cs.CRNov 9, 2026

DeepChronos: Temporal Neuro-Symbolic Reasoning for Multi-Step Attack Detection

Authors: Sofia Burkow, Andrea Agiollo, Enkeleda Bardhi, Fernando Kuipers, Kaitai Liang, Georgios Smaragdakis

Organizations: Delft University of Technology · University of Turku

Abstract

Modern cyber threats commonly unfold as multi-step attacks comprising temporally and causally related phases. Current defenses commonly follow a detect first and correlate later paradigm. Intrusion detection systems classify events independently, while downstream systems reconstruct attack progression from the resulting alerts or audit records. In this context, learning-based detectors learn attack-step dependencies implicitly as statistical regularities in the data and cannot guarantee that their predictions follow the real attack progression. Conversely, correlation systems represent attack relationships explicitly, but apply this knowledge only after the underlying attack observations have been detected. We present DEEPCHRONOS, a neuro-symbolic network intrusion detection system that shifts the paradigm from detect first and correlate later to detection through logical progression. DEEPCHRONOS combines learned flow-level evidence with explicit attack-phase rules, temporal prerequisites, and previously inferred phases, allowing the evolving attack history to inform and constrain each detection decision. Evaluations on DARPA 2000 and AIT-LDS V2 show that DEEPCHRONOS improves macro F1 over purely neural baselines by up to 11.3%, eliminates causal violations under strict temporal constraints, and maintains millisecond-scale inference latency. These results demonstrate that integrating explicit attack progression knowledge into detection produces more accurate and temporally coherent multi-step attack predictions.

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