cs.CRNov 16, 2026

TRIAGE-CPG: A Cross-Model Study of Budgeted Static Malware Triage with Large Language Models

Authors: Paul-Andrei Sava, Alexander Küchler, Daniel Kowatsch, Bernhard Grill, Jennifer Pullman, Yanick Fratantonio, Luca Invernizzi

Organizations: Fraunhofer AISEC Garching, Germany · Google Zurich, Switzerland

Abstract

When triaging unknown binaries, security analysts must decide which samples to clear as benign, flag as malicious, or escalate for deeper analysis. Large Language Models (LLMs) could support these decisions by interpreting decompiled code, but a binary can contain hundreds or thousands of functions, making exhaustive LLM analysis impractical. We study how current LLMs behave when static triage is formulated as budgeted evidence acquisition: which functions they inspect and how they trade off benign clearance, malware detection, and escalation. To enable a controlled comparison, we implement TRIAGE-CPG, a fixed pipeline over a code property graph (CPG) of a decompiled binary. An LLM-free heuristic selects seed functions, an agent expands the resulting evidence dossier under a fixed budget, and a reporting stage produces a benign, suspicious, or malicious verdict together with a behavioral report. We evaluate eight closed-source and open-weight models on 1,000 Windows PE binaries, using a 600-sample test split and the same zero-shot protocol for every model. We assess the ternary verdicts under both a strict binary reading and triage balanced accuracy (tBA), which credits malware that is flagged or escalated and benign samples only when cleared. After analyzing about 40 of a mean 1,000 functions per binary, the highest-scoring model reaches a strict balanced accuracy of 0.805 and a tBA of 0.855, flagging 65% of malware, escalating another 12%, and clearing 94% of benign samples. The models implement different triage policies: high-specificity models produce small, malware-rich escalation queues, whereas recall-oriented models escalate or flag much more broadly. Both closed-source and open-weight models appear across this spectrum. Our results identify no universal deployment configuration: model choice itself determines the clear/flag/escalate trade-off under limited static evidence.

Figures & tables

Appendix figures & tables2 assets

Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.

Appendix

Explore similar work

Jun 18, 2026

Multi-View Decompilation for LLM-Based Malware Classification

Malware analysts often inspect compiled binaries through decompiled pseudo-C, when source code is unavailable. Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) can assist this process by classifying decompiled code as benign or malicious, but existing pipelines typically rely on a single decompiler view. We argue that this assumption is fragile: decompilers are lossy heuristic tools, and different decompilers can expose different artefacts of the same binary. We curate a benchmark of benign utilities and malicious programs spanning a range of threat behaviors. Each sample is compiled and decompiled with both Ghidra and RetDec, yielding matched pseudo-C views. Across a range of LLMs from major model families, we find that providing both decompiler views improves malicious-class F1, mainly by increasing recall on malicious samples. Agreement analyses further show that Ghidra and RetDec make partially different errors, supporting the view that decompiler outputs provide complementary evidence. Our results suggest that multi-decompiler prompting is a simple, training-free way to improve LLM-based malware triage in practical settings.
Oct 7, 2026

MARS: Malware Analysis with Rule-Based Scoring of LLM Claims

Large language models can triage malware through direct verdicts or behavioral claims scored by an external policy. We present MARS, a malware triage framework, and compare direct classification with single-pass claim scoring using the same evidence collector and identical static evidence bundles for each model. The evaluation covers 1,195 PE and ELF binaries grouped into 1,001 near-duplicate clusters and six language models, with deterministic rules providing a baseline. Direct classification is more accurate for all six models. On samples with usable outputs from both paths, its accuracy advantage ranges from 3.7 to 20.9 percentage points, with all 95% cluster-bootstrap confidence intervals for the differences above zero. It also achieves higher malicious alert recall in ten of twelve platform and model combinations. Claim mediation provides no consistent reduction in performance variation across models. Separate subset studies find more consistent alert decisions for direct classification and a larger recall loss for the claim path when predefined indicator fields are removed. In a family identification probe, claims yield higher accuracy than verdict labels but lower accuracy than evidence text. Retained claims expose the inputs to verdict computation and permit policy revision without another model call. We reproduce archived verdicts exactly and apply a revised policy to the same records, including outputs from two additional models withdrawn by their provider. Under the evaluated claim taxonomy and additive policy, these results favor direct classification when only a verdict is required, while demonstrating that retained claims support explicit policy inspection and revision.
Sep 17, 2026

ALIBI: Adversarial Legitimacy Injection in Binary Input against LLM Malware Analyzers

Large language models are being integrated into malware triage workflows as reasoning components that summarize static evidence and produce analyst-facing verdicts. This paper shows that the same reasoning capability introduces a new attack surface. We present ALIBI, a semantic cover story attack against frontier LLM-based malware analyzers. ALIBI adds a small, non-executed read-only section to a compiled binary, containing a coherent but false security product narrative, without altering imports or executable behavior. Instead of issuing direct instructions to the model, it reframes suspicious evidence as expected behavior of a benign endpoint security tool. On a frozen PE set of 50 malicious samples, the payload flips 30 of the 35 baseline-malicious samples to benign on Gemini 2.5 Pro, while GPT-5.5 Pro and Claude Opus 4.7 produce substantial severity downgrades with significant confidence reductions even when verdict labels are preserved. The attack transfers to ELF binaries, where Gemini flips 16 of 40. A verification-guided defense prompt roughly halves the benign verdicts, but 42.9 percent of malicious samples still reach benign. LLM malware analyzers therefore require provenance checks that separate verified facts from attacker-controlled claims, not narrative trust.