Uncovering the Computational Ingredients of Human-Like Representations in LLMs
Authors: Zach Studdiford, Timothy T. Rogers, Kushin Mukherjee, Siddharth Suresh
Organizations: University of Wisconsin–Madison · Stanford University
Abstract
The human ability to translate diverse perceptual and linguistic inputs into structured behavior has been thought to rest on learning robust representations of concepts. The rapid advancement of transformer-based large language models (LLMs) has surfaced a diversity of computational ingredients relevant for model building - architectures, fine-tuning methods, and training datasets among others - yet it remains unclear which are most crucial for developing human-like conceptual representations. Further, most current benchmarks are ill-suited to measuring representational alignment, making LLMs' scores on them unreliable for assessing whether they are progressing as cognitive models. We address these limitations by evaluating over 75 models on a triplet similarity task, a method well established in cognitive science for measuring conceptual representations, using concepts from the THINGS database. We find that instruction fine-tuning and larger attention head dimensionality are among the strongest predictors of human alignment, while activation function choice, multimodal pretraining, and parameter size have limited influence on alignment. Correlations between alignment scores and existing benchmark scores reveal that while some benchmarks (e.g., BigBenchHard) better capture representational alignment than others (e.g., MUSR), none fully accounts for the variance in human-model alignment, demonstrating their insufficiency. Taken together, our findings highlight key computational ingredients for advancing LLMs as models of human conceptual representation and address a key gap in LLM evaluation.
Reasoning representations are increasingly used as explanations for large language model outputs. Yet they are typically evaluated with model-centric criteria, such as answer accuracy and faithfulness, leaving it unclear whether they help people evaluate model responses. In this work, we study reasoning representations as human-facing interfaces rather than proxies for model reasoning ability. We conduct a controlled human study of six reasoning formats across tasks of varying complexity, supported by a web-based framework that randomizes task domains, problem instances, and representation order. The study collects fine-grained judgments of structural understanding, error detection and localization, and trust calibration. Our study shows a mismatch between perceived preference and support for human evaluation. Participants prefer planning- and decomposition-based representations, but simpler chain-of-thought traces better support verification, trust, and interpretability. Preferred representations also introduce calibration risks, with more false alarms on correct traces and high trust despite low willingness to verify.
Much work on the cognitive foundations of AI has focussed on comparisons between the ways in which Large Language Models (LLMs) and humans process information and represent it. One aspect of this comparison involves determining the extent to which LLMs can achieve or surpass human performance on a variety of cognitively interesting tasks. A second explores points of convergence and divergence between LLM and human systems for processing information. Here, I consider some recent research that has addressed both issues in two informational domains. The first is the representation of linguistic knowledge. The second is real world reasoning and planning. While LLMs frequently achieve impressive levels of performance and fluency on linguistic applications, they tend to handle linguistic content in ways that are distinct from human processing. They are also, for the most part, less efficient than humans in learning and generalisation for reasoning tasks.
Are large language models (LLMs) bad at capturing human judgment? Two commonly stated limitations are that LLMs fail to capture full distributions of responses, and that their judgments are unstable across wording variations. We demonstrate simple prompting strategies that mitigate these limitations. Across two datasets--a U.S.-representative set of 144 moral scenarios and 38 moral beliefs from the International Social Survey Programme's Family and Changing Gender Roles module covering 32 countries--we show how simple elicitation techniques help improve AI-human alignment. First, prompting models to report standard deviations and response proportions recovers the full range of human responses better than common strategies. Second, ensuring scenarios are clear to human participants--as reflected in human confusion ratings--boosts model alignment, and LLMs can track human confusion ratings. At the same time, we find that LLMs' estimates of their own error are poorly calibrated, though they can predict human variability relatively well. These results suggest that asking better questions to LLMs can yield better answers.