cs.LGFeb 3, 2023

Robust Budget Pacing with a Single Sample

Authors: Santiago Balseiro, Rachitesh Kumar, Vahab Mirrokni, Balasubramanian Sivan, Di Wang

Organizations: DRO, Columbia Business School, New York, NY, USA · Google Research, New York, NY, USA · IEOR, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA

Abstract

Major Internet advertising platforms offer budget pacing tools as a standard service for advertisers to manage their ad campaigns. Given the inherent non-stationarity in an advertiser's value and also competing advertisers' values over time, a commonly used approach is to learn a target expenditure plan that specifies a target spend as a function of time, and then run a controller that tracks this plan. This raises the question: how many historical samples are required to learn a good expenditure plan? We study this question by considering an advertiser repeatedly participating in TT second-price auctions, where the tuple of her value and the highest competing bid is drawn from an unknown time-varying distribution. The advertiser seeks to maximize her total utility subject to her budget constraint. Prior work has shown the sufficiency of Tlog⁡TT\log T samples per distribution to achieve the optimal O(T)O(\sqrt{T})-regret. We dramatically improve this state-of-the-art and show that just one sample per distribution is enough to achieve the near-optimal O~(T)\tilde O(\sqrt{T})-regret, while still being robust to noise in the sampling distributions.

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Appendix

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