Memory vs. Context? Influential Factors of Factual Recall in Language Models

While scaling laws govern aggregate large language model performance, no scaling law has linked factual recall to both model size and training-data composition. We evaluated 38 models on over 8,900 scholarly references evaluated by an automated reference verification system. Recall quality follows a sigmoid in the log-linear combination of model parameter count and topic representation in training data. These two variables alone explain 60% of the variance across 16 dense models from four families, rising to 74-94% within individual families. The form matches a superposition-inspired account in which recall is gated by a signal-to-noise ratio: signal strength scales with concept frequency and the noise floor with model capacity.

Language models are increasingly being deployed as user simulators, but their memory is far more reliable than that of real users. To measure this gap, we run a series of classic memory experiments from psychology on both humans and language models. Across tasks, we find that out-of-the-box language models exhibit better memory than humans, even when prompted to imitate human behavior. We then show that better prompting strategies and the use of a compactor can cause language models to forget content in a more human-like way. Using these methods, we show preliminary evidence that language models with human-like memory constraints can function as more effective user simulators in a downstream education task. Finally, we release human reference data and benchmarks to support future work on simulating human memory with language models.

Continual learning promises a language model that keeps acquiring knowledge after training, with each new fact written into its weights. Whether weight writes can support accumulation remains undecided. We follow invented facts written into Qwen3 models from creation through sequences of twenty to one hundred later writes, using held-out questions of five types, with the original model given the fact in its prompt as the reference. Across these experiments, the breadth of the training data determines the kind of knowledge created. Bare-statement training produces recitation, while diverse restatements reduce the recitation-to-use gap from 27.4 to 5.4 points without showing the model a conclusion. This difference carries into later writes: after twenty sequential writes, bare-statement facts retain 1% accuracy while facts written from broad study data retain 46%. We also find that facts can be behaviourally forgotten without being erased. Forgotten facts keep most of the log-probability added by their write, and under bare-statement training 70% of wrong answers about them contain the most recently written fact. The same writes barely degrade the model's use of facts in context, and a forgotten study fact supplied in the prompt recovers to 77-80% on its questions. These results describe knowledge that is stored but question-keyed: later writes redirect the questions that reached it. Damage to unrelated abilities tracks KL divergence from the original model, and the later writes cause interference regardless of how the earlier fact was stored. Broad data can create usable knowledge, and a frozen reference can preserve capability, but no intervention we tested, including those built on accurate local measurements of each write, keeps earlier facts reachable. When facts must be composed or survive later writes, the reliable channel is context rather than the weights.