Reason to Play: Behavioral and Brain Alignment Between Frontier LRMs and Human Game Learners

Understanding how humans and artificial intelligence systems predict and plan by interacting with their environment is a fundamental challenge at the intersection of neuroscience and machine learning. Most brain-encoding studies focus on aligning artificial models with brain activity during language comprehension or passive visual processing, while interactive brain-alignment studies have to date been largely limited to reinforcement-learning (RL) agents and theory-based models. To address this gap, we study brain alignment of representative models from two foundation-model families, namely vision-language models (VLMs) and large-action models (LAMs), using fMRI recordings from participants playing naturalistic Atari-style video games. Specifically, we examine how action-focused and reasoning-focused prompts shape model's internal representations and align with fMRI brain activity. First, we find that both VLMs and LAMs exhibit significantly exhibit voxel-wise encoding performance than RL baselines, with the advantage holding even under matched feature dimensionality. Second, prompt-driven gains scale with the cortical processing hierarchy: the largest improvements appear in frontal-parietal and motor-planning regions, while early visual cortex gains roughly half as much. Third, variance partitioning reveals a qualitatively different representational organization: VLM is prompt-symmetric (12.5% unique action vs. 13.6% unique reasoning), whereas LAM is prompt-asymmetric (27% unique action vs. -5% unique reasoning), with the asymmetry strongest in frontal-motor cortex. Together, these results demonstrate that action-specialized fine-tuning reorganizes multimodal representations toward action-relevant neural computations even when whole-brain prediction accuracy is statistically equivalent between VLM and LAM.

Modern reasoning models depend on reasoning data, today sourced from human annotations or distilled from stronger LLMs. However, a rich and largely untapped source of supervision lies in expert systems (e.g., game engines, classical planners, theorem provers), which routinely produce near-optimal actions across diverse domains. But these experts are silent: they commit to an action without writing down the chain of thought (CoT) behind it. Recovering that CoT as natural-language reasoning would distill expert knowledge into a student that generalizes beyond the demonstrated actions. We treat it as a latent variable and study how to recover it from the action alone. Our approach, LeAct (Learning to reason from Actions), optimizes this latent variable: the student samples candidate CoTs for each expert action, and we retain those that measurably improve its own probability of recovering the action. Across imperfect-information games at multiple scales and a simulated robotics benchmark, LeAct reaches the solver's numerical floor on small enumerable games. At larger scale, it is $5\times$ closer to the solver than the strongest expert-iteration baseline. At Flop Hold'em ($\sim 10^9$ infosets), LeAct wins head-to-head by $+60$ mbb/g, and on the robotics probe it is the only training recipe that improves on direct imitation. We present a principled framework and the result: expert systems become a categorically new source of reasoning teachers for foundation models.

A major question in cognitive modeling concerns the behavioral alignment between large language models and humans across linguistic and non-linguistic tasks. Unlike standard LLMs, large reasoning models (LRMs) are optimized with reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards, encouraging correct solutions to reasoning tasks rather than preference-aligned responses. Recent work (de Varda et al., 2025) investigates the cost of thinking in humans and LRMs by comparing human reaction times with model reasoning traces across a range of reasoning tasks. We isolate this alignment by turning to abductive reasoning: unlike deductive tasks, its difficulty cannot be inferred from formal structure and offers no shortcuts a model could exploit to mimic effort without genuine search, providing firmer ground for empirical claims of shared effort. We find further evidence of alignment between LRM and human reasoning effort, as well as evidence that models and humans tend to make similar errors. Finally, we show that decoding methods that let models explore multiple reasoning paths increase alignment in reasoning cost between humans and LRMs across the three models tested.