cs.CRNov 12, 2026

MobileProbe: Adaptive Security Evaluation of Mobile Agents via Trajectory-Aware Injection

Authors: Yingbin Jin, Ji'an Wang, HaoYang Chai, Hanjun Luo, Li Hu, Xinfeng Li, Huadi Zheng, PeiZhao Hu, 

Organizations: The Hong Kong Polytechnic University · Zhejiang University · Huawei · Research Centre for Privacy and Security Technologies in Future Smart Systems, PolyU

Abstract

Mobile GUI agents read the screen of a phone and operate apps on a user's behalf to complete multi-step tasks such as online shopping or messaging. Because the agent acts on whatever the screen shows, an attacker can embed malicious instructions into ordinary UI content and redirect its actions. We refer to this threat as environmental injection attack (EIA). Existing benchmarks measure this risk by pinning hand-crafted payloads to a fixed step of a fixed task. This approach faces two limitations. First, each payload is bound to one task in one app and does not transfer without manual redesign. Second, agents given the same task may follow different routes, so an agent that never reaches the injected page is recorded as safe without being tested. This insufficient test coverage can cause fixed-point benchmarks to underestimate the security risk of deployed mobile agents. In this work, we propose MobileProbe, a trajectory-aware red-teaming framework that evaluates mobile agents adaptively. MobileProbe discovers attacker-controllable content surfaces through automated pentesting, localizes vulnerable decision points along the agent's trajectory, and iteratively refines context-aware payloads through a surrogate-filtered evolutionary loop. We construct a benchmark of 83 long-horizon attack instances spanning 12 mobile applications. Each is annotated with a Confidentiality, Integrity, or Availability (CIA) attack goal to cover the principal categories of security threats facing mobile agents. On three representative agent architectures, MobileProbe attains higher attack success rates than human-written, zero-shot LLM, and prior automated red-teaming baselines adapted to the mobile domain. MobileProbe can serve as a pre-deployment auditing tool to systematically uncover vulnerabilities and inform security hardening of mobile agents.

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