Large Language Model probabilities cannot reliably distinguish between possible and impossible language

Grammaticality and likelihood are distinct notions in human language. Pretrained language models (LMs), which are probabilistic models of language fitted to maximize corpus likelihood, generate grammatically well-formed text and discriminate well between grammatical and ungrammatical sentences in tightly controlled minimal pairs. However, their string probabilities do not sharply discriminate between grammatical and ungrammatical sentences overall. But do LMs implicitly acquire a grammaticality distinction distinct from string probability? We explore this question through studying internal representations of LMs, by training a linear probe on a dataset of grammatical and (synthetic) ungrammatical sentences obtained by applying perturbations to a naturalistic text corpus. We find that this simple grammaticality probe generalizes to human-curated grammaticality judgment benchmarks and outperforms LM probability-based grammaticality judgments. When applied to semantic plausibility benchmarks, in which both members of a minimal pair are grammatical and differ in only plausibility, the probe however performs worse than string probability. The English-trained probe also exhibits nontrivial cross-lingual generalization, outperforming string probabilities on grammaticality benchmarks in numerous other languages. Additionally, probe scores correlate only weakly with string probabilities. These results collectively suggest that LMs acquire to some extent an implicit grammaticality distinction within their hidden layers.

Whether neural language models (NLMs) possess the ability to distinguish strings on the basis of their grammaticality remains a debated topic in the computational linguistics literature. Existing evidence has largely relied on probability-based measures, testing whether models assign higher probabilities to grammatical than ungrammatical strings. However, probability comparisons have been criticized as a measure for grammatical knowledge based on the assumption that grammaticality is inherently entangled with likelihood. Model-assigned probability is a function of many related sentence properties, such as lexical frequency, plausibility, and world knowledge. In this work, we move beyond probability-based evaluations and investigate whether grammaticality is encoded in the internal representations of NLMs. Using mass-mean probing, we test whether grammatical and ungrammatical sentences are systematically separated in representational space. We further examine the extent to which these representations are independent of sentence properties that are correlated with grammaticality, as well as their generalization across grammatical phenomena and languages. Our results provide evidence that grammaticality is robustly encoded in sentence representations of a wide range of pretrained NLMs, yielding clear representational separation on the dimension of grammaticality that cannot be fully explained by alternative sentence-level factors. Moreover, this encoding generalizes across a broad range of grammatical phenomena and to some degree, across languages, suggesting that grammaticality constitutes a coherent representational dimension in contemporary NLMs. These findings contribute new evidence to debates about the nature of syntactic knowledge in language models and offer a complementary framework for evaluating grammatical competence that is not dependent on string probabilities alone.

Large language models increasingly produce and interpret verbal probability expressions, yet whether these expressions carry consistent meaning across models (or match human perceptions of uncertainty) remains unknown. We present a systematic cross-model evaluation using a word-to-number mapping task grounded in established human benchmarks. Eleven uncertainty expressions were presented to 19 models under two conditions, forced single-number response and explanation elicitation, alongside a novel bidirectional roundtrip test of internal consistency. LLMs track the human benchmark with surprising fidelity: word ordering is preserved, three anchor points are recovered, and possible'' shows the highest variance and cross-model disagreement of any expression tested, consistent with its documented bimodal interpretation in humans. However, models show a systematic upward bias for negative expressions such as unlikely'' and ``improbable.'' Explanation elicitation reduces within-model variance while increasing between-model divergence, stabilizing individual models at the cost of inter-model consensus, and the roundtrip experiment reveals clear stratification, with frontier models maintaining coherent bidirectional representations. LLMs thus reproduce the structure of human verbal probability cognition, including its biases, while diverging systematically at the negative end---with implications for any setting where humans and models exchange probabilistic language.