From Construction to Injection: Edit-Based Fingerprints for Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) are costly intellectual assets that remain exposed to unauthorized redistribution and commercial misuse. Injected fingerprints, i.e., trigger--target pairs embedded in model behavior, offer a practical, black-box-verifiable ownership signal, but existing methods decouple the two stages of the fingerprint life cycle: how a fingerprint is constructed and how it is injected. Existing fingerprinting frameworks suffer from two limitations. Natural-language fingerprints are prone to accidental activation, and garbled fingerprints are easily filtered by perplexity-based detection. Furthermore, decoupling construction from injection leaves the latter unaware of the trigger's linguistic structure, missing the opportunity for targeted optimization. We argue that fingerprint construction should drive injection, and present a unified fingerprinting framework that jointly optimizes both stages. First, LCF constructs code-mixing fingerprints by combining low-resource languages under a semantic-density substitution rule and grammar-biased mixing, yielding triggers whose perplexity sits far below garbled baselines while avoiding the accidental-activation failures of natural-language triggers. Second, LCFEdit injects each fingerprint with a null-space projection derived from high-resource multilingual representations that preserves knowledge, augmented by a cross-lingual alignment step that steers the weight update toward the fingerprint language's representation subspace. This construction-aware injection ensures that the update is linguistically informed and therefore more stable. Extensive evaluations on imperceptibility, detectability, and harmlessness demonstrate persistent ownership verification with negligible impact on utility.

Growing concerns over the theft and misuse of Large Language Models (LLMs) underscore the need for effective fingerprinting to link a model to its original version and detect misuse. We define five essential properties for a successful fingerprint: Transparency, Efficiency, Persistence, Robustness, and Unforgeability. We present a novel fingerprinting framework that provides verifiable proof of ownership while preserving fingerprint integrity. Our approach makes two main contributions. First, a chain and hash technique that cryptographically binds fingerprint prompts to their responses, preventing collisions and enabling irrefutable ownership claims. Second, we address a realistic threat model in which instruction-tuned models' output distribution can be significantly altered through meta-prompts. By incorporating random padding and varied meta-prompt configurations during training, our method maintains robustness even under significant output style changes. Experiments show that our framework securely proves ownership, resists both benign transformations (e.g., fine-tuning) and adversarial fingerprint removal, and extends to fingerprinting LoRA adapters\footnote{We release our code at: https://github.com/microsoft/Chain-Hash.

Large language models (LLMs) are high-value assets that can be derived through redeployment, fine-tuning, quantization, or further alignment. Because deployed LLMs are commonly exposed only through query APIs, ownership verification must often rely on black-box text responses. This setting is difficult: generations are open-ended and can vary across repeated queries, while existing black-box fingerprints rely on signals that are fragile under a final-response interface, including full-text matching, soft behavioral features, or model-specific prompts designed not to transfer. We propose TCF (Targeted Counterfactual Fingerprinting), a black-box LLM fingerprinting framework that converts open-ended generation comparison into constrained-answer targeted counterfactual transfer. TCF restricts each verification query to a finite answer space, reducing the surface-form ambiguity that enters the verification score, and optimizes a prompt perturbation toward a counterfactual target different from the protected model's clean answer on the original prompt. Verification reduces to checking whether the suspect model's parsed final answer matches the recorded target. We introduce the source-model counterfactual margin (SCM), a protected-model-only quantity that certifies the target is unlikely before the perturbation and likely after it; SCM controls target selection, perturbation stopping, and fingerprint filtering. Under explicit derived-preservation and independent-transfer budgets motivated by local behavioral closeness, we derive a target-accuracy gap between derived and independent models. Across four LLM families, TCF achieves an average AUC of 0.9861, improving over TRAP, ProFLingo, and ZeroPrint by 0.07 to 0.19.