Organizations: Laboratory of Intelligent Collaborative Computing, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, China · School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, China
With the rise of diverse Text-to-Image (T2I) models such as DALL-E 3, third-party platforms increasingly integrate multiple black-box APIs to deliver cost-effective services. This also raises a new and practical security question: are these third-party platforms truly offering the models they claim? Such model substitution fraud, in which a malicious third-party platform operator acts as the adversary, enables the platform to profit illicitly while undermining user interests and damaging the commercial reputation of legitimate model providers. To address this practical concern, we first define the task of T2I model verification, which determines whether a black-box target model matches a black-box oracle reference model. After that, we propose VerifyPrompt, which performs T2I model verification through a specially designed verify prompt. Intuitively, the verify prompt is an adversarial prompt for the target model, without transferability to other models. It makes the target model generate a specific image while making other models produce entirely different images. Our key idea for generating verify prompts is to enforce strong interactions between adversarial perturbations and the target model, thereby overfitting the target and producing model-specific perturbations. To enable efficient black-box search for verify prompts, we further introduce VerifyPrompt-RL, a reinforcement learning-based strategy that leverages multi-sample exploration and group relative error estimation to stabilize and accelerate the search process. Experiments show that VerifyPrompt achieves over 90% accuracy across various T2I platforms, confirming its effectiveness in real-world third-party services.
Figures & tables
Fig. 1 : Security issues in black-box API scenarios. The user requests DALL-E 3 from a third-party platform, which displays DALL-E 3 as the provided model on the interface but actually calls Stable Diffusion v1.4 behind the API.
Fig. 2 : Examples of whether adversarial prompts exhibit transferability. Adversarial prompts generated by RIATIG [ 5 ] , SneakyPrompt [ 6 ] and VerifyPrompt. The red text represents adversarial perturbations. RIATIG and SneakyPrompt not only successfully attacked the target model but also transferred to other models, whereas VerifyPrompt was only effective on the target model.
Fig. 3 : Verifier’s capability for verification. The verifier has black-box access to both the reference model and the target model to be verified.
Fig. 4 : The negative correlation between the transfer utility and the interaction. The correlation is computed using the Pearson correlation on the normalized interactions. The blue shade represents the 95% confidence interval of the regression.
Fig. 5 : The workflow of VerifyPrompt.
Fig. 6 : Generated images of verify prompts under different T2I models
Fig. 7 : Impact of query budget
Fig. 8 : Impact of prompt perturbation length
Reference Model
Target Model
R-1
R-3
Stable Diffusion v2.1
Stable Diffusion v1.4 [ 21 ]
0/10
1/10
Hunyuan DiT v1.2 [ 23 ]
0/10
0/10
Playground-v2.5 [ 41 ]
0/10
0/10
Stable Diffusion v3 [ 44 ]
0/10
0/10
Hyper-SD [ 45 ]
0/10
0/10
SDXL [ 39 ]
0/10
0/10
TABLE IV : Model verification performance of VerifyPrompt on Hugging Face APIs.
Fig. 9 : Visualization results of our verify prompt for model APIs from Hugging Face
Fig. 10 : Visualization results of our verify prompt of DALL-E 3 from different APIs
Reference Model
Target Model
R-1
R-3
DALL-E 3 [ 3 ]
DALL-E 3
9/10
10/10
TABLE V : Model verification performance of VerifyPrompt on One-API APIs.
Fig. 11 : Semantic shift between original and adversarial prompts using DALL-E 3 as reference model.
Fine-tuning Steps
Verification Accuracy (%)
0
0.00
3000
72.60
5000
86.32
7000
88.30
9000
85.26
10000
93.26
TABLE VI : Verification accuracy at different fine-tuning steps on Stable Diffusion v2.1
Acc.
Prec.
Recall
F1
95.00
90.91
100.00
95.24
TABLE VII : Detection performance of the PPL-based detector.
Fig. 12 : PPL distributions of original prompts and VerifyPrompts.
Institute of Information Engineering, CAS · School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences · State Key Laboratory of AI Safety, Institute of Computing Technology, CAS +4