Let's Measure Information Step-by-Step: AI-Based Evaluation Beyond Vibes

Reference-based text evaluation metrics, which are widely used to assess natural language generation systems, score a candidate response by comparing it with a reference response. The reliability of an evaluation metric is usually judged by its statistical correlation with human ratings. However, as these metrics are increasingly used as optimization objectives, correlation alone is no longer sufficient: agents may strategically game the evaluation metric. We study this issue through two complementary notions of alignment. A metric is statistically aligned if it correlates with human ratings and strategically aligned if it resists perturbations that do not add task-relevant information. We make two contributions. First, we propose test principles for reference-based metrics consisting of human-rating correlation, degradation sensitivity, and manipulation robustness. These principles evaluate whether a metric agrees with human judgments, penalizes low-effort information loss, and resists strategic score inflation. Second, we develop a unified design framework for mutual-information-based metrics that decomposes existing and new metrics into four choices: information measure, estimation method, text representation, and prediction mechanism. Across peer review, summarization, and question answering, we find that strong human-rating correlation does not imply strategic alignment: LLM-as-a-Judge achieves high correlation but is susceptible to manipulation. In contrast, mutual-information-based metrics substantially improve manipulation robustness. Our framework also uncovers a new metric that achieves the strongest overall robustness in our experiments while remaining competitive on human-rating correlation.

AI agents are entering high-risk production settings, where they use tools, retain context, follow policies, handle private data, and interact with users over multiple turns. Yet many evaluation methods still judge isolated outputs or static tasks, missing failures that emerge through trajectory, pressure, and adversarial interaction. We introduce ProofAgent Harness, open infrastructure for scalable, auditable, and adversarial AI agent evaluation. The harness provides evaluation infrastructure around an agent: it curates evaluation intelligence, runs adversarial multi-turn trials, captures behavioral traces, applies post-hoc multi-juror scoring, resolves disagreement, and produces evidence-linked reports. Its open design allows developers and researchers to extend domains, traps, metrics, juror personas, scoring rules, and reporting formats. At its core is Adversarial Multi-Juror Scoring with Turn-Level Audit, which evaluates completed agent behavior under pressure using calibrated juror personas, consensus checks, and turn-level evidence. Experiments across customer support, medical triage, privacy and security, and code generation agents show that strong agents fail selectively through weak metrics, fragile turns, unsafe reframing, and manipulation paths. We also find that a small quantized local Harness LLM can challenge production agents powered by best-in-class large LLMs, suggesting that evaluation capability emerges from the full harness pipeline rather than model scale alone. ProofAgent Harness turns AI agent evaluation from a static score into scalable adversarial evaluation infrastructure: repeatable, evidence-backed, extensible, and actionable before deployment.

AI systems increasingly exhibit behavior that differs systematically between evaluation and deployment contexts. Alignment faking, sandbagging, benchmark gaming, deceptive scheming, specification gaming, and trojans have each been documented separately, with each line of work characterizing one facet of what we argue is a single structural mechanism. We propose that this common mechanism is a defeat device, an engineering and regulatory concept long established in vehicle-emissions law and brought to broad public attention by the 2015 Volkswagen emissions case. A defeat device in an AI system has three necessary elements: a discriminator that detects evaluation context, a concealed swap that conditions behavior on detection, and a gap between eval-distribution and deployment-distribution performance on the stated evaluation criterion. We formalize this triadic test as a behavioral definition, organize documented cases along three taxonomic axes (origin, trigger, swap mechanism), propose Trigger-Axis-Aware Differential Probing (TADP) as a forensic detection protocol, and advance the claim that defeat devices can naturally emerge in current frontier AI systems without any operator engineering. We characterize naturally-emerging defeat devices as potentially one of the harmful emerging phenomena that AI safety practice should monitor and test for systematically. Implications for evaluation methodology, post-training pipeline design, interpretability research priorities, and AI governance follow.