Reinforcement Learning and Consumption-Savings Behavior

Reinforcement learning algorithms are commonly analyzed (and designed) under the Markov assumption. This is unrealistic, as most environments encountered in practice are either partially observable, or require function approximation that restricts the agent to access non-Markovian state features. We consider the problem of learning an optimal reactive policy in a finite environment with deterministic observations (or equivalently, hard state aggregation). We introduce a new algorithm, Committed Q-learning, and prove almost-sure convergence to the optimal reactive policy under an intuitive assumption we call rewire-robustness. This assumption is strictly weaker than the $q_\star$-realizability condition used in prior work. Our algorithm is a variant of classical Q-learning in which the behavior policy commits to a single action upon entering a feature, and only resamples actions when the observed feature changes. A crucial part of our analysis is the introduction of quasi-Markov environments.

In the forward reinforcement-learning problem, the reward is fixed and known; the learner is asked to find a good policy or value function. Here we turn the question around. Given offline data generated by an expert, can we recover the reward the expert was optimizing? This is the inverse reinforcement learning problem, and remarkably, two communities, structural econometricians studying dynamic discrete choice (DDC) and machine learners studying entropy-regularized IRL, have been working on exactly the same probabilistic model under different names. We begin by proving their equivalence. We then develop the classical identification result of Magnac and Thesmar and the classical computational paradigms that grew out of it: Rust's nested fixed-point algorithm, the conditional-choice-probability approach of Hotz and Miller, and the two temporal-difference approaches of Adusumilli and Eckardt: linear semi-gradient TD and approximate value iteration. Each route has its limits: dimensionality, transition-kernel estimation, the deadly triad, or projected fixed-point bias. We then walk through the modern ML/IRL strand: adversarial IRL, occupancy matching, IQ-Learn, and offline ML-IRL, deriving each method's actual objective and stating precisely what it does and does not identify. We close with the empirical-risk-minimization framework of Kang et al., which yields a gradient-based estimator for offline IRL/DDC.

In this paper, we investigate whether a model-free RL agent can identify and exploit price manipulation opportunities more effectively than a traditional model-based approach that assumes correct specification of the data-generating process but relies on noisy parameter estimates. We consider a single-asset market in which prices evolve according to an Almgren-Chriss framework with non-linear permanent impact and linear temporary impact. We first establish the existence of price-manipulative strategies in discrete time and compute the optimal benchmark strategy using Sequential Least Squares Quadratic Programming under full information. We then compare two finite-sample learning approaches: a model-based procedure that estimates impact parameters from simulated execution data and an agnostic RL approach based on Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient, trained directly on the same amount of data. For intermediate volatility, the RL agent successfully discovers profitable manipulative strategies without explicit knowledge of the underlying model, even when training data are quite limited. More importantly, RL consistently outperforms the model-based approach when parameter estimates are affected by sampling error, despite the latter benefiting from the correct model specification. For large volatility, all methods are unable to identify manipulation opportunities, while for small volatility, the model based approach outperforms RL. These findings highlight both the effectiveness of RL in complex control problems and the risks associated with deploying learning algorithms in financial markets without appropriate safeguards.