cs.CLNov 6, 2026

Does Reasoning Improve Psychological Depth in Large Language Models?

Authors: Ruichen Zheng, Yihe Wang, Fabrice Harel-Canada, Sara Khosravi, Zeynep Senahan Yildiz, Amit Sahai, Nanyun Peng

Organizations: University of California, Los Angeles · Now at Arizona State University. · Cornell University · LA General Hospital · 

Abstract

Benchmark gains from reasoning-enhanced large language models encourage the assumption that these models should broadly perform better on complex generative tasks, but this remains underexplored in open-ended, creative domains shaped by nuances of reader experience. We tested this assumption through the lens of psychological depth in short stories. We compared DeepSeek-R1 vs. DeepSeek-V3, our closest available contrast for reasoning-oriented post-training, and GPT-5 vs. GPT-4o, through 60 blinded pairwise evaluations in which seven human annotators and an ensemble LLM-as-a-Judge rated prompt-matched story outputs. Human evaluations showed no universal reasoning advantage: GPT-5 was slightly preferred over GPT-4o (60.0-62.9% across two reasoning-effort settings), whereas DeepSeek-R1 fell behind DeepSeek-V3 (42.9%). Although this pattern was marked by low inter-annotator agreement (Krippendorff's α=0.070α= 0.070), our annotation-quality checks suggested genuine evaluative subjectivity, plausibly reflecting distinct annotator decision schemes rather than annotation failure. In contrast, the LLM-as-a-Judge showed a strong pro-reasoning bias (98.3% of pairs vs. 55.2% of human votes), consistent across its five configurations and partly tracking sentence length. These findings suggest that, at the frontier, reasoning-related quality differences are small enough to be dominated by reader subjectivity, and that LLM-as-a-Judge evaluators can obscure this subjectivity in nuanced creative-generation tasks.

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