The use of generative AI in political campaigns has drawn public concern and policy attention. Public concerns range from distrust of candidates to skepticism about the authenticity and accuracy of political advertising, including AI-generated images and video. Nearly half of U.S. states have enacted laws that prohibit, or require disclosure of, "materially deceptive" AI-generated content (AIGC) in elections to guard against these concerns. This study measures how candidates and their campaigns produce and circulate AIGC during an election cycle. We develop two measures that estimate not only wether campaigns use AIGC, but how much they produce (magnitude) and in what forms (modality). We apply these measures to a novel dataset of text and images from the campaign websites, X accounts, and emails of 12,977 candidates for U.S. political office from 2023 to 2025. We report three findings. First, detectable AIGC from campaigns increased significantly across modalities over the observation window, and campaigns that use AIGC frequently do not disclose it. Second, incumbents' campaigns produced significantly less AIGC than challengers' campaigns. Third, candidates in states with AIGC disclosure or prohibition laws do not produce measurably less AIGC than candidates in other states. Our method and findings have implications for transparency and trust in elections, and on state laws that regulate AI use in campaigns. Because current state laws largely target mainly "materially deceptive" content, we identify additional policy mechanisms that could increase electoral transparency and improve trust as AIGC becomes more prevalent.
Figures & tables
Figure 1. We collect data on political candidates across political races from 2023 to 2025 and their campaign data from three modalities (campaign websites, X posts, and emails). We apply AI detection methods to text and image content and introduce two metrics to estimate prevalence of AIGC across races and modalities. We use these estimates to characterize detectable AIGC use over time, which types of candidates use it, and potential effects of state regulations on its use.
Figure 2
Variable
Level
Reference
AME
95% CI
p
Rel. change
Rel. 95% CI
Incumbency
Incumbent
Challenger
−0.014
[−0.017,−0.010]
<0.001
−20.0%
[−24.6%,−15.4%]
Open
Challenger
−0.005
[−0.009,−0.001]
0.023
−7.4%
[−13.6%,−1.3%]
Open
Incumbent
0.009
[0.005,0.012]
<0.001
+15.7%
[+9.0%,+22.4%]
Party
Republican
Democrat
0.003
[0.000,0.006]
0.028
+5.3%
[+0.5%,+10.1%]
Race type
US Legislator
State Legislator
0.010
[0.005,0.015]
<0.001
+16.3%
[+7.7%,+24.9%]
Compliance to law
Disclosure
None
0.003
[0.000,0.007]
0.044
+5.7%
[+0.0%,+11.4%]
Table 2. Average marginal effects on campaign AI magnitude.
Figure 3. Impact of state regulations at the office-level. Each point is the estimated coefficient on the “regulated” indicator from a separate two-way fixed effects (TWFE) regression; The three colors portray differences in how the outcome is defined: Any use (yes/no), green = whether a candidate used any AIGC at all (binary); Amount (all candidates), red = magnitude of AIGC use across all candidates (zeros included); Amount (users only), blue = magnitude of use among only candidates who used some AIGC (zeros excluded).
Research question
Finding
Implication
RQ1: What is the magnitude of detectable AI-generated content in campaigns?
7.6% of text samples (N= 29,996) and 6.1% of image samples (N=104,562) are detected to be AI; candidates rarely disclose AI use.
Enforcement of disclosure and prohibition laws may be difficult given the lack of transparency and monitoring capabilities.
RQ2: How are the features of a campaign associated with the use of AI-generated content?
Challengers have, on average, higher AI magnitude than incumbents .
AIGC is not evenly distributed across elections and candidates, though effects are small.
RQ3: What is the effect of state-level regulations on the use of AI-generated content in campaigns?
Federal candidates use less AIGC when regulated; there is no effect on state or municipal races.
Current AIGC regulations have a narrow and uneven relationship with campaign messaging.
Table 3. A summary of our primary research questions, findings, and implications.
Appendix figures & tables10 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
State
Date Enacted
Bill Number
Type
Time frame Requirements
Penalties
Explicitly only about deception?
Texas
11/01/2019
TX BS 751
Prohibition
30 days before
Class A misdemeanor. Max of 1 year in prison and/or a fine of $4,000.
Yes
Michigan
01/01/2023
MI HB 5141
Disclosure
90 days before
First violation: Max of 90 days in prison and/or a fine of 500.Secondviolations:Maxoffiveyearsinprisonand/orafineof1,000.
No
Washington
04/13/2023
WA SB 5152
Disclosure
None
A candidate may seek general or special damages, including attorney’s fees and costs.
No
Minnesota
08/01/2023
MN HB 1370
Prohibition
90 days before a nominating convention
First violation: Max of 90 days in prison and/or a fine of 1,000.Secondviolation:Maxoffiveyearsinprisonand/orafineof10,000. Violations that result in bodily harm: Max one year in prison and/or a fine of $3,000.
Yes
California
01/01/2024
CA AB 2839
Disclosure
120 days before, 60 days after
A candidate may seek general or special damages, including attorney’s fees and costs.
Yes
Florida
02/09/2024
FL HB 919
Disclosure
None
A person who fails to include the disclaimer is guilty of misdemeanor of the first degree.
Yes
Appendix
Table 4. Summary of all U.S. state regulation for AI-generated content / use in elections enacted from 2019–2025.
Race
Year
Candidates Total
% of Names Found
% Campaign Site Coverage
% Campaign X URL Coverage
Attorney General
2023
6
100.0
100.0
100.0
2024
20
100.0
100.0
80.0
2025
2
100.0
100.0
100.0
Governor
2023
6
100.0
100.0
83.3
2024
22
100.0
100.0
72.7
2025
4
100.0
100.0
75.0
Appendix
Table 5. Coverage of Candidates by Year and Race Type. Percentage of campaign site and X coverage are calculated from the amount of candidate names we have, not from all candidates. *For 2024, we could find no breakdown of state senate and house; we found 10,098 state legislatures total out of 11,718 and thus generalize to 86% for both senate and house. **For state legislative elections, some general election candidates may be missing and are replaced by primary candidates.
Feature of Campaign
Definition
Source
Race type
The office for which a candidate is running.
Collected while conducting data collection from a range of sources: Ballotpedia, Wikipedia, MIT Election Lab, FollowTheMoney.org (now, OpenSecrets.org)
Election type
Whether or not the election is a special election
Same sources as Race Type. This data is also sourced manually for races that were not available via automated data collecting or external datasets, such as for U.S. Senate 2024 races.
Incumbency status
Whether the candidate was an incumbent (already in office), a challenger to an incumbent, or it was an open race with no sitting incumbents
This data is included on Ballotpedia. For data that we collect manually we also save this information.
Funding
Total contributions the campaign recieved
FollowTheMoney.org (now, OpenSecrets.org)
Race outcome
Whether the candidate won or lost
Collected while conducting data collection from a range of sources: Ballotpedia, Wikipedia, MIT Election Lab, FollowTheMoney.org (now, OpenSecrets.org)
Party
Political party of the candidate. Can be any party, not necessarily Democrat or Republican, though we conduct analysis only on Democrat vs Republican for simplicity.
Collected while conducting data collection from a range of sources: Ballotpedia, Wikipedia, MIT Election Lab, FollowTheMoney.org (now, OpenSecrets.org)
Appendix
Table 6. Description and sources of features of candidate campaigns used in RQ2
Mayor
State House
State Senate
US House
US Senate
Attorney General
Governor
2023
0.029
0.055
0.024
0.015
NA
0.006
0.046
2024
0.060
0.057
0.055
0.062
0.050
0.057
0.066
2025
0.062
0.076
0.089
0.135
NA
0.003
0.018
Appendix
Table 7. Average magnitude per year and race
Figure 4. Percentage of text content per electoral race across years 2023-2025 identified to be AI
Variable
Level
Reference
AME
95% CI
p
Rel. change
Rel. 95% CI
Incumbency
Incumbent
Challenger
−0.014
[−0.018,−0.010]
<0.001
−20.5%
[−25.1%,−15.8%]
Open
Challenger
−0.006
[−0.010,−0.001]
0.015
−8.2%
[−14.5%,−1.9%]
Open
Incumbent
0.008
[0.005,0.012]
<0.001
+15.4%
[+8.5%,+22.4%]
Party
Republican
Democrat
0.003
[0.000,0.006]
0.028
+5.3%
[+0.5%,+10.1%]
Race type
US Legislator
State Legislator
0.008
[0.001,0.014]
0.024
+12.9%
[+1.6%,+24.2%]
Compliance law
Disclosure
None
0.003
[0.000,0.007]
0.041
+5.8%
[+0.1%,+11.4%]
Appendix
Table 8. Average marginal effects on campaign AI magnitude, interaction model.
Question
Hypothesis
Estimate
Std. Error
z
p
S
95% CI
oes the IQR funding effect differ by incumbency?
Incumbent − Challenger
−0.000683
0.00154
−0.442
0.658
0.6
[ −0.00371 , 0.00234]
Open − Challenger
−0.002324
0.00179
−1.302
0.193
2.4
[ −0.00582 , 0.00118]
Open − Incumbent
−0.001641
0.00177
−0.929
0.353
1.5
[ −0.00510 , 0.00182]
Does the IQR funding effect differ by race type?
US Legislator − State Legislator
0.00201
0.00212
0.949
0.343
1.5
[ −0.00214 , 0.00616]
Appendix
Table 9. Differences in the effect of an interquartile increase in campaign funding, by incumbency status and race type. Estimates are differences in conditional AMEs when moving total funding from 25th percentile to 75th pecentile.
Question
Hypothesis
Estimate
Std. Error
z
p
S
95% CI
Does the race-type effect differ by incumbency?
Incumbent − Challenger
−0.00472
0.00567
−0.832
0.406
1.3
[ −0.0158 , 0.00640]
Open − Challenger
−0.00719
0.00811
−0.886
0.376
1.4
[ −0.0231 , 0.00872]
Open − Incumbent
−0.00247
0.00759
−0.326
0.745
0.4
[ −0.0173 , 0.01240]
Appendix
Table 10. Differences in the effect of race type by incumbency status. Estimates are differences in conditional AMEs of race type (U.S. legislature vs state legislature) across incumbency groups
Figure 5. Raw distribution of AIGC amount (inverse-hyperbolic-sine scale) among candidates in unregulated versus regulated state-cycles, shown separately for federal, state, and municipal offices. Boxes give the median and interquartile range; points are individual candidates.
Office
Outcome
Diff.
95% CI
n
Federal
Amount, all
-0.035
[−0.064,−0.005]
817
Any use
−0.017
[−0.047,0.013]
817
Amount, users
-0.034
[−0.065,−0.002]
803
State
Amount, all
−0.026
[−0.076,0.024]
6205
Any use
0.036
[−0.117,0.188]
6205
Amount, users
−0.029
[−0.080,0.021]
5984
Appendix
Table 11. Coefficient on regulated from two-way fixed effects regressions, by office level. Bold marks 95% CIs excluding zero. Estimates are in inverse-hyperbolic-sine units (yes/no for “Any use”). Outcomes: Amount, all = AIGC amount over all candidates (non-users =0 ); Any use = used any AIGC; Amount, users = amount among users only. All models absorb state and year fixed effects and adjust for incumbency, party, log funding, special-election status, and district lean; SEs clustered by state.
The widespread deployment of generative artificial intelligence (AI) models has raised serious concerns about the proliferation of AI-generated content. This has led to a surge of interest in, and demand for, reliable tracking and detection mechanisms for content that is AI-generated, such as watermarking, metadata tagging, content tagging, and more. The problem has captured the attention of policymakers as well as the popular media, and a spate of recent bills in the US have sought to regulate the spread of AI content, and enforce or promote methods to track and label it. This work performs a critical analysis of the policy discourse surrounding generative AI content transparency in the US and EU. Through a broad document selection methodology, we first collect a broad corpus of documents containing legislative language and policy-relevant discourse on the topic. We then analyze these through inductive coding, and leverage our coding to systematize these documents, identifying key patterns, gaps, and open questions. We identify critical points of disconnect between policy and technological capabilities and practice, and we highlight and discuss potential ambiguities and pitfalls raised by the trends in our corpus.
Andrés Fábrega, Arkaprabha Bhattacharya, Miranda Christ +1
Cornell University · Columbia University · New York University
Cognitive operations are a rising concern in the geopolitical sphere, a quiet yet rigorous fight for public perception and decision making. While such operations have been extensively studied in the context of bot-driven amplification, the emergence of generative AI introduces a new set of capabilities that may have fundamentally altered how these operations are designed and executed. The possible evolution of cognitive operation via generative AI puts nation states vulnerable without proper mitigation strategies. To address this, we compared behavioral and linguistic coordination patterns in X (formerly Twitter) datasets from the 2016 and 2024 U.S. presidential elections. Utilizing a combined corpus of over 133,000 posts, we applied post-type distribution, semantic clustering, temporal synchrony analysis, and Jaccard-based lexical overlap measures. Findings suggest that the 2024 corpus exhibits a distinct pattern from 2016. Original content rose from 59% to 93% with retweets virtually disappeared; lexical overlap collapsed from a mean Jaccard score of 0.99 to 0.27, with posts converging on the same subject matter expressed in markedly different words; and temporal coordination shifted from pervasive cross-semantic synchrony to narratively concentrated co-occurrence. Taken together, these patterns point toward an operational logic organized around active content generation and narrative-specific targeting - characteristics consistent with generative AI involvement. These findings offer an empirical baseline for future research investigating generative AI's role in the cognitive operation pipeline, and as a practical reference point for security practitioners developing detection frameworks calibrated to the post-generative AI threat environment.
In this paper, we evaluate the extent of undisclosed LLM-generated content in texts from the parliaments of the United Kingdom and Sweden. In many areas, such as in journalism or in academic writing, there are often requirements to clearly disclose whether AI tools, such as LLMs, have been used. In the case of parliamentary texts, the guidelines on disclosure of AI use are more vague. However, in order to maintain transparency and retain public trust, it is generally recommended that parliamentarians should state whether or not they have used AI when writing texts, such as parliamentary motions. Here, we train an interpretable (glass-box) text classifier using pre-LLM parliamentary texts and LLM-generated versions of such texts. We then apply the classifier to a test set containing recent parliamentary texts, finding a steady increase in undisclosed LLM use, in both parliaments, from 2022 onwards.
Minerva Suvanto, Andrea McGlinchey, Peter J. Barclay +1
Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden · Edinburgh Napier University, Edinburgh, UK