Language models used in retrieval-augmented settings must arbitrate between parametric knowledge stored in their weights and contextual information in the prompt. This work presents a mechanistic study of that choice by extracting an \emph{arbitration vector} from model activations on a curated dataset designed to disentangle (i) irrelevant contexts that elicit parametric recall and (ii) relevant but false contexts that elicit copying. The vector is computed as the residual-stream centroid difference between these regimes across 27 relations, and is injected as an additive intervention at selected layers and token spans to steer behavior in two directions: Copy→Recall (suppressing context use) and Recall→Copy (inducing the model to copy any token from the context). Experiments on three architectures (decoder-only and encoder/decoder) and two open-domain QA benchmarks show consistent behavior shifts under moderate scaling while monitoring accuracy and fluency. Mechanistic analyses of attention routing, MLP contributions, and layer-wise probability trajectories reveal an asymmetry: inducing copying is an easy reactivation'' process that can be triggered at different locations in the input, while restoring recall is a suppression'' process that is more fragile and strongly tied to object-token interventions.
We reproduce and stress-test the work of Yu et al. (2023), who characterize how language models (LMs) arbitrate between memorized knowledge and contradictory in-context statements. We replicate their world-capitals experiments on 31 models spanning Pythia, GPT-2, Qwen3, and Ministral families, including base and post-trained variants, and extend evaluations to five additional knowledge relation types from the ParaConflict dataset. We empirically confirm most of their original findings: larger models and higher-frequency entities tend to favor memorized answers, with substantial family-level variance. However, several conclusions do not generalize cleanly: entity-frequency effects disappear on Qwen3-14B and 32B; post-training shifts the memory-context trade-off inconsistently across families; question phrasing alone can change a model's reliance on memorized knowledge by up to 80 percentage points; and semantically unrelated prose can mimic coherent supporting context. Our results clarify where Yu et al.'s claims hold and to what extent they generalize to other prompts.
When contextual information conflicts with the knowledge stored in model parameters, activation directions can be used to decode and steer which source the model follows. However, steering along a direction does not establish causality: whether the unedited model would naturally use that direction or whether the direction is reusable across tasks. We test these distinctions through counterfactual experiments in unambiguous settings. First, we estimate authority directions from agreement prompts, in which the context and parametric knowledge support the same answer. We then interchange naturally occurring coordinates along these directions between matched prompts that direct the model to prioritize either the supplied context or its parametric knowledge. Across Qwen, Llama, and OLMo models, this intervention reproduces 30-68% of the authority-induced shift in source choice, whereas matched controls reproduce almost none. To test cross-task reuse, we learn authority directions on two tasks separately and see that cross-task transferability closes only 9% of the authority gap while the local direction learned on the given task closes 57%. These results distinguish authority representation, causal use, and cross-task causal reuse, and suggest that authority computations may be task-dependent, rather than reusable across tasks.
Large language models that generate step-by-step reasoning traces have achieved strong performance on complex tasks, and extending them to long-context settings has emerged as an important frontier. However, we identify a critical failure mode in this regime: \emph{repetitive copying}, where models extensively copy text from the input into their reasoning traces rather than productively solving the problem. We show that this behavior is pervasive across frontier long-context LLMs and intensifies with context length. By separating each prompt into task-relevant key evidence and irrelevant distractor context, we further show that the root cause is insufficient grounding: models copy from the prompt indiscriminately, and those that fail to focus on key evidence are far more likely to answer incorrectly. Motivated by this diagnosis, we propose GEAR (Grounding Evidence-Aware Reward), a reward shaping method that augments the accuracy signal with a grounding reward for overlap with key evidence and a distractor penalty for overlap with irrelevant context. To enable GEAR on natural-language data, we develop an automated pipeline that constructs evidence-annotated training data from arbitrary documents. We validate GEAR across multiple model scales and benchmarks, showing consistent improvements of up to +4.6 average points over standard RL with accuracy-based rewards, with larger gains at longer contexts, while also reducing repetitive copying and thinking length. Our findings suggest that, even as long-context evaluation shifts from simple retrieval toward complex reasoning, accurate grounding in relevant evidence remains an indispensable capability with substantial room for improvement.