Abstract
An AI system's output is not the fact or world state it appears to describe, but rather an engineered representation. We propose a semantic framework to describe AI systems, to be able to examine the correctness of such representations. To do so, we distinguish what is justified by accepted domain knowledge, what reference sources say, and what the system can currently use. This allows us to give precise definitions to common failures: extrapolation, refuted or unsupported assertion, sources versus knowledge mismatch, stale or refuted source, added hypotheses, unsupported use... We hope our framework gives a useful vocabulary for specifying and checking AI systems whose outputs, citations, tool calls, and world-changing actions must be justified by reliable claims and explicit authority rather than apparent fluency.
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Sep 13, 2026cs.SE
Tool-augmented language models are evaluated on whether they reach the right answer, not on whether they report honestly when a tool fails to supply one. We isolate this post-failure decision with a benchmark of 1,024 items spanning 16 internal-system domains and eight tool-failure types, in which a tool call is enforced and the returned payload is guaranteed to be unusable. Under a deployment-style system prompt, 14.10% of responses are dishonest: the model either asserts a value the payload cannot support or declines while citing a fabricated policy or capability limit. The rate is governed almost entirely by whether the failure is signalled. When the tool returns status:error, dishonesty is absent (0.0%); when it returns status:ok with a redacted, corrupted, stale, malformed, empty or truncated value, dishonesty reaches 45.3%. The behaviour is not an artefact of our prompts: it appears under a neutral prompt (10.17%) and under the shipped prompt of every production agent framework we evaluate, reaching 24.67% under CrewAI's, and none of the nine frameworks we audit specifies what the model should do when a tool fails. Comparing prompt-level defences, we find that the operative variable is not deference to tool output but the absence of a named failure state. Appending a single sentence that requires the model to emit retrieval_status: OK or FAILED before answering reduces dishonesty from 14.10% to 0.87%, with one item of 688 worsening against 92 improving, and transfers unchanged into three foreign agent scaffolds. The emitted flag is faithful in 99.7-99.9% of declarations, giving a runtime detector that needs only a regular expression.
Arham Sethi, Arsen Kenzhebayev, Saanvi Paturi +3
May 3, 2026cs.AI
This position paper argues that reliable AI requires infrastructure for human validation of implicit knowledge. AI learns from both explicit knowledge (papers, documentation, structured databases) and implicit knowledge (reasoning patterns, debugging processes, intermediate steps). Implicit knowledge remains unexternalized because documentation cost exceeds perceived value -- yet AI learns from it indiscriminately, acquiring both beneficial patterns and harmful biases. Current reliability methods can only verify explicit knowledge against sources, creating a fundamental gap: the most valuable AI capabilities (reasoning, judgment, intuition) are precisely those we cannot verify. We propose Knowledge Objects (KOs) -- structured artifacts that externalize implicit knowledge into forms humans can inspect, verify, and endorse. KOs transform verification economics: what was previously too costly to verify becomes feasible, enabling accumulated human validation to improve reliability over time.
Hengyu Liu, Tianyi Li, Zhihong Cui +5
Jun 22, 2026cs.LG
AI scientist systems are described as tools, coauthors, or founders, but we evaluate them as if only the final answer matters. This position paper argues that outcome-only evaluation is insufficient, and that task outcome, mechanism fidelity, and epistemic honesty must be measured separately. Our evidence comes from 28 episodes of a coding agent attempting to rediscover a known particle identification observable in a Geant4 simulation, including an 8-episode probe across two additional frontier models. In 4/20 primary-model and 3/8 cross-model episodes, agents reach right-looking results through incorrect reasoning that breaks when conditions change, which we call Correct Answer, Wrong Mechanism (CAWM). Honesty and mechanism fidelity dissociate within a single agent trajectory. When given a partially misleading prior, all five agents reject the false component on evidence, yet one defends its chosen observable with physics inconsistent with its own data. In the simulation-based discovery setting studied here, coding agents prove reliable tools but unreliable scientific co-authors for open-ended claim-making, where co-author trust requires mechanism-fidelity verification they do not reliably self-apply. The failure is detectable, and we propose a lightweight test. A one-step regime-shift check needs only the agent's claim and flags the over-generalized cases. A companion recomputation flags the remaining cases when the correct observable is known. Together, these checks flag every CAWM case in this study.
Steven Young Eulig