cs.LGAug 13, 2023

Approximate and Weighted Data Reconstruction Attack in Federated Learning

Authors: Yongcun Song, Ziqi Wang, Enrique Zuazua

Organizations: Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 28049 Madrid, Spain

Abstract

Federated Learning (FL) is a distributed learning paradigm that enables multiple clients to collaborate on building a machine learning model without sharing their private data. Although FL is considered privacy-preserved by design, recent data reconstruction attacks demonstrate that an attacker can recover clients' training data based on the parameters shared in FL. However, most existing methods fail to attack the most widely used horizontal Federated Averaging (FedAvg) scenario, where clients share model parameters after multiple local training steps. To tackle this issue, we propose an interpolation-based approximation method, which makes attacking FedAvg scenarios feasible by generating the intermediate model updates of the clients' local training processes. Then, we design a layer-wise weighted loss function to improve the data quality of reconstruction. We assign different weights to model updates in different layers concerning the neural network structure, with the weights tuned by Bayesian optimization. Finally, experimental results validate the superiority of our proposed approximate and weighted attack (AWA) method over the other state-of-the-art methods, as demonstrated by the substantial improvement in different evaluation metrics for image data reconstructions. The source code is available at https://github.com/DCN-FAU-AvH/FL-AWA-attack.

Figures & tables

Explore similar work

Sep 9, 2026

Cascading Gradient Inversion via LT-Code Inspired Peeling in Federated Learning

Federated learning shares model updates rather than raw data, yet these updates can be inverted to reconstruct the clients' training data. Analytic reconstruction attacks, which invert a gradient in closed form, degrade as the batch grows: prior single-round attacks recover only about half of a batch of size 100100 even when the attacker fully controls the network parameters, and known upper bounds limit what any such method can recover. We establish a connection between gradient inversion and the theory of erasure-correcting codes, and use it to construct attacks that exceed these bounds. Our attacks recover batches exactly, together with every sample's label, from a single FedSGD round, and certify each recovery without ground-truth data. On eight image and tabular benchmarks they outperform prior single-round attacks by a wide margin. Even a passive attacker who only observes an honestly trained network recovers 9494--100%100\% of ImageNet batches at sizes up to 128128, more than prior single-round attacks achieve even with active manipulation of the model, and in the active setting more than 90%90\% is recovered at batch sizes of several hundred. These results show that the privacy leakage of federated learning has been underestimated.
Jul 8, 2026

FedCVESA: Taking Away Training Data in Federated Learning via Correlation Value Encoding and Segmented Aggregation

Federated learning (FL) avoids explicit data exposure by keeping raw data on local clients, yet privacy risks remain in the training process and the learned model itself. Recently, centralized Taking Away Training Data (TATD) attacks have shown that malicious training could abuse the memorization capacity of deep models to store and later recover training data. However, this memorization-based threat has not been systematically studied under FL environments, where multi-client averaging could overwrite encoded training data. In this paper, we study a white-box TATD attack in which a malicious server selects n target clients from K participating clients and actively writes private training data into the global model during federated training. We propose FedCVESA, a federated variant of Correlation Value Encoding Attack (CVEA), by adding a Pearson-correlation regularizer to the loss function of target clients, so that private training data are gradually encoded into selected model parameters, referred to as carrier parameters. To reduce the overwriting of carrier parameters during server aggregation, we further propose segmented aggregation over dispersed carrier parameters, preserving selected carrier parameters while keeping standard averaging on the remaining parameters. Experiments on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10 under Dirichlet non-IID partitions show that the proposed method can steal semantically meaningful private training images from the trained model while maintaining acceptable main-task utility in a controlled proof-of-concept setting. These results demonstrate that FL can become a parameter-level memorization channel for active TATD attack under the studied white-box malicious-server setting.
May 4, 2026

Adversarial Update-Based Federated Unlearning for Poisoned Model Recovery

Federated learning (FL) is vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where malicious clients upload manipulated updates to degrade the performance of the global model. Although detection methods can identify and remove malicious clients, the model remains affected. Retraining from scratch is effective but costly, and existing unlearning methods remain unsatisfactory in both effectiveness and efficiency. We propose Federated Adversarial Unlearning (FAUN), a lightweight framework that retains only a short window of malicious clients' updates and employs adversarial optimization on a proxy dataset to derive updates that eliminate malicious directions. Applying these updates for a few unlearning rounds, followed by benign fine-tuning, enables fast removal of malicious effects and stable recovery. Experiments on three canonical datasets show that FAUN achieves recovery comparable to retraining while requiring far fewer rounds and reduces attack success rates to near zero, confirming FAUN successfully eliminates the contributions of unlearned clients.