cs.CRNov 16, 2026

LLMs as Validators for Cross-Chain Bridges: Evaluating Source-Level and Transaction-Level Attack Detection on Solana

Authors: Yasir Rahman, Ishraq Samiha, Shahnewaz Karim Sakib, Anindya Bijoy Das

Organizations: Chittagong University of Engineering and Technology Bangladesh · East Delta University Bangladesh · University of Tennessee at Chattanooga USA · The University of Akron USA

Abstract

Cross-chain bridges have suffered substantial asset losses due to vulnerabilities in their on-chain programs. On Solana, missing validation checks can enable exploits even when the underlying blockchain operates correctly. The ability of large language models (LLMs) to diagnose these flaws from source code or transaction records, rather than merely raise alarms, remains insufficiently understood. We implement a native Rust lock-and-mint bridge on a local Solana validator with four exploitable variants: two model flaws from the Cashio and Wormhole incidents, while the other two represent vulnerability classes documented in Solana security audits. Paired vulnerable and secure programs, together with successful attacks, benign sessions, and blocked attempts, allow us to distinguish correct diagnoses from unsupported alarms. We evaluate six configurations of five open-weight models across 16,800 responses, compare source inputs with and without comments, and grade 7,200 answers on vulnerable inputs using two blinded LLM graders. The results reveal substantial differences across conditions: without comments, models diagnose 24% of vulnerable source inputs while frequently flagging the secure bridge. Transaction diagnosis is high for the missing-signer scenario but averages 6% across the other three scenarios. Original comments, some of which describe the flaw, increase source diagnosis to 60%. These findings highlight the importance of distinguishing correct vulnerability diagnoses from unsupported alarms in bridge security review.

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