Mechanism Design
Mechanism design focuses on creating rules and incentives for interactions among self-interested agents to achieve desirable outcomes, such as maximizing social welfare or revenue. Current research emphasizes developing mechanisms that are robust to strategic behavior, incorporating fairness constraints, and handling uncertainty in agent preferences, often employing techniques like multi-fidelity neural networks, reinforcement learning, and differentially private online learning algorithms. This field is crucial for designing efficient and equitable systems in diverse applications, including resource allocation, auctions, and multi-agent coordination, impacting both theoretical understanding of game theory and the practical design of real-world systems.
Papers
The Good Shepherd: An Oracle Agent for Mechanism Design
Jan Balaguer, Raphael Koster, Christopher Summerfield, Andrea Tacchetti
HCMD-zero: Learning Value Aligned Mechanisms from Data
Jan Balaguer, Raphael Koster, Ari Weinstein, Lucy Campbell-Gillingham, Christopher Summerfield, Matthew Botvinick, Andrea Tacchetti