Network Intrusion Detection

Overview

Network intrusion detection studies how to identify attacks and suspicious behavior from network flows, packet sequences, and related telemetry, often without inspecting encrypted payloads. Common approaches include supervised flow classifiers such as random forests and gradient boosting, anomaly detectors such as autoencoders, and temporal or graph models; federated learning lets organizations collaborate without sharing raw traffic. Researchers also explore detecting unseen attacks, explaining alerts, and resisting adversarial evasion, while adapting models to settings such as IoT, industrial control, and vehicle networks. A central challenge is that high benchmark scores may not transfer across networks or time, and reliable deployment must balance rare-attack detection against false alarms, latency, privacy, and resource limits.

Latest papers

184 papers17 papers in the last four weeks, down 29% on the four weeks before. 0.1% of all new papers.

Sep 24, 2025

Adversarial Defense in Cybersecurity: A Systematic Review of GANs for Threat Detection and Mitigation

Machine learning-based cybersecurity systems are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks, while Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) act as both powerful attack enablers and promising defenses. This survey systematically reviews GAN-based adversarial defenses in cybersecurity (2021--August 31, 2025), consolidating recent progress, identifying gaps, and outlining future directions. Using a PRISMA-compliant systematic literature review protocol, we searched five major digital libraries. From 829 initial records, 185 peer-reviewed studies were retained and synthesized through quantitative trend analysis and thematic taxonomy development. We introduce a four-dimensional taxonomy spanning defensive function, GAN architecture, cybersecurity domain, and adversarial threat model. GANs improve detection accuracy, robustness, and data utility across network intrusion detection, malware analysis, and IoT security. Notable advances include WGAN-GP for stable training, CGANs for targeted synthesis, and hybrid GAN models for improved resilience. Yet, persistent challenges remain such as instability in training, lack of standardized benchmarks, high computational cost, and limited explainability. GAN-based defenses demonstrate strong potential but require advances in stable architectures, benchmarking, transparency, and deployment. We propose a roadmap emphasizing hybrid models, unified evaluation, real-world integration, and defenses against emerging threats such as LLM-driven cyberattacks. This survey establishes the foundation for scalable, trustworthy, and adaptive GAN-powered defenses.
Sep 17, 2025

Risk-Calibrated Bayesian Streaming Intrusion Detection with SRE-Aligned Decisions

[Corrected v2: an audit found that the score, threshold, and latency descriptions below are not what the shared codebase implements, and that the evaluation streams are assembled constructions. See the correction note on the title page and the corrected companion work, arXiv:2605.24696 (corrected v3), artifact doi:10.5281/zenodo.22673735.] We present a risk-calibrated approach to streaming intrusion detection that couples Bayesian Online Changepoint Detection (BOCPD) with decision thresholds aligned to Site Reliability Engineering (SRE) error budgets. BOCPD provides run-length posteriors that adapt to distribution shift and concept drift; we map these posteriors to alert decisions by optimizing expected operational cost under false-positive and false-negative budgets. We detail the hazard model, conjugate updates, and an O(1)-per-event implementation. A concrete SRE example shows how a 99.9% availability SLO (43.2 minutes per month error budget) yields a probability threshold near 0.91 when missed incidents are 10x more costly than false alarms. We evaluate on the full UNSW-NB15 and CIC-IDS2017 benchmarks with chronological splits, comparing against strong unsupervised baselines (ECOD, COPOD, and LOF). Metrics include PR-AUC, ROC-AUC, Brier score, calibration reliability diagrams, and detection latency measured in events. Results indicate improved precision-recall at mid to high recall and better probability calibration relative to baselines. We release implementation details, hyperparameters, and ablations for hazard sensitivity and computational footprint. Code and reproducibility materials will be made available upon publication; datasets and implementation are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.
Aug 26, 2025

FALCON: Transforming Cyber Threat Intelligence into Deployable IDS Rules with Self-Reflection

Signature-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) detect malicious activity by matching network or host events against predefined rules. Security analysts manually develop these rules from Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI). As threats evolve, this manual pipeline faces two bottlenecks. Before authoring a new rule, an analyst must reconcile the incoming CTI with the existing rule base and determine whether to create, update, or retire one. This process is challenging due to the representational differences between the CTI and Rule formats. This gap limits the effectiveness of keyword- and embedding-based search, making rule reconciliation cognitively demanding and, in turn, contributing to "rule bloat". Second, automated verification of a new rule is inherently difficult as zero-day threats lack ground truth from simulated testing. Hence, standard metrics cannot prove that a rule semantically adheres to the CTI, and the use of LLMs leads to non-deterministic behavior. To address these challenges, we introduce FALCON, an agentic framework for CTI-grounded rule retrieval, generation, and validation. At its core, a novel CTI-Rule semantic scorer, quantifies the functional alignment between a CTI and a rule; the same signal drives a retriever that surfaces relevant deployed rules and a ground-truth-free validator that scores generated ones. Around it, a generation pipeline produces deployable rules from CTI in real time and refines them through self-reflective syntactic, semantic, and performance validators. Across network (Snort) and host-based (YARA) platforms on a purpose-built CTI-Rule dataset, FALCON attains a mean relevance of 0.72 (approx), with 84% inter-rater agreement among cybersecurity analysts, underscoring the promise of real-time security automation.
Apr 2, 2025

CO-DEFEND: Continuous Decentralized Federated Learning for Secure DoH-Based Threat Detection

The use of DNS over HTTPS (DoH) tunneling by an attacker to hide malicious activity within encrypted DNS traffic poses a serious threat to network security, as it allows malicious actors to bypass traditional monitoring and intrusion detection systems while evading detection by conventional traffic analysis techniques. ML techniques can be used to detect DoH tunnels; however, their effectiveness relies on large datasets containing both benign and malicious traffic. Sharing such datasets across entities is challenging due to privacy concerns. In this work, we propose CO-DEFEND framework that enables multiple entities to collaboratively train a classification machine learning model for DoH threat detection while preserving data privacy, enhancing scalability and resilience against single points of failure. The proposed DFL framework provides a realistic implementation for DoH threat detection, enabling multiple entities to train their local models online with incoming DoH flows in real-time batches as they are processed - an approach that fits naturally within modern Internet architectures. This framework adapts four classical machine learning algorithms, Support Vector Machines, Logistic Regression, Decision Trees, and Random Forest, for federated scenarios and efficient training. In addition, a key methodological feature of CO-DEFEND is the use of DT and RF as model selection rather than aggregation mechanisms, allowing each participant to retain interpretable and locally optimal decision structures while benefiting from collective updates. We compare our proposed method by using the dataset CIRA-CIC-DoHBrw-2020 with existing machine learning approaches, including more computationally complex alternatives such as neural networks, to demonstrate its effectiveness in detecting malicious DoH tunnels while improving scalability and computational efficiency.