The regulation of Artificial Intelligence is susceptible to various forms of capture by industry actors that hold undue influence over the policymaking process, due in part to their information advantage in developing these technologies. In the following paper, we investigate the roles of public commenters in providing evidence to potential regulation in the USA. We build a corpus of 40 potential regulations, and 2,664 public comments submitted by a variety of stakeholders. We computationally process these texts to extract evidence meant to inform regulators, in the form of formal citations and informal references. We find significant differences in the type and amount of evidence supplied: Holding comment length constant, business commenters introduce altogether less evidence, and government, university, and civil society commenters provide significantly more research and legal sources. The publication status of cited research is nearly evenly split, with preprints and peer-reviewed articles being introduced by commenters of all types. We further explore patterns of self-citation and find that while it is prevalent amongst all groups, a small cluster of organizations account for over half of all self-citations in our corpus. Our findings complicate a narrative that public comments alone are means to information capture. We interpret these results in terms of the role that commenters attempt to play in the policymaking process-being either an Issue Advocate or an Honest Broker. These findings on the supply of evidence in public comments shed light on an often overlooked form of policymaking that has implications for how and through what sources information is made accessible to regulators of AI.
Figures & tables
Label
Precision
Recall
F1
citation_sentence
0.819
0.896
0.856
citation_link
0.800
0.822
0.811
citation_footnote/reference
0.810
0.811
0.810
author_name
0.894
0.876
0.885
author_affiliation
0.758
0.649
0.699
Table 1. Classification performance by label.
Figure 1. Distribution of evidence cited, by commenter type
Figure 2. Rate ratios of expected evidence type cited relative to business/industry commenters
Predictor
b
SE
z
OR
95% CI
p
Intercept ( Business/Industry )
0.041
0.172
0.24
1.04
[0.74, 1.46]
.812
Government
1.024
0.479
2.14
× 2.78
[1.09, 7.12]
.033
Civil Society Org.
0.234
0.224
1.05
× 1.26
[0.82, 1.96]
.295
Trade/Coalition Org.
0.371
0.215
1.73
× 1.45
[0.95, 2.21]
.084
University
0.695
0.305
2.28
× 2.00
[1.10, 3.64]
.023
Table 3. Mixed-effects logistic regression of self-citation, by commenter type
Contrast
b
SE
z
Ratio
95% CI
p
Business/industry vs.
Government
−0.766
0.260
−2.94
0.47
[0.22, 0.98]
.039
Individual
0.479
0.126
3.78
1.61
[1.13, 2.31]
.002
Civil society organization
−0.842
0.122
−6.89
0.43
[0.30, 0.61]
< .001
Trade/coalition
−0.509
0.114
−4.45
0.60
[0.43, 0.83]
< .001
University
−0.877
0.165
−5.31
0.42
[0.26, 0.67]
< .001
Table 4. Pairwise comparisons of expected citation counts by commenter type
Figure 3. Citation of Peer-reviewed Research vs Preprints
Commenter type
Works
Self- citations
Self-citation rate
Preprint self-citations
% to preprints (95% CI)
Business/industry
748
117
15.6%
75
64.1% (55.1, 72.2)
Government
173
27
15.6%
5
18.5% (8.2, 36.7)
Civil Society
1,302
179
13.7%
87
48.6% (41.4, 55.9)
Trade/coalition organization
443
7
1.6%
2
28.6% (8.2, 64.1)
University
1,146
462
40.3%
178
38.5% (34.2, 43.0)
Table 5. Self-citation and preprint self-citation by commenter type
Figure 4. Identified Comment Duplicates
Label
Ground Truth
Model’s Annotation
citation_sentence
A dynamic, risk-based approach to AI regulation is necessary (National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST], 2023).
I. Dynamic, Risk-Based Approach: A dynamic, risk-based approach to AI regulation is necessary (National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST], 2023).
National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2023). Artificial intelligence risk management framework (AI RMF 1.0) . https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/NIST.AI.100-1.pdf
National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2023). Artificial intelligence risk management framework (AI RMF 1.0) . https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/NIST.AI.100-1.pdf
Artificial intelligence governance studies how laws, institutions, and technical controls shape AI development, deployment, accountability, and social effects.
The growing role of AI-generated content and AI-enabled systems in public communication has led regulators to demand clear disclosure of content provenance and AI involvement. But the effects of such disclosures remain uncertain. We test two disclosure approaches in their impact on an AI chatbot's persuasive appeal. In a preregistered experiment, 1,500 UK adults held a short conversation with a persuasive chatbot about one of 60 policy issues. The chatbot was identical for everyone. We randomized the disclosure that people received: nothing (control), a prominent disclosure that they were interacting with an AI (T1), or that disclosure plus the chatbot's persuasive intent and instructions (T2). The chatbot shifted attitudes by 12.6 points on a 100-point scale in the control group. The AI-identity disclosure was practically equivalent to no disclosure, with a 13.1-point shift, whereas the additional intent disclosure cut the persuasive effect roughly in half to 6.3 points. It also made participants view the campaign's methods as less acceptable and support stronger penalties against it. For direct chatbot interactions, transparency about AI identity alone does not meaningfully impact its influence. While current rules emphasize what a system is, our results show why the regulation of persuasive AI must also address what the system is trying to do.
Adrian Rauchfleisch, Andreas Jungherr
1National Taiwan University · University of Bamberg
Present practice of deciding on regulation faces numerous problems that make adopted regulations static, unexplained, unduly influenced by powerful interest groups, and stained with a perception of illegitimacy. These well-known problems with the regulatory process can lead to injustice and have substantial negative effects on society and democracy. We discuss a new approach that utilizes distributed artificial intelligence (AI) to make a regulatory recommendation that is explainable and adaptable by design. We outline the main components of a system that can implement this approach and show how it would resolve the problems with the present regulatory system. This approach models and reasons about stakeholder preferences with separate preference models, while it aggregates these preferences in a value sensitive way. Such recommendations can be updated due to changes in facts or in values and are inherently explainable. We suggest how stakeholders can make their preferences known to the system and how they can verify whether they were properly considered in the regulatory decision. The resulting system promises to support regulatory justice, legitimacy, and compliance.
Thomas Hofweber, Andreas Sudmann, Evangelos Pournaras
University North Carolina at Chapel Hill · University of Bonn · University of Leeds
Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming economies, societies, and polities, raising fundamental questions about how it should be regulated. Policymakers face choices over whether to prioritize innovation or safety, rely on public oversight or private self-regulation, and govern nationally or internationally. Yet little is known about how citizens evaluate these competing priorities. Here we report a conjoint survey experiment conducted in seven countries with diverse political and economic profiles. We find that citizens strongly support regulating AI and generally prioritize safety over innovation, public governance over private self-regulation, and international over national approaches. The preference for safety is strongest among those who perceive AI as risky, unpredictable, and personally consequential. These findings reveal a systematic misalignment between dominant regulatory approaches and citizen preferences.
Magnus Lundgren, Jonas Tallberg
Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg · Department of Political Science, Stockholm University