cs.NEFeb 2, 2026

Fine-Tuning Language Models to Know What They Know

Authors: Sangjun Park, Elliot Meyerson, Xin Qiu, Risto Miikkulainen

Organizations: The University of Texas at Austin · Cognizant AI Lab

Abstract

Evaluating true metacognition in Large Language Models (LLMs) is difficult due to biases and heuristics. This paper presents a framework to measure and enhance LLM metacognition while controlling for these biases. A measurement method using the dtype2′d'_{\rm type2} metric is established to isolate metacognitive ability. The Evolution Strategy for Metacognitive Alignment (ESMA) is proposed, demonstrating robust generalization across unseen datasets, languages, and newly acquired knowledge. Gradual parameter updates reveal that these improvements are driven by a sparse set of parameters, opening a potential avenue for targeted metacognitive optimization.

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