Overview

Information flow control studies how to prevent sensitive or untrusted data from reaching unauthorized destinations or influencing unsafe actions. Systems label data and track its provenance using techniques such as taint analysis, security lattices, capabilities, and type systems, then enforce rules with runtime monitors or policy-aware data infrastructure. For AI agents, these controls can cover tool use, prompt-injection risks, retrieval, persistent memory, and communication between agents, with carefully scoped declassification allowing permitted disclosures. A central challenge is maintaining strong, compositional guarantees across changing workflows and recipients without blocking useful work; benchmarks and formal methods are still catching up with these complex settings.

Latest papers

34 papers6 papers in the last four weeks, down 25% on the four weeks before. 0.0% of all new papers.

May 11, 2026

The Granularity Mismatch in Agent Security: Argument-Level Provenance Solves Enforcement and Isolates the LLM Reasoning Bottleneck

Tool-using LLM agents must act on untrusted webpages, emails, files, and API outputs while issuing privileged tool calls. Existing defenses often mediate trust at the granularity of an entire tool invocation, forcing a brittle choice in mixed-trust workflows: allow external content to influence a call and risk hijacked destinations or commands, or quarantine the call and block benign retrieval-then-act behavior. The key observation behind this paper is that indirect prompt injection becomes dangerous not when untrusted content appears in context, but when it determines an authority-bearing argument. We present PACT (Provenance-Aware Capability Contracts), a runtime monitor that assigns semantic roles to tool arguments, tracks value provenance across replanning steps, and checks whether each argument's origin satisfies its role-specific trust contract. Under oracle provenance, PACT achieves 100% utility and 100% security on mixed-trust diagnostic suites, while flat invocation-level monitors incur false positives or false negatives. In full AgentDojo deployments across five models, PACT reaches 100% security on the three strongest models while recovering 38.1--46.4% utility, 8--16 percentage points above CaMeL at the same security level. Ablations show that both semantic roles and cross-step provenance are necessary. PACT reframes agent security as authority binding, and isolates the remaining deployment bottleneck to provenance inference and contract synthesis.
Apr 21, 2026

An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data

AI agents promise to serve as general-purpose personal assistants for their users, which requires them to have access to private user data (e.g., personal and financial information). This poses a serious risk to security and privacy. Adversaries may attack the AI model (e.g., via prompt injection) to exfiltrate user data. Furthermore, sharing private data with an AI agent requires users to trust a potentially unscrupulous or compromised AI model provider with their private data. This paper presents GAAP (Guaranteed Accounting for Agent Privacy), an execution environment for AI agents that guarantees confidentiality for private user data. Through dynamic and directed user prompts, GAAP collects permission specifications from users describing how their private data may be shared, and GAAP enforces that the agent's disclosures of private user data, including disclosures to the AI model and its provider, comply with these specifications. Crucially, GAAP provides this guarantee deterministically, without trusting the agent with private user data, and without requiring any AI model or the user prompt to be free of attacks. GAAP enforces the user's permission specification by tracking how the AI agent accesses and uses private user data. It augments Information Flow Control with novel persistent data stores and annotations that enable it to track the flow of private information both across execution steps within a single task, and also over multiple tasks separated in time. Our evaluation confirms that GAAP blocks all data disclosure attacks, including those that make other state-of-the-art systems disclose private user data to untrusted parties, without a significant impact on agent utility.
Apr 2, 2026

Free Information Disrupts Even Bayesian Crowds

A core tenet underpinning the conception of contemporary information networks, such as social media platforms, is that users should not be constrained in the amount of information they can freely and willingly exchange with one another about a given topic. By means of a computational agent-based model, we show how even in groups of truth-seeking and cooperative agents with perfect information-processing abilities, unconstrained information exchange may lead to detrimental effects on the correctness of the group's beliefs. If unconstrained information exchange can be detrimental even among such idealized agents, it is prudent to assume it can also be so in practice. We therefore argue that constraints on information flow should be carefully considered in the design of communication networks with substantial societal impact, such as social media platforms.
Mar 1, 2026

Tracking Capabilities for Safer Agents

AI agents that interact with the real world through tool calls pose fundamental safety challenges: agents might leak private information, cause unintended side effects, or be manipulated through prompt injection. To address these challenges, we propose to put the agent in a programming-language-based "safety harness": instead of calling tools directly, agents express their intentions as code in a capability-safe language: Scala 3 with capture checking. Capabilities are program variables that regulate access to effects and resources of interest. Scala's type system tracks capabilities statically, providing fine-grained control over what an agent can do. In particular, it enables local purity, the ability to enforce that sub-computations are side-effect-free, preventing information leakage when agents process classified data. We demonstrate that extensible agent safety harnesses can be built by leveraging a strong type system with tracked capabilities. Our experiments show that agents can generate capability-safe code with no significant loss in task performance, while the type system reliably prevents unsafe behaviors such as information leakage and malicious side effects.