Bellman Optimality of Average-Reward Robust Markov Decision Processes with a Constant Gain
Authors: Shengbo Wang, Nian Si
Organizations: Daniel J. Epstein Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Southern California · Department of Industrial Engineering and Decision Analytics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Learning and optimal control under robust Markov decision processes (MDPs) have received increasing attention, yet most existing theory, algorithms, and applications focus on finite-horizon or discounted models. Long-run average-reward formulations, while natural in many operations research and management contexts, remain underexplored. This is primarily because the dynamic programming foundations are technically challenging and only partially understood, with several fundamental questions remaining open. This paper steps toward a general framework for average-reward robust MDPs by analyzing the constant-gain setting. We study the average-reward robust control problem with possible information asymmetries between the controller and an S-rectangular adversary. Our analysis centers on the constant-gain robust Bellman equation, examining both the existence of solutions and their relationship to the optimal average reward. Specifically, we identify when solutions to the robust Bellman equation characterize the optimal average reward and stationary policies, and we provide one-sided weak communication conditions ensuring solutions' existence. These findings expand the dynamic programming theory for average-reward robust MDPs and lay a foundation for robust dynamic decision making under long-run average criteria in operational environments.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: The dynamics of an average-reward robust MDP instance where α∗=α′ . The red and blue arrows represent the dynamics under actions a1 and a2 , respectively.
Figure 2: Transition diagrams for different actions in the example of dynamic service allocation in queuing environments.
Robust average-reward Markov decision processes provide a fundamental framework for long-term performance optimization under uncertainty, and can have optimal long-run rewards that depend on the initial state. This state dependence requires a vector Bellman theory that accounts for both recurrent-class rewards and transition uncertainty. We develop such a theory for finite models with compact, post-action (s,a)-rectangular ambiguity. A gain-first, bias-second optimization principle yields a coupled vector gain-bias system, and every finite solution identifies the optimal robust gain and supplies stationary saddle strategies against history-dependent opponents, simultaneously from all initial states. We further characterize solvability through stationary gain conditions and a uniform bound on canonical transient corrections, and give sufficient conditions that permit distinct recurrent-class gains. The certificates also yield asymptotically affine trajectories of the robust Bellman operator, based on which we design a robust approximately shifted Halpern planning algorithm. Under finite Bellman solvability, the gain estimates and Bellman displacements converge to the optimal gain vector, and every extracted greedy controller is average-optimal after a finite, instance-dependent budget. These results thus connect finite Bellman certificates to undiscounted planning for state-dependent robust average rewards, providing theoretical understandings.
Yue Wang, George Atia
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Central Florida
We study non-rectangular robust Markov decision processes under the average-reward criterion, where the ambiguity set couples transition probabilities across states and the adversary commits to a stationary kernel for the entire horizon. We show that any history-dependent policy achieving sublinear expected regret uniformly over the ambiguity set is robust-optimal, and that the robust value admits a minimax representation as the infimum over the ambiguity set of the classical optimal gains, without requiring any form of rectangularity or robust dynamic programming principle. Under the weak communication assumption, we establish the existence of such policies by converting high-probability regret bounds from the average-reward reinforcement learning literature into the expected-regret criterion. We then introduce a transient-value framework to evaluate finite-time performance of robust optimal policies, proving that average-reward optimality alone can mask arbitrarily poor transients and deriving regret-based lower bounds on transient values. Finally, we construct an epoch-based policy that combines an optimal stationary policy for the worst-case model with an anytime-valid sequential test and an online learning fallback, achieving a constant-order transient value.
Shengbo Wang, Nian Si
Daniel J. Epstein Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Southern California · Department of Industrial Engineering and Decision Analytics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
We propose and study distributionally robust Markov games (DR-MGs) with the average-reward criterion as a crucial framework for multi-agent decision-making under model mismatches and over extended horizons. Under a standard irreducible assumption, we first derive a correspondence between the optimal policies and the solutions of the robust Bellman equation, based on which we further show the existence of a stationary Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game. We further study DR-MGs under a more general weakly communicating setting. We construct a set-valued map based on the constant-gain optimal robust Bellman operator and show that its value is a subset of the best-response policies. We further prove that this map admits a fixed point, which implies the existence of NE. We then design two algorithms, Robust Nash-Iteration and robust TD Descent, with provably convergent guarantees. Finally, we show that the NE under average-reward can be approximated by the ones for the discounted DR-MGs as the discount factor approaches one. Our studies provide a comprehensive theoretical and algorithmic foundation for decision-making in complex, uncertain, and long-running multi-player environments.
Zachary Roch, Yue Wang
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Central Florida, Orlando, Florida, USA. · Department of Computer Science, University of Central Florida, Orlando, Florida, USA.