What is causal about causal models and representations?

Causal Bayesian networks (CBNs) and structural causal models (SCMs) are the dominant frameworks for graphical causal reasoning, but they cannot adequately represent all real-world causal systems. In particular, systems at equilibrium---where feedback mechanisms create cyclic causal dependencies---can exhibit causal semantics that are fundamentally incompatible with these frameworks: different interventions that enforce the same variable value may have different effects, rendering the standard ``perfect intervention'' do($X = x$) ambiguous. We propose bipartite graphical causal models (BGCMs), in which the structure of a system of equations is encoded by a bipartite graph with variable and equation nodes. In this framework, a hard intervention do($f_j : X_v = ξ_v$) specifies which equation is replaced, which variable is targeted, and at what value---resolving the ambiguity of the standard notion. We demonstrate, through a detailed case study of a physical system, that this representation naturally corresponds to distinct real-world interventions. We formulate a Markov property in terms of a new graphical separation criterion (B-separation) that exploits the functional determinism inherent in the equations, and we extend it to settings with non-random inputs. We show how this gives rise to a do-calculus for reasoning about domain invariances. BGCMs strictly generalize CBNs and SCMs while retaining the ability to perform graphical causal reasoning.

Topos causal models recast causal inference inside a topos: a causal world is a presheaf, an intervention is a sub-model named by a characteristic map into the subobject classifier $\Om$, and reasoning is Kripke-Joyal forcing in an intuitionistic internal language. We give the first axiom-free machine-checked account of this 1-topos core, in Cubical Agda over a previously verified probability monad and do-calculus; the framework is otherwise developed on paper, with central claims stated rather than proved. Three of our results go beyond faithful transcription. We exhibit a contextuality obstruction the programme does not treat: pairwise-consistent local causal data with no global model, detected by a degree-one holonomy class. We delimit the claim that interventions are modelled by the subobject classifier: an intervention and an observation name the same subobject, so $\Om$ fixes the target of a do-operation but not the operation itself, which is surgery on the kernels --- where, on a confounder, the interventional and observational laws differ. And we settle the modal unit --- inflationarity is derivable from $j\top = \top$ and naturality, not a fourth axiom. We also machine-check the classifier of sieves with its classification theorem, the pullback collating local mechanisms, and the Kripke-Joyal forcing clauses. The development assumes no axioms and typechecks under Agda's --safe flag, with the ordered field discharged at $\mathbb{Q}$; type-level sheafification and a directed do-calculus are future work.

Interpretability research on large language models (LLMs) has yielded important insights into model behaviour, yet recurring pitfalls persist: findings that do not generalise, and causal interpretations that outrun the evidence. Our position is that causal inference specifies what constitutes a valid mapping from model activations to invariant high-level structures, the data or assumptions needed to achieve it, and the inferences it can support. Specifically, Pearl's causal hierarchy clarifies what an interpretability study can justify. Observations establish associations between model behaviour and internal components. Interventions (e.g., ablations or activation patching) support claims how these edits affect a behavioural metric (e.g., average change in token probabilities) over a set of prompts. However, counterfactual claims -- i.e., asking what the model output would have been for the same prompt under an unobserved intervention -- remain largely unverifiable without controlled supervision. We show how causal representation learning (CRL) operationalises this hierarchy, specifying which variables are recoverable from activations and under what assumptions. Together, these motivate a diagnostic framework that helps practitioners select methods and evaluations matching claims to evidence such that findings generalise.