cs.AINov 18, 2026

Study and Improvement of Search Algorithms in Stochastic Perfect-Information

Authors: Quentin Cohen-Solal, Tristan Cazenave

Abstract

In this article, we generalize Unbounded Minimax, the state- of-the-art search algorithm for deterministic zero-sum two- player games with perfect information to the framework of stochastic zero-sum two-player games with perfect informa- tion. We experimentally show that this generalized algorithm achieves better performance than the main stochastic search algorithms.

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