Advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) have accelerated digital content generation and intensified concerns around fraud, misuse, counterfeiting, and content provenance. Defensive image watermarking provides a practical mechanism for identifying and tracing digital content, but recent watermark-removal attacks challenge its robustness. This study investigates Sequential Semantic Non-Semantic Watermarking (SSNSW), which combines HiDDeN and StegaStamp as complementary non-semantic and semantic watermarking schemes. Using 50 images from MS-COCO and CelebA-HQ, both embedding orders are evaluated, followed by UnMarker's non-semantic and semantic attacks applied individually and sequentially. Results show that both watermarks remain highly decodable after dual embedding, with only limited embedding-order effects. Under individual attacks, one watermark generally remains strongly decodable: StegaStamp under the non-semantic attack and HiDDeN under the semantic attack. Sequential attacks are therefore required to substantially reduce both watermark signals, while attack order has a limited and configuration-dependent effect. The semantic attack also shows a broader effect across the two watermark types than the non-semantic attack. LPIPS remains relatively low in several settings, although qualitative inspection reveals noticeable distortions, particularly in selected facial images, indicating that LPIPS should not be used alone to assess visual quality. Overall, the findings show that combining complementary watermark types can increase robustness against single-stage removal attacks and motivate broader multi-layer watermarking, stronger perceptual evaluation, and further study of sequential watermark-removal strategies.
Figures & tables
Fig. 1: Illustration of visible and invisible watermarking. Source: adapted from [ 5 ] .
Fig. 2: Global digital watermarking market size and projected growth. Source: adapted from [ 16 ]
TABLE IX: Baseline results over COCO and CelebA. H and S denote HiDDeN and StegaStamp; NS and Sem denote non-semantic and semantic attacks, respectively.
Embed.
Attack order
Stage
BAH
BAS
LPIPS
H → S
–
WM
0.981
0.982
0.123
NS → S
After NS
0.599
0.957
0.009
After S
0.573
0.689
0.083
S → NS
After S
0.883
0.642
0.083
After NS
0.607
0.662
0.008
S → H
–
WM
0.997
0.993
0.044
TABLE X: Phase 3 summary over COCO and CelebA. H → S and S → H denote the HiDDeN–StegaStamp embedding orders; NS and S denote non-semantic and semantic attacks, respectively.
Generative images have proliferated on Web platforms in social media and online copyright distribution scenarios, and semantic watermarking has increasingly been integrated into diffusion models to support reliable provenance tracking and forgery prevention for web content. Traditional noise-layer-based watermarking, however, remains vulnerable to inversion attacks that can recover embedded signals. To mitigate this, recent content-aware semantic watermarking schemes bind watermark signals to high-level image semantics, constraining local edits that would otherwise disrupt global coherence. Yet, large language models (LLMs) possess structured reasoning capabilities that enable targeted exploration of semantic spaces, allowing locally fine-grained but globally coherent semantic alterations that invalidate such bindings. To expose this overlooked vulnerability, we introduce a Coherence-Preserving Semantic Injection (CSI) attack that leverages LLM-guided semantic manipulation under embedding-space similarity constraints. This alignment enforces visual-semantic consistency while selectively perturbing watermark-relevant semantics, ultimately inducing detector misclassification. Extensive empirical results show that CSI consistently outperforms prevailing attack baselines against content-aware semantic watermarking, revealing a fundamental security weakness of current semantic watermark designs when confronted with LLM-driven semantic perturbations.
Zheng Gao, Xiaoyu Li, Zhicheng Bao +2
University of New South Wales Sydney, New South Wales, Australia · Griffith University Brisbane, Queensland, Australia
With the proliferation of AI-generated images, digital watermarking has become an essential safeguard for protecting intellectual property and mitigating malicious exploitation. Recent works on semantic watermarking have enabled efficient copyright protection for diffusion models. However, the dependence of semantic watermarking on diffusion inversion for watermark detection creates a critical vulnerability. Imprint removal and forgery attacks exploit this weakness to produce deceptive results. Our analysis reveals that these attacks succeed by displacing watermarked latents into the unwatermarked region, while guiding unwatermarked latents into the watermarked region. Based on that, we propose Progressive Guided Inversion and Denoising (PGID), the first plug-and-play, training-free noise extraction framework designed to defend against both attack strategies. PGID effectively defends by projecting perturbed latents back to the region where they originally belong. The projection is achieved by eliminating intermediate latent deflections and mitigating adversarial perturbations through progressive inversion-denoising cycles. Comprehensive evaluations across multiple schemes demonstrate that PGID successfully restores detection reliability by recovering removed watermarks and identifying forged instances.
Semantic watermarks tie the mark to sentence meaning rather than token choices, promising robustness to content-preserving edits. However, the detector only observes attacker-supplied text, which can be reworded, reordered, or resegmented to evade detection without content loss. Rewording, reordering, and resegmentation all cause embedding displacement: detection tests embeddings different from those selected during watermarking and can therefore lose the mark. Our adaptive embedding displacement attack (EDA) admits all three edits under a single objective that maximizes this displacement. It uses a public paraphraser and surrogate encoder without access to the provider's generator or secret key. At a 5% false-positive rate (FPR) and content-preservation threshold qˉ=90%, EDA successfully removes the mark on between 32.6% and 47.9% of documents across four schemes, the highest among the tested attacks. Therefore, EDA evaluates the schemes' robustness more thoroughly than passive paraphrasing. To address these vulnerabilities, we design (k)-SwordStamp: semantic watermarks with order-robust detection over sub-sentence units, reducing sensitivity to attacker-chosen structure at a small quality cost. Against k-SwordStamp, the strongest no-box attack we test is an EDA variant adapted to its design, with a 10.8% attack-success rate. A stronger EDA with access to the provider's detector and secret key reaches a 39.7% attack-success rate, compared with 65.5% on k-SemStamp. Our code is available at https://github.com/D-Diaa/SwordStamp.
Abdulrahman Diaa, Jonathan Petit, Florian Kerschbaum