cs.AINov 13, 2026

Knowledge After Collapse: Context and Wording Shape Factual Accessibility in Language Models

Authors: Sujato Dutta, Prithviraj Patil, Chandrajit Bajaj

Organizations: Mahindra University · The University of Texas at Austin

Abstract

When a language model accepts a false correction in a factual discussion, its next answer can depend on how the conversation continues. We introduce Knowledge Answer Divergence (KAD), an event-conditioned evaluation protocol that distinguishes initial false-answer adoption from subsequent persistence, recovery, and abstention. KAD freezes the conversation at the first explicit adoption of a designated false target and branches independent probes from that exact history. This enables matched comparisons of post-adoption behavior and history-management interventions that a single susceptibility score cannot capture. We evaluate eight local checkpoint conditions and six hosted endpoints, alongside an audited 300-question rerun. In corrected Llama 3.2 Instruct 3B controls, a neutral-history branch yields 42/46 correct responses, compared with 16/46 under full history. A matched cue-placement control changes false adoption by 27.3 percentage points in Qwen 3.5 4B. Twelve independently authored pressure templates demonstrate substantial sensitivity to wording. Together, these findings demonstrate the utility of KAD for evaluating factual reliability beyond initial susceptibility, enabling systematic comparisons of false-answer persistence, recovery conditions and conversational interventions.

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