Predictive benchmarking, evaluating machine learning models based on predictive performance and competitive ranking, is central to machine learning research and scientific inquiry. However, benchmark scores at best measure performance relative to a specific dataset and learning problem. Drawing substantial scientific inferences requires additional assumptions. Adapting ideas from psychological validity theory, we propose validity conditions that make these assumptions explicit. In two case studies---ImageNet and the Fragile Families Challenge---we show how benchmark results can support inferences about research progress and limits of predictability, situating predictive benchmarking as a distinct epistemic practice in machine learning.
An AI benchmark result rarely reaches a consequential claim in one step. Evaluators generalize it to further cases, interpret it as evidence of capability, extrapolate it to new tasks, transport it to another system or site, and combine it with assumptions about human review and downstream consequences. Validity-centred approaches require evidence for each claim. This paper makes explicit and operationalizes a problem those approaches leave to the analyst: warranted links don't automatically make a warranted chain. The target of one study may not be the source of the next; system, population, outcome, or conditions may change at the interface; and shared data or model lineage may make apparently independent support dependent. Projectibility concerns whether a bounded extension from observed to unobserved cases is warranted. Goodman supplies the problem of rival extensions; argument-based validity supplies an architecture for testing them. The contribution is an interface audit for distributed AI evidence: typed source and target descriptions, and a procedure separating endpoints that never meet from endpoints that meet while warrant fails to cross. A legal-research case shows how benchmark evidence and a deployment study can each be sound while remaining parallel. A known-truth demonstration shows why aggregate stability can erase distinctions a later projection requires. The resulting projectibility audit diagnoses unsupported joins in benchmark-to-use arguments.
Predicting LLM's capabilities on real-world tasks is essential, yet the extent to which performance on commonsense benchmarks predicts downstream performance remains underspecified. To establish the practical usability of widely adopted commonsense benchmarks, we evaluate 23 models from six families on four established commonsense benchmarks, four reworked variants, three non-commonsense controls, and eight downstream tasks requiring implicit social, pragmatic, temporal, or physical reasoning. We compare model rankings, compute controlled correlations, and use leave-one-family-out cross-validation to assess the criterion validity of commonsense benchmarks. Our results show that revised benchmarks largely preserve original model rankings and do not improve downstream predictive power. Commonsense benchmarks show consistent cross-family predictive validity for only a narrow subset of downstream tasks, with smaller or metric-specific gains elsewhere. Overall, standardized commonsense benchmarks provide task-dependent rather than broad evidence of downstream commonsense competence.
State-of-the-Art (SOTA) claims pervade Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) research. These claims rest on benchmark evaluations, where models are ranked by aggregate scores across tasks. Public benchmarks or leaderboards are the most visible instance, but the same structure appears in paper tables throughout the literature. However, such minimal evidence often cannot support these strong claims. We identify a widespread claim-evidence gap in AI benchmarking. Claiming SOTA carries implicit assumptions beyond mean score superiority, suggesting that a model meaningfully outperforms alternatives across most tasks. However, a marginal improvement in the mean score merely indicates a top average rank rather than true superiority. Analyzing ten cross-domain benchmarks from public leaderboards, we found that in more than half of top-model comparisons, at least one commonly assumed property of superiority does not hold. These properties include meaningful effect size, consistency across tasks, or robustness to dataset removal. Instead, aggregate gains are frequently driven by outlier datasets. This fragility persists even in benchmarks with many tasks. We argue that claim language should reflect the strength of the underlying evidence. This requires no additional experiments, only honest reporting of what results actually show, enabling more precise and interpretable comparisons across models.
YongKyung Oh
Medical & Imaging Informatics (MII), University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)