Tuning without Peeking: Provable Generalization Bounds and Robust LLM Post-Training

Optimization of LLM training and inference configurations, such as hyperparameters, data mixtures, and prompts, is critical to performance, but it is often approached heuristically in practice, leading to potentially suboptimal outcomes. By framing them as noisy, expensive, and derivative-free optimization problems, Bayesian optimization (BO) and other black-box optimization (BBO) methods offer a promising yet underexplored direction for principled, sample-efficient methods. However, LLM training and inference costs are prohibitively high for most of the BBO research community, and new methods are often only evaluated on synthetic test functions and small-scale datasets that fail to capture the challenges of modern LLM optimization problems. This impedes the development of BBO methods and makes it difficult to assess their effectiveness on modern LLM tasks. We introduce BoLT, the first LLM-centric benchmark that democratizes LLM research for the BBO community. BoLT is released at https://github.com/chewwt/bolt. BoLT covers broad and well-motivated LLM optimization problems, involving multi-fidelity, multi-objective, heteroscedastic noise, and high-dimensional search spaces. Each problem in BoLT is grounded in real experimental data and made fully reproducible and accessible through lightweight surrogate models fitted to the results of thousands of real LLM experiments. We benchmark BoLT against an extensive range of BO and BBO methods, showing that selected BO methods consistently outperform others across tasks and highlighting gaps in existing BBO methods on LLM tasks, underscoring the need to modernize benchmarks for the BBO community.

Large Language Models are increasingly trained on proprietary or sensitive data, from private healthcare and financial records to user conversations containing secrets. Ensuring the privacy of such data against extraction attacks has become a central concern. In this paper, we ask whether an attacker who can poison a portion of the training data can facilitate the leakage of a separate target record they have no access to. We answer in the affirmative and show that such leakage can be induced by a poisoning mechanism that reshapes the model's local loss landscape around the target completion. Our key insight is that poisoning to create a sharp loss minimum at the target, surrounded by elevated loss on nearby alternatives, forces the model to memorize the target as the unique low-loss solution in its neighborhood. The attack requires no architectural changes, and generalizes across centralized and federated learning settings. We demonstrate that the attack amplifies privacy leakage across language (up to 100% successful extraction), and vision-language models (up 90% successful extraction). We show that the attack is thwarted when the model is trained to be differentially private. However, we introduce a new attack that directly probes the loss landscape bypassing even differential privacy defenses.

LLM post-training proceeds through multiple stages, e.g., supervised fine-tuning (SFT) followed by reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) or direct preference optimization (DPO), where each stage draws data from different, potentially untrusted sources. Existing literature assumes data poisoning attacks may occur at each training stage, but neglects the possibility of multiple attackers. To study the trustworthiness of the entire post-training pipeline, we propose the threat model of sequential data poisoning, where multiple adversaries separately poison the SFT and preference datasets. Under this threat model, we identify the single-attacker illusion: each adversary, evaluated in isolation, appears to pose a negligible threat. Yet when adversaries collaborate across stages, the true vulnerability is revealed. In the SFT $\to$ DPO pipeline, their contributions are additive: splitting a fixed poison budget across stages outperforms concentrating it in either stage alone. In the SFT $\to$ PPO pipeline, their contributions are complementary: neither SFT nor reward model poisoning succeeds individually, yet their combination does. These findings show that security analyses of individual post-training stages systematically underestimate compound vulnerabilities that emerge only from their interaction. Code is available at https://github.com/jcksanderson/sequential-poisoning.