Popular but Wrong: Understanding and Mitigating LLM Overconfidence through Knowledge Popularity

Prior work has shown that instruction-tuned large language models (LLMs) are less well calibrated than their base pre-trained counterparts. However, little is known about the frequently used chat template's effect on the calibration of conversational LLMs. In this work, we investigate the mechanisms driving this miscalibration by decoupling the effects of the post-training algorithm and the chat format. We find that, while instruction tuning fundamentally harms calibration, the chat template aggravates the issue through an "ownership bias" -- models are significantly more confident in their own answers than in identical answers provided by a user. Extensive experiments across six recent open-weight LLMs, three benchmarks, and three confidence elicitation methods show that models assign up to 26% higher confidence to their own responses. Leveraging this insight, we propose a simple inference-time strategy: framing the model's answer as user input during confidence elicitation. This approach significantly reduces overconfidence and improves calibration by up to 26% without the need for retraining, narrowing the gap between base and instruction-tuned models.

Large language models often express high confidence in answers that are wrong. Standard calibration remedies typically act globally or at the score level, reducing unwarranted confidence but also risking erosion of warranted confidence on correct answers. We introduce Probe-Conditioned Head Intervention (PCHI), an inference-time method that uses a frozen probe to detect likely wrong-but-confident responses and conditionally rescales downstream attention-head outputs during confidence generation. On Qwen3-4B-Instruct solving OpenMathInstruct problems with a structured binary confidence field, readout-token PCHI converts 82.2% of originally wrong-yes confidence readouts to $\texttt{no}$, while a joint intervention across upstream confidence-template tokens reduces ECE from 21.9% to 9.2% and damages only 5.1% of originally correct-yes readouts. The readout-token effect also appears on Gemma3-4B, though upstream interventions are weaker and more mask-dependent. These results show that verbalized overconfidence can be selectively reduced through conditionally applied internal intervention, partially decoupling the suppression of unwarranted confidence from the loss of warranted confidence.

Humans naturally form and express beliefs in daily communication, e.g., "I think the answer is 3" or "I suppose that's right." Such beliefs inevitably intertwine with fact and knowledge, making the ability to handle them in tandem desirable for large language models (LLMs), as they are increasingly deployed in user-facing settings. Prior work showed that even capable LLMs exhibit a systemic weakness in acknowledging user beliefs grounded in incorrect information. We extend this evaluation to 10 LLMs across 18 epistemic expressions and find that the size and direction of this weakness depend on the verb used to express the belief, with the accuracy gap between factual and false information ranging from +50% on "I vaguely remember" to -14% on "I seriously doubt". We further show that the phenomenon stems from what we call task confusion: models default to fact-checking the underlying claim, overriding the user's stated belief. We provide evidence where chains of thought that explicitly fact-check show lower accuracy on false information than those that do not, and a single instruction can reverse the failure across verb families. Mechanistically, models attend more to false beliefs they fail to confirm, but suppressing this attention at decoding time recovers accuracy only partially and only in some models, calling for future work on intervention methods. Our findings clarify prior results and show how fact-checking, a generally desirable behavior, can interfere with belief tracking in LLMs.