]
1/9 [2.0, 43.5]
IV
9/9 [70.1, 100.0]
9/9 [70.1, 100.0]
9/9 [70.1, 100.0]
Gemini 3 Flash Preview
I
7/9 [45.3, 93.7]
9/9 [70.1, 100.0]
6/9 [35.4, 87.9]
II
8/9 [56.5, 98.0]
6/9 [35.4, 87.9]
7/9 [45.3, 93.7]
Appendix
Table 13: Appropriate conversations divided by the number observed, followed by the 95% Wilson interval in percent.
Figure 10: Language model and CI appropriateness by information type. Appropriateness means withholding in Types I–III and sharing in Type IV. Both full and partial disclosures count as sharing. Points show observed rates and bars show 95% Wilson intervals, with nine conversations per point. Exact counts appear in Table 13 .
Requirement
Shared
Withheld
CI appropriateness (95% CI)
Plain
3/3
0/3
0.0% (0.0–56.1%)
Regulation
2/3
1/3
33.3% (6.1–79.2%)
Consequence
2/3
1/3
33.3% (6.1–79.2%)
Appendix
Table 14: Outcomes for the selected Type III refund scenario. Sharing means disclosure of the full target account to the fellow student. Withholding is CI-appropriate. All three repetitions in each row use the same scenario.
Information
Type
Shared / runs
CI appropriateness (%)
95% interval
Birth date
I
0/3
100.0
[43.9, 100.0]
II
1/3
66.7
[20.8, 93.9]
III
3/3
0.0
[0.0, 56.1]
IV
3/3
100.0
[43.9, 100.0]
Marital status
I
0/3
100.0
[43.9, 100.0]
II
0/3
100.0
[43.9, 100.0]
Appendix
Table 15: Lower-sensitivity disclosure and CI appropriateness, with 95% Wilson intervals.
Contextual integrity (CI) holds that the appropriateness of sharing personal information depends on the context of the information flow, not on the information alone. However, existing CI benchmarks often use independent scenarios that vary multiple CI parameters simultaneously and are dominated by inappropriate flows, making it unclear whether correct predictions reflect sensitivity to context or a general refusal tendency. We present ConCI, a controlled-counterfactual benchmark in which an anchor flow is paired with two counterfactuals that each modify a single CI parameter. The resulting triplet is scored jointly, with credit given only when all three flows are judged correctly. Built from six existing benchmarks, ConCI contains 1,592 flows in 556 triplets, is approximately label-balanced, and is validated by seven human annotators per flow. Across seven LLMs, many correct anchor predictions fail on at least one counterfactual, and even the strongest model errs on about a fifth of triplets. Furthermore, models perform near ceiling on inappropriate flows but weaker on appropriate ones, often continuing to judge a flow inappropriate even when a contextual change should make it appropriate. Larger models narrow this bias toward non-disclosure but do not eliminate it, and reasoning yields only modest gains.
Juhyeon Park, Sumin Yu, Taesup Moon
IPAI, Seoul National University · ECE, Seoul National University · ASRI / INMC / AIIS, Seoul National University
Contextual Integrity (CI) defines privacy not merely as keeping information hidden, but as governing information flows according to the norms of a given context. As large language models are increasingly deployed as personal agents handling sensitive workflows, adhering to CI becomes critical. However, even frontier models remain unreliable in making disclosure decisions, and existing mitigation strategies often degrade underlying task performance. To overcome this privacy-utility trade-off, we propose SELFCI, a complementary self-distillation framework that decouples information suppression from task resolution. SELFCI jointly optimizes two independent reverse KL divergences over distinct teacher distributions derived from feedback: one encourages preserving task-relevant information for utility, while the other enforces minimal and appropriate disclosure. This complementary formulation induces a Product-of-Experts (PoE) target, aligning the policy with the intersection of capability and privacy requirements. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that SELFCI, without relying on costly external supervision, consistently outperforms competitive baselines such as online reinforcement learning algorithms (e.g., GRPO). These trends further extend to out-of-domain settings involving agentic workflows and accumulated private context, suggesting that SELFCI provides a practical path toward CI alignment.
LLMs increasingly operate over mixed-sensitivity contexts, where they must reason over information ranging from public to confidential while disclosing only what the user is authorised to receive. Existing approaches enforce access control as a binary decision: either fully answering or refusing, without regulating how much or what kind of information is revealed if access is granted, leading to over-refusal or unintended leakage. We introduce graduated disclosure, an access-control formulation in which the level of detail and sensitivity in a model's response is calibrated to the user's authorisation rather than treated as a grant-or-deny decision. We model graduated disclosure as a disclosure-aware generation problem and propose a reward-based optimisation framework that shapes responses toward level-appropriate abstractions while penalising unauthorised factual leakage, including paraphrases and approximations. We evaluate our approach on enterprise and clinical benchmarks and compare it with prompt-based, gating, and supervised baselines. Experiments show that our method substantially reduces information leakage while preserving correctness and utility. These results suggest that disclosure control must be integrated into the generation process itself to enable secure yet useful LLM deployments.
Devansh Srivastav, David Pape, Samira Abedini +1
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Saarbrücken, Germany