cs.CVNov 16, 2026

Wrong Input, Wrong Threshold: Re-evaluating Adversarial Facial Privacy

Authors: Tunahan Parlayıcı, Erchan Aptoula, Yücel Saygın

Organizations: Faculty of Engineering and Natural Sciences, Sabancı University, 34956 Istanbul, Türkiye

Abstract

Published face-privacy methods report protection above 90% against black-box recognition models. That number comes from an evaluation protocol with two independent defects, reported in a measure that cannot size either one. The input is wrong: methods published since 2022 feed the network the whole photograph, or a detector's box, where deployed systems detect, align to a landmark template and crop. Re-scoring the same files through a realistic front end costs a standard transfer attack 56% of its dodging protection and a budget-allocating attack 7%, with no image regenerated. The measure is wrong: that loss is a difference of success rates, so it saturates, moving by 8.2x over a budget sweep while the effect beneath it moves by 1.34x. We therefore report the paired cosine shift, in which both thresholds cancel algebraically, so the input defect holds without committing to a calibration. Measured that way it is 2.2x and 10.7x larger on three unseen recognizers, and at matched budget it reverses the L-infinity transfer ranking: the one surveyed method that aligns at evaluation gains 0.18 where MI-FGSM loses 0.05. The cause is a resampling mismatch, not perturbation lost outside the crop; optimising through a differentiable alignment operator largely removes it, adding +24 to +58 points on unseen recognizers and a commercial system, with a residual on one of them. The thresholds are wrong: the four constants inherited since 2021 hold the false-accept rate near its nominal 1% on aligned crops but admit 2.3-5.4% on whole images, with an opposite-signed bias across dodging and impersonation, the two tasks reported side by side. Differentiable alignment and gallery scoring are not new: the first generation of this literature used both, and we show what dropping them cost.

Figures & tables

Explore similar work

Mar 23, 2026

Adversarial Camouflage

While the rapid development of facial recognition algorithms has enabled numerous beneficial applications, their widespread deployment has raised significant concerns about the risks of mass surveillance and threats to individual privacy. In this paper, we introduce Adversarial Camouflage as a novel solution for protecting users' privacy. This approach is designed to be efficient and simple to reproduce for users in the physical world. The algorithm starts by defining a low-dimensional pattern space parameterized by color, shape, and angle. Optimized patterns, once found, are projected onto semantically valid facial regions for evaluation. Our method maximizes recognition error across multiple architectures, ensuring high cross-model transferability even against black-box systems. It significantly degrades the performance of all tested state-of-the-art face recognition models during simulations and demonstrates promising results in real-world human experiments, while revealing differences in model robustness and evidence of attack transferability across architectures.
Oct 12, 2026

SSM-Attack: Learning Where to Perturb for Black-Box Face Privacy

Face recognition systems are deployed widely enough that a photograph shared online can be matched without its subject's consent. Generator-based protection methods rely on heavy pretrained backbones, multi-stage inference or visible semantic edits. We introduce SSM-Attack, a black-box face privacy framework built on Selective State Space Models. Rather than synthesizing the perturbation, the state-space model predicts in one linear-time pass a spatial allocation of the perturbation budget, marking which facial locations carry identity evidence; a short projected refinement then sets the values within this per-pixel budget. Against published benchmark results, SSM-Attack attains the highest average black-box attack success rate on all three evaluation sets: 87.10 percent on CelebA-HQ, 86.90 on LADN and 81.15 on FFHQ, the last from a network that never saw that dataset. The allocation network holds 5.73 million parameters, or 16.13 million with the frozen networks used by its quality terms. Under the same cap of 0.10 on the maximum per-pixel change, allocation improves structural similarity by 0.044, peak signal-to-noise ratio by 1.62 decibels and Frechet Inception Distance by 11.2 points over a uniform map while spending 37 percent of its capacity. Strong facial privacy protection therefore does not require a large generative prior; it requires knowing where to spend a small one.
Oct 6, 2026

Adaptive Model Inversion Attacks Generalize a Privacy-Robustness Tradeoff

In this paper, we show that standard evaluations of high-resolution Model Inversion Attacks (MIAs) significantly underestimate training-data privacy leakage. State-of-the-art privacy defenses, standard training techniques such as MixUp and Adversarial Training, and undefended models all leak training images at rates 1.16 to 6.59 times higher on FaceScrub under simple adaptive changes to the attack, with the largest increases among defenses reporting the strongest privacy. We further show that measured leakage depends on the feature basis of the external classifier used to evaluate reconstructions: for the same reconstructed images, an adversarially trained Inception evaluator identifies the targeted identity at different rates than the standard Inception evaluator. Our results suggest that standard MIA evaluation can mistake optimization and measurement failures for privacy. These underestimated leakage rates also concealed a broader relationship between privacy and adversarial robustness. Once we adapt the attack and vary the evaluator, reconstruction leakage closely tracks adversarial robustness across recent defenses and standard training regimes, suggesting that robustness provides an attack-agnostic proxy for reconstruction vulnerability that applies far more broadly than previously theorized. This raises an open question: can a practical defense reduce training-data reconstruction without paying a corresponding cost in adversarial robustness?