AI Accountability

AI agents increasingly act on behalf of humans, yet no existing system provides a tamper-evident, independently verifiable record of what they did. As regulations such as the EU AI Act begin mandating automatic logging for high-risk AI systems, this gap carries concrete consequences -- especially for agents running on personal hardware, where no centralized provider controls the log. Extending Floridi's informational rights framework from data about individuals to actions performed on their behalf, this paper proposes the Right to History: the principle that individuals are entitled to a complete, verifiable record of every AI agent action on their own hardware. The paper formalizes this principle through five system invariants with structured proof sketches, and implements it in PunkGo, a Rust sovereignty kernel that unifies RFC 6962 Merkle tree audit logs, capability-based isolation, energy-budget governance, and a human-approval mechanism. Adversarial testing confirms all five invariants hold. Performance evaluation shows sub-1.3 ms median action latency, ~400 actions/sec throughput, and 448-byte Merkle inclusion proofs at 10,000 log entries.

The proliferation of agentic artificial intelligence systems--characterized by autonomous goal-seeking, tool use, and multi-agent coordination--presents unprecedented challenges to existing legal and financial regulatory frameworks. While traditional AI governance has focused on model-level alignment through training-time interventions such as Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), the deployment of large language models (LLMs) as persistent agents necessitates a paradigm shift toward institutional governance structures. This paper examines the intersection of agentic AI, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), and their implications for legal accountability and financial market integrity. Through analysis of the Institutional AI framework, we argue that alignment must be reconceptualized as a mechanism design problem involving runtime governance graphs, sanction functions, and observable behavioral constraints rather than internalized constitutional values[...].The analysis concludes that the future of AI governance lies not in perfecting isolated model behavior, but in architecting institutional environments where compliant behavior emerges as the dominant strategy through carefully calibrated payoff landscapes.

AI-related incidents are becoming increasingly frequent and severe, ranging from safety failures to misuse by malicious actors. In such complex situations, identifying which elements caused an adverse outcome, the problem of cause selection, is a critical first step for establishing liability. This paper investigates folk perceptions of causal responsibility in causal chain structures when AI systems are involved in harmful outcomes. We conduct human experiments to examine judgments of causality, blame, foreseeability, and counterfactual reasoning. Our findings show that: (1) When AI agency was moderate (human sets the goal, AI determines the means) or high (AI sets the goal and the means), participants attributed greater causal responsibility to the AI. However, under low AI agency (where a human sets both a goal and means) participants assigned greater causal responsibility to the human despite their temporal distance from the outcome and despite both agents intended it, suggesting an effect of autonomy; (2) When we reversed roles between human and AI, participants consistently judged the human as more causal, even when both agents perform the same action; (3) The developer, despite being distant in the chain, was judged highly causal, reducing causal attributions to the human user but not to the AI; (4) Decomposing the AI into a large language model and an agentic component showed that the agentic part was judged as more causal in the chain. Overall, our research provides evidence on how people perceive the causal contribution of AI in both misuse and misalignment scenarios, and how these judgments interact with the roles of users and developers, key actors in assigning responsibility. These findings can inform the design of liability frameworks for AI-caused harms and shed light on how intuitive judgments shape social and policy debates surrounding real-world AI-related incidents.

When building AI systems for decision support, one often encounters the phenomenon of predictive multiplicity: a single best model does not exist; instead, one can construct many models with similar overall accuracy that differ in their predictions for individual cases. Especially when decisions have a direct impact on humans, this can be highly unsatisfactory. For a person subject to high disagreement between models, one could as well have chosen a different model of similar overall accuracy that would have decided the person's case differently. We argue that this arbitrariness conflicts with the EU AI Act, which requires providers of high-risk AI systems to report performance not only at the dataset level but also for specific persons. The goal of this paper is to put predictive multiplicity in context with the EU AI Act's provisions on accuracy and to subsequently derive concrete suggestions on how to evaluate and report predictive multiplicity in practice. Specifically: (1) We introduce the AI Act's accuracy provisions and argue that incorporating information about predictive multiplicity could serve compliance with specific provisions for providers. (2) Based on this legally rigorous analysis, we suggest individual conflict ratios and $δ$-ambiguity as tools to quantify the disagreement between models on individual cases and to help detect individuals subject to conflicting predictions. (3) Based on computational insights, we derive easy-to-implement rules on how model providers could evaluate predictive multiplicity in practice. (4) Ultimately, we suggest that information about predictive multiplicity should be made available to deployers under the AI Act, enabling them to judge whether system outputs for specific individuals are reliable enough for their use case.

Equity Bias is a philosophical and practical framework for building more equitable AI systems. It treats AI as an interpretive agent that constructs meaning and knowledge rather than as a neutral calculator. Grounded in Gadamerian hermeneutics and epistemic injustice theory, Equity Bias views bias not as an error to eliminate but as a reflection of whose knowledge is encoded into systems. Since all knowledge is situated, neutral systems are not possible. While traditional approaches aim to reduce or remove bias, Equity Bias instead makes bias transparent and contestable. Its three-stage AI Life Cycle (Equity Archaeology, Co-Creating Meaning, and Ongoing Accountability) turns these principles into practice. Equity Bias gives developers, researchers, policymakers, and communities affected by AI a method for examining whose knowledge a system encodes and who has the power to contest it. By placing the politics of knowledge at the centre of equitable AI design, Equity Bias offers a distinct approach to AI ethics.

Existing AI disclosure mandates in scholarship require that AI assistance be reported but leave transparency philosophically unspecified: they fix the duty without explaining what the duty serves. We argue that ethical inquiry is essentially contested at two independent levels -- about what it is, and about what it demands of the inquirer -- defeating output-only evaluation and welfare-economic dismissal of the transparency question, and, by extension, reproducibility framings imported from the empirical sciences. The transparency duty is grounded instead in agent-integrity: the legibility, before a community of inquiry, of the identity-constituting commitments that the author's mode of philosophising expresses. Because the standards for evaluating such work are not communally settled, the achievable goal for transparency is not evaluation against agreed criteria but tracking -- accumulating the evidentiary record that lets each tradition assess the work on its own terms and makes future normative judgments possible. We develop a documentation-adequacy framework that operationalises Meaningful Human Control through five transparency elements -- declaration, navigation, documentation account, process documentation, and development records -- demonstrated by the paper itself, whose full documentation record is archived at a persistent identifier. The framework is a first iteration subject to revision, not a settled standard.

This paper examines the role of public interest litigation in promoting accountability for AI and automated decision-making (ADM) in Australia. Since ADM regulation faces political and geopolitical headwinds, effective governance will have to rely on the enforcement of existing laws. Drawing on interviews with Australian public interest litigators, technology policy activists, and technology law scholars, the paper positions public interest litigation as part of a larger ecosystem for transparency, accountability and justice with respect to ADM. The paper explores the tactics and strategies of what one participant described as 'retrofitting' old laws to ADM. These go beyond creative legal argumentation, to encompass practices of community-building, collaboration on theories of change, canny selection of clients and causes of action, and aligning the interests of stakeholders in litigation. Naturally, the paper also contends with the limits of these strategies, and of the Australian legal system. Where limits are capable of being overcome, the paper presents findings on urgent needs: the enabling institutional arrangements without which effective litigation and accountability will falter. The paper is relevant to law and technology scholars, individuals and groups harmed by ADM, public interest litigators and technology lawyers, civil society and advocacy organisations, and policymakers.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) can undermine and strengthen democratic governance. This paper introduces the AIRD/AIPD framework, a dual taxonomy and operational framework for analyzing AI's democratic risks and conditional contributions. The AI Risks to Democracy (AIRD) taxonomy identifies threats to autonomy, fairness, public discourse, democratic institutions, and trust, while the AI's Positive Contributions to Democracy (AIPD) taxonomy captures AI's potential to enhance efficiency, accessibility, security, informed citizenry, transparency and accountability, inclusive democratic dialogue, and evidence-based policymaking. Grounded in five democratic principles and the seven Trustworthy AI requirements proposed by the European Commission's High-Level Expert Group on AI, the framework connects democratic goals with governance and design mechanisms. It provides an operational process for identifying affected contexts and actors, classifying primary and secondary AIRD/AIPD effects, mapping them to relevant Trustworthy AI requirements, and defining proportionate governance responses and responsible actors. An operational mapping and two worked examples illustrate its application to electoral misinformation and AI-assisted public service allocation. The analysis highlights the transversal relevance of transparency, accountability, fairness, and societal wellbeing, while recognizing trade-offs, implementation costs, differential impacts, institutional capacity, and contextual variation across democratic settings. The framework is conceptual and has not been empirically validated, but it offers a traceable and adaptable basis for research, policy analysis, institutional oversight, and responsible AI design. By connecting democratic diagnosis with governance action, it bridges the gap between normative principles and the operational requirements of trustworthy and democratically legitimate AI.