SAEs Can Improve Unlearning: Dynamic Sparse Autoencoder Guardrails for Precision Unlearning in LLMs

Machine unlearning in Large Language Models (LLMs) faces a critical trade-off between erasing target knowledge and preserving general utility. We propose SAUL (Sharpness-Aware Augmented-Lagrangian Unlearning), which formulates unlearning as a constrained minimization problem following the principle of "forget enough, but no more than necessary." At its core, SAUL formulates forgetting as an explicit constraint with a prescribed satisfaction criterion, whereas prior unlearning methods typically specify the desired level of forgetting implicitly through optimization objectives. An augmented Lagrangian controller adaptively adjusts forget-side pressure according to constraint violation and can eventually deactivate the forget-side update as the prescribed criterion remains satisfied. Sharpness-aware updates on both retain and forget objectives, together with a dual-optimizer design that maintains role-separated states, further stabilize the resulting unlearning dynamics. We evaluate SAUL on the TOFU, WMDP, and MUSE benchmarks, demonstrating favorable forgetting-utility trade-offs over representative sharpness- and perturbation-based baselines under benchmark-specific forgetting criteria. Beyond the complete SAUL framework, we further show on TOFU that applying the augmented-Lagrangian controller as a drop-in modifier to representative baselines improves their post-forgetting utility, demonstrating the practical value of explicit forgetting control.

Large Language Model (LLM) unlearning aims to remove undesirable knowledge or behaviors while preserving retained capabilities. Current unlearning methods all involve a trade-off between unlearning and retention. We have found that the retention activation bias can also be used to quantify the damage an unlearning method inflicts on retention, without considering the specific implementation of the unlearning process. This allows us to restore retention performance for any unlearning method using a post-hoc approach. Therefore, we propose a complementary post-hoc setting to sanitize the final update vector without rerunning the original unlearning pipeline. In this setting, we design SAGE, Spectral Activation-GEometry Sanitization, a source-agnostic correction for final unlearning updates. SAGE collects real module inputs from a small retain proxy, extracts their dominant activation geometry, and solves a source-anchored optimization objective in closed form, which suppresses update components aligned with high-energy retained directions while preserving the source method's forgetting carrier. Across multiple unlearning methods, model scales, and benchmarks, SAGE consistently relieves the retain-forget trade-off, identifying post-hoc sanitization of final vectors as a practical and underexplored axis for machine unlearning.

Machine unlearning aims to remove specific knowledge from a trained large language model (LLM) without retraining from scratch. Existing methods modify model weights via gradient ascent and its advances. While effective on certain benchmarks, these weight-based approaches exhibit a sharp forget-utility trade-off, where stronger forgetting of target knowledge can degrade model utility, and unlearned knowledge may reappear under post-unlearning fine-tuning or prompt attacks. We propose ARIA (autoencoder-gated inference-time unlearning), a test-time unlearning method that leaves model weights intact and gates access to unwanted knowledge only when generation enters a forget-related state. ARIA uses sparse autoencoder (SAE) latents to train a lightweight linear detector, then applies an interpretable intervention on triggered states with negligible test-time overhead. Empirical evaluations on TOFU, R-TOFU, and WMDP show that ARIA improves the forget-retain trade-off over weight-based baselines across both a thinking model (DeepSeek-R1-Distilled-Qwen-1.5B) and an instruction model (Gemma-3-1B-it), e.g., reducing WMDP-cyber forget-set accuracy significantly while keeping MMLU within 1% of the pre-unlearning model. We further introduce three post-unlearning adversarial attacks targeting weight-space and decoding-space recovery, and find that ARIA remains robust under all three, with forgetting changing by less than 1% under attack. A feature-level case study leveraging the interpretability of ARIA suggests that some retain degradation may reflect response styles underlying the unlearning data rather than leakage of the targeted knowledge itself, highlighting a potential source of bias in unlearning task construction.