An Incomplete Loop: Deductive, Inductive, and Abductive Reasoning in Language Models

Language models are trained to follow instructions, but they are also powerful pattern completers. What happens when these two objectives conflict? We construct conversations in which a user instruction to behave in a target way T (e.g., always output a specific token, answer in a particular language, or adopt a persona) is opposed by N hardcoded assistant turns demonstrating a competing pattern P. We then measure instruction-following (IF) rates in this setting, across 13 models and 16 different instructions, for up to 50 turns. Average instruction-following rates range from 1% to 99% across models, largely uncorrelated with standard capability benchmarks. The transition from instruction-following to pattern-following is universal but highly model-dependent. Robustness is modulated both by instruction content, with models resisting induction longer when instructions align with their trained value priors, and by output format, with diverse multi-token responses proving substantially more resistant than single-token outputs. Chain-of-thought reasoning improves robustness but does not eliminate susceptibility, and can produce dissociation between correct deliberation and incorrect output. When asked to predict their behavior in this setting, models achieve 83.5% accuracy on average but systematically underestimate their own resistance to induction pressure. These results suggest that instruction-following remains brittle under induction pressure even for otherwise capable models, and that output diversity, rather than semantic engagement with the input, is the primary factor predicting robustness.

Humans effortlessly go beyond literal meanings: If you mow the lawn, I will give you fifty dollars, is typically understood as implying that the speaker will pay only if the lawn is mowed, whereas If you are hungry, there is pizza in the oven implies that pizza is available regardless of the hearers hunger. Large Language Models - LLMs - show human-like performance on many tasks, yet it remains unclear whether they reason like humans. To address this, we conducted a population-matching experiment assessing how twentyfive LLMs compute conditional inferences across four languages, compared to an equal number of humans per language. We find that humans enrich logical reasoning through pragmatic inferences across languages. Model behavior is more variable. Some LLMs perfectly follow the truth-table of conditionals but they ignore pragmatic inferences, while others deviate from the truth-table, adhering to a single interpretation across the board, thus reflecting accurate rule-based processing but not human-like reasoning. Overall, LLMs are accurate semantic operators, but fail to capture the pragmatic enrichments characteristic of human reasoning. Crucially, LLM accuracy is neither predicted nor boosted by open vs. closed status, training orientation, or architecture type, suggesting that pragmatic reasoning is still an emerging ability in the cognitive toolkit of artificial systems.

A major question in cognitive modeling concerns the behavioral alignment between large language models and humans across linguistic and non-linguistic tasks. Unlike standard LLMs, large reasoning models (LRMs) are optimized with reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards, encouraging correct solutions to reasoning tasks rather than preference-aligned responses. Recent work (de Varda et al., 2025) investigates the cost of thinking in humans and LRMs by comparing human reaction times with model reasoning traces across a range of reasoning tasks. We isolate this alignment by turning to abductive reasoning: unlike deductive tasks, its difficulty cannot be inferred from formal structure and offers no shortcuts a model could exploit to mimic effort without genuine search, providing firmer ground for empirical claims of shared effort. We find further evidence of alignment between LRM and human reasoning effort, as well as evidence that models and humans tend to make similar errors. Finally, we show that decoding methods that let models explore multiple reasoning paths increase alignment in reasoning cost between humans and LRMs across the three models tested.