HAL: Inducing Human-likeness in LLMs with Alignment
Authors: Masum Hasan, Junjie Zhao, Ehsan Hoque
Organizations: University of Rochester
Abstract
Aligning language models to qualitative behavioral traits, such as human-likeness, remains difficult because they are hard to define, measure, and optimize. As a result, improvements in human-like behavior are largely driven by scale or broad supervised training, rather than targeted alignment. We introduce Human Aligning LLMs (HAL), a framework for aligning language models to conversational human-likeness using an interpretable, data-driven reward. HAL derives explicit conversational traits from contrastive dialogue data, combines them into a compact scalar score, and uses this score as a transparent reward signal for alignment with standard preference optimization methods. Using this approach, we align models of varying sizes without affecting their overall performance. In large-scale Chatbot Arena-style human evaluations, a model aligned with HAL is more frequently perceived as human-like in conversation. Because HAL operates over explicit, interpretable traits, it enables inspection of alignment behavior and diagnosis of unintended effects. More broadly, HAL demonstrates how soft, qualitative properties of language--previously outside the scope for alignment--can be made measurable and aligned in an interpretable and explainable way.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as surrogates for human participants, but it remains unclear which models best capture human behavior and why. To address this, we introduce Psych-201, a novel dataset that enables us to measure behavioral alignment at scale. We find that post-training -- the stage that turns base models into useful assistants -- consistently reduces alignment with human behavior across model families, sizes, and objectives. Moreover, this misalignment widens in newer model generations even as base models continue to improve. Finally, we find that persona-induction -- a popular technique for eliciting human-like behavior by conditioning models on participant-specific information -- does not improve predictions at the level of individuals. Taken together, our results suggest that the very processes that are currently employed to turn LLMs into useful assistants also make them less accurate models of human behavior.
Kahneman & Tversky's prospect theory tells us that humans perceive random variables in a biased but well-defined manner (1992); for example, humans are famously loss-averse. We show that objectives for aligning LLMs with human feedback implicitly incorporate many of these biases -- the success of these objectives (e.g., DPO) over cross-entropy minimization can partly be ascribed to them belonging to a family of loss functions that we call human-aware losses (HALOs). However, the utility functions these methods attribute to humans still differ from those in the prospect theory literature. Using a Kahneman-Tversky model of human utility, we propose a HALO that directly maximizes the utility of generations instead of maximizing the log-likelihood of preferences, as current methods do. We call this approach KTO, and it matches or exceeds the performance of preference-based methods at scales from 1B to 30B, despite only learning from a binary signal of whether an output is desirable. More broadly, our work suggests that there is no one HALO that is universally superior; the best loss depends on the inductive biases most appropriate for a given setting, an oft-overlooked consideration.
Are large language models (LLMs) bad at capturing human judgment? Two commonly stated limitations are that LLMs fail to capture full distributions of responses, and that their judgments are unstable across wording variations. We demonstrate simple prompting strategies that mitigate these limitations. Across two datasets--a U.S.-representative set of 144 moral scenarios and 38 moral beliefs from the International Social Survey Programme's Family and Changing Gender Roles module covering 32 countries--we show how simple elicitation techniques help improve AI-human alignment. First, prompting models to report standard deviations and response proportions recovers the full range of human responses better than common strategies. Second, ensuring scenarios are clear to human participants--as reflected in human confusion ratings--boosts model alignment, and LLMs can track human confusion ratings. At the same time, we find that LLMs' estimates of their own error are poorly calibrated, though they can predict human variability relatively well. These results suggest that asking better questions to LLMs can yield better answers.