cs.CRNov 7, 2026

The Limits of Information-Flow Control Enforcement for Agentic Systems

Authors: Jonathan Gregory, Kyle Domico, Kunyang Li, Jean-Charles Noirot Ferrand, Patrick McDaniel

Organizations: University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, WI, USA

Abstract

Information-flow control (IFC) is a promising approach to enforce policy in agentic AI systems. However, IFC suffers from label creep, a phenomenon where monotonically increasing security labels propagate through a system and progressively limit its utility. Label creep in agentic AI systems can be mitigated using two major strategies: (1) improved system design and (2) label declassification. In this paper, we characterize how far system design alone can mitigate label creep in agentic systems. Specifically, we measure how system topology, scale, and agent composition affect utility loss and security enforcement cost proxies for conservative IFC enforcement in a stateful agentic system simulator. We develop a pipeline to systematically vary these features and measure their impacts on label propagation. Our results demonstrate strong associations between structural graph features and our IFC utility loss metric (up to a Spearman correlation ∣ρ∣|ρ| of 0.960.96) and show that system size and tool allocation substantially affect how labels propagate. These findings identify design choices to reduce IFC utility loss, but they also demonstrate that system design alone cannot fully prevent utility loss due to monotonic label propagation. This motivates the development of label declassification mechanisms that aid these design choices and diminish IFC utility cost.

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