On the Existence of Consistent Adversarial Attacks in High-Dimensional Linear Classification

The vulnerability of ML models to adversarial examples has recently emerged as a major concern. While adversarial training is one of the most effective countermeasures to this issue, its high computational cost remains an obstacle to practical deployment. Recent progress in reducing this cost has relied, in the case of linear models, on a formal equivalence between the adversarial risk and a simpler form of regularized risk. This enabled significantly more efficient training procedures, which naturally raises the question of whether such an equivalence can be extended beyond linear models. In this work, we formally show that no such equivalence is possible for two-layer networks. Our proofs proceed via a reduction to key properties that fundamentally separate the adversarial risk from any simple regularized risk which would only exhibit a weak form of data dependence. Beyond this setting, we provide empirical evidence on Wide-ResNets indicating that the same type of impossibility persists in deeper and more expressive architectures.

Several theoretical works have tried to explain the adversarial vulnerability of deep neural networks through properties of high-dimensional geometry. However, the assumptions underlying these works are rarely examined empirically, and systematic evidence remains limited. In this work, we present a systematic study of the role of input dimensionality in both the emergence and the targeted control of adversarial examples. We first analyse the scope and limitations of existing theoretical frameworks based on concentration of measure, showing that real image classes exhibit strong empirical localization, beyond what such theories typically assume. We then conduct an extensive empirical evaluation across hierarchical image datasets spanning a wide range of input dimensionalities and diverse neural architectures. Our results consistently show that adversarial examples become easier to construct as dimensionality increases. We also investigate how input dimensionality affects the additional difficulty of crafting targeted adversarial examples. In particular, we provide theoretical arguments showing that high-dimensional geometry implies that enforcing a specific target label entails only a limited additional distortion compared to untargeted attacks. We corroborate this insight through extensive experiments, demonstrating that the gap between targeted and untargeted perturbations remains small and further narrows as input dimensionality increases. While, taken together, our findings establish high input dimensionality as a fundamental factor underlying the emergence and targeted control of adversarial examples, whether this phenomenon primarily arises from the interplay between high-dimensional geometry and data distributions or from the architectural properties of deep neural networks remains an open question.

We study norm-constrained linear classification under Eu clidean adversarial perturbations in a Gaussian model with a low-dimen sional informative subspace and an independent noise tail. For bounded ramp loss, we prove that a principal-space witness with risk below one half forces every near-optimal predictor to have small tail weight. A path-specific density bound yields constants without requiring positive tail variance. Under isotropic principal covariance, we establish a unique population minimizer and joint local growth. Boundary normalization then removes the common attack penalty from centered margins, giving localized finite-sample guarantees governed by principal dimension and total tail energy. Globalized growth removes the entrance condition at weaker constants; a model-aware comparison retains local guarantees. Experiments with twenty paired repetitions show decreasing excess risk and tail use with sample size, and nearly unchanged behavior when tail dimension grows at fixed total energy. Pure-noise controls and optimizer diagnostics clarify the scope and limitations of these conclusions.