On the Inherent Privacy Amplification of Missing Data

Differential privacy (DP) has become the gold standard for ensuring the privacy protection of machine learning and statistical algorithms in recent decades. A plethora of algorithms and methods have been developed to enhance the utility of DP algorithms while maintaining the same level of DP. However, these are often overly complex or computationally ineffective. We propose a novel approach focusing on denoising the output of the simple additive Gaussian mechanism by adopting the idea of \textit{empirical Bayes estimation}. We highlight that the empirical Bayes approach can reduce the mean-squared error solely by taking the output of the Gaussian mechanism as input. Our numerical studies show that this simple yet powerful approach can be applied to improve upon various statistical problems, including histogram release, principal component analysis, and linear regression, often outperforming existing private algorithms.

Differential privacy (DP) ensures rigorous individual-level privacy guarantees against even the most knowledgeable attackers, but its worst-case nature can impose a costly privacy-accuracy tradeoff. We introduce privacy via predictability, a fine-grained framework that explicitly incorporates the attacker's core knowledge, a compromised portion of the dataset generated by a stochastic process, and a specified family of queries. Predictability measures privacy leakage as the incremental gain in an attacker's ability to predict sensitive information about unknown individuals after observing the algorithm's output, beyond what can already be inferred from the compromised data. We show that predictability and DP are generally incomparable: each can be small while the other is large. However, in the worst-case regime where all but one individual is compromised, and all binary queries are considered sensitive, predictability implies mutual-information DP. More generally, predictability provides a finer-grained privacy metric tailored to specific sensitive information and specific attacker models. We introduce a general framework, using the generalized method of moments (GMM), to analyze asymptotic predictability when the compromised data is generated by a stationary, ergodic, mixing process. Using this analysis, we derive a predictability-calibrated output perturbation scheme for ERM. Our approach is complementary to DP and can be used alongside DP to provide fine-grained privacy control.

Standard differential privacy imposes uniform privacy constraints across all features, overlooking the inherent distinction between sensitive and insensitive features in practice. In this paper, we introduce a relaxed definition of differential privacy that accounts for such heterogeneity, allowing certain features to be treated as insensitive even when correlated with sensitive ones. We propose a correlation-aware framework, $\textsf{CorrDP}$, which relaxes privacy for insensitive features while accounting for their correlations with sensitive features, with the correlations quantified using total variation distance. We design algorithms for differentially private empirical risk minimization (DP-ERM) under the $\textsf{CorrDP}$ framework, incorporating distance-dependent noise into gradients for improved theoretical utility guarantees. When the correlation distance is unknown, we estimate it from the dataset and show that it achieves a comparable privacy-utility guarantee. We perform experiments on synthetic and real-world datasets and show that $\textsf{CorrDP}$-based DP-ERM algorithms consistently outperform the standard DP framework in the presence of insensitive features.