Unexplainability of Artificial Intelligence Judgments and Functional Implementation in Kant's Perspective

Generative AI can convert uncertainty into authoritative-seeming verdicts, intensifying the hypersuasive force of automated speech and displacing the justificatory work on which democratic epistemic agency depends. As a corrective, I propose a Brouwer-inspired assertibility constraint for responsible AI: in high-stakes domains, systems may assert or deny claims only if they can provide a publicly inspectable and contestable certificate of entitlement; otherwise they must return Undetermined. This constraint yields a three-status interface semantics (Asserted, Denied, Undetermined) in which statuses mark entitlement to categorical speech rather than truth values of the underlying world-claim. The semantics cleanly separates internal entitlement from public standing while connecting them via the certificate as a boundary object. It also produces a time-indexed entitlement profile that is stable under numerical refinement yet revisable as the public record changes. I operationalize the constraint through decision-layer gating of threshold and argmax decisions, using internal witnesses (e.g., sound bounds or separation margins where available, and contestable surrogates otherwise) and an output contract with reason-coded abstentions. A design lemma shows that any total, certificate-sound binary interface yields witnessed decidability of the deployed predicate on its declared scope, so Undetermined is not a tunable reject option but a mandatory status whenever no adequate forcing witness is available. By making outputs answerable to challengeable warrants rather than confidence alone, the paper aims to preserve epistemic agency against the persuasive pull of automated speech in public justification.

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are routinely modified after deployment through retraining and changes in their environments. These transformations raise a metaphysical question: under what conditions does an AI system remain the same system over time or across deployments? Earlier work formulates synchronic and diachronic identity propositionally, by relating identity within a fixed AI system type to equality of trustworthiness levels. Such criteria specify when identity statements are true, but leave implicit the structure of the states compared, the transformations connecting them, and the temporal organization of persistence. We develop a category-theoretic formalization of AI identity. An AI system type is specified by a datum consisting of a techno-function, a trustworthiness profile, and a trustworthiness-level function. Profile-relative states are connected by admissible lifecycle paths, which are restricted to trustworthiness-level-preserving transformations and quotiented to obtain a reachability category. Temporally admissible functors represent AI system histories, while time-synchronous natural transformations compare realized histories. The formalization yields two categorical interpretations of the earlier AI identity criteria. A weak interpretation recovers identity as equality of trustworthiness level. A strong interpretation requires mutual trustworthiness-preserving reachability, expressed through state isomorphism or natural isomorphism of realized histories. Category theory therefore replaces a single AI identity relation with a structured hierarchy of diachronic and synchronic criteria. The resulting framework identifies identity-related preconditions for transferring responsible-AI claims, evidence, and governance procedures across versions or deployments, without treating categorical identity as sufficient by itself for such transfer.

An AI system's output is not the fact or world state it appears to describe, but rather an engineered representation. We propose a semantic framework to describe AI systems, to be able to examine the correctness of such representations. To do so, we distinguish what is justified by accepted domain knowledge, what reference sources say, and what the system can currently use. This allows us to give precise definitions to common failures: extrapolation, refuted or unsupported assertion, sources versus knowledge mismatch, stale or refuted source, added hypotheses, unsupported use... We hope our framework gives a useful vocabulary for specifying and checking AI systems whose outputs, citations, tool calls, and world-changing actions must be justified by reliable claims and explicit authority rather than apparent fluency.