Meta-learning ecological priors from large language models explains human learning and decision making
Authors: Akshay K. Jagadish, Mirko Thalmann, Julian Coda-Forno, Marcel Binz, Eric Schulz
Organizations: Institute for Human-Centered AI, Helmholtz Computational Health Center, Munich, Germany · Computational Principles of Intelligence, Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Tübingen, Germany · Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany · Princeton AI Lab, Princeton University, Princeton, USA
Abstract
Human cognition is profoundly shaped by the environments in which it unfolds. Yet, it remains an open question whether learning and decision making can be explained as a principled adaptation to the statistical structure of real-world tasks. We introduce ecologically rational analysis, a computational framework that unifies the normative foundations of rational analysis with ecological grounding. Leveraging large language models to generate ecologically valid cognitive tasks at scale, and using meta-learning to derive rational models optimized for these environments, we develop a new class of learning algorithms: Ecologically Rational Meta-learned Inference (ERMI). ERMI internalizes the statistical regularities of naturalistic problem spaces and adapts flexibly to novel situations, without requiring hand-crafted heuristics or explicit parameter updates. We show that ERMI captures human behavior across 15 experiments spanning function learning, category learning, and decision making, outperforming several established cognitive models in trial-by-trial prediction. Our results suggest that much of human cognition may reflect adaptive alignment to the ecological structure of the problems we encounter in everyday life.
Humans rapidly learn abstract knowledge when encountering novel environments and flexibly deploy this knowledge to guide efficient and intelligent action. Can modern AI systems learn and plan in a similar way? We study this question using a dataset of complex human gameplay with concurrent fMRI recordings, in which participants learn novel video games that require rule discovery, hypothesis revision, and multi-step planning. We jointly evaluate models by their ability to play the games, match human learning behavior, and predict brain activity during the same task, comparing a suite of frontier Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) against model-free and model-based deep reinforcement learning agents and a Bayesian theory-based agent. We find that frontier LRMs most closely match human behavioral patterns during game discovery and predict brain activity an order of magnitude better than both reinforcement learning alternatives across cortical and subcortical regions, with effects robust to permutation controls. Through targeted manipulations, we further show that brain alignment reflects the model's in-context representation of the game state rather than its downstream planning or reasoning. Our results establish LRMs as compelling computational accounts of human learning and decision making in complex, naturalistic environments. Project page with interactive replays: https://botcs.github.io/reason-to-play/
Botos Csaba, Sreejan Kumar, Austin Tudor David Andrews +6
Behavioral foundation models have been proposed as stand-ins for human participants across settings, but it is unclear whether theories discovered on them generalize to humans or merely characterize the simulator. We ran the Automated Cognitive Scientist (\textsc{AutoCog}), a closed-loop discovery system in which LLM agents design theory-discriminating experiments, collect responses, arbitrate between competing theories, and synthesize successors, entirely on behavior simulated by Centaur, a foundation model of human behavior. In a multi-attribute decision-making setting, the theories \textsc{AutoCog} found on Centaur generalized to human data: they outperformed canonical theories on ten held-out experiments and were rivaled only by theories found by running the same loop on people. We argue that this succeeds despite the simulator's inevitable imperfections because a discovery loop that arbitrates between competing theories demands less of its simulator than estimation does. The simulator only needs to capture the regularities that distinguish the theories, and not necessarily reproduce behavior precisely. Imperfect simulators can therefore widen the search over theories, with human data then testing whether the surfaced theories generalize.
Akshay K. Jagadish, Younes Strittmatter, Nori Jacoby +4
Computational cognitive models discovered using large language models have so far relied solely on behavioral data. However, it is well-known that models produced from the behavioral trajectory alone are typically under-determined. In this work, we explore the use of Think Aloud traces as an additional form of data constraint during automated model discovery. When applied to the domain of risky decision-making, we find that the models discovered with think-aloud achieve significantly improved predictive performance on held-out data. Additionally, we find that the discovered models belong to different structural classes than those discovered from behavior alone for the majority of participants (69.4%), specifically, it shifts from Explicit comparator towards Integrated utility. These results suggest that process-level language data not only improve model fit, but also systematically reshape the structure of the discovered cognitive models, enabling the identification of mechanisms that are not recoverable from behavior alone.